In re Burton's Estate

16 Citing cases

  1. In re Estate of McCauley

    101 Ariz. 8 (Ariz. 1966)   Cited 36 times
    Finding evidence of concealment when the challenged will was hidden inside a safe

    In re Day's Estate, 198 Or. 518, 257 P.2d 609 (1953). In re Burton's Estate, 45 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1950). In re Westfall's Estate, 74 Ariz. 181, 245 P.2d 951 (1952).

  2. Reliastar Life Insurance Company v. Moore

    1:CV-08-1942 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2010)

    As the proceeds of the Policy were not property to be administered as part of Budd's estate, the designation of Hatfield-Bingaman as the beneficiary under the Policy did not render her a beneficiary of Budd's estate. See In re Burton's Estate, 20 Pa. D. C. at 566; Estate of Stalnaker, 479 A.2d at 614; Estate of Myers, 544 A.2d at 508-09. Stated otherwise, because the proceeds of the Policy did not pass through the estate, the designation of Hatfield-Bingaman as the Policy beneficiary did not qualify her as a beneficiary of the estate.

  3. Scavella v. School Bd. of Dade County

    363 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1978)   Cited 13 times
    In Scavella, this Court defined its duty as deciding whether the statute at issue denied the appellant any right. 363 So.2d at 1097-98, citing art. I, § 2, Fla. Const. (stating that "[N]o person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or Physical handicap.").

    Upon review, we are to accept all the allegations in the complaint as true. In re Burton's Estate, 45 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1950). In paragraph 9 of the complaint, Jerry Grace alleged that the maximum amount established by the Dade County School Board was "based on an arbitrary formula different from the actual cost of educating the exceptional student."

  4. In re Estate of Whiteside

    258 A.2d 279 (Del. 1969)   Cited 6 times

    Cf. In Re Burton's Estate, 30 Del. Ch. 615, 59 A.2d 278; Wall v. Wall, 123 Pa. 545, 16 A. 598. No provision is found in either Delaware's Constitution or its statutes expressly conferring upon him the right to exercise judicial functions in settling accounts; as to them, he is purely an accounting officer. Bodziak v. Theisen, 4 Terry 487, 50 A.2d 409; Theisen v. Hoey, 29 Del. Ch. 365, 51 A.2d 61. Thus, in the Morrow case, supra, it was held that he had no authority to establish a general rule allowing in accounts "as a debt of the deceased only one-half of the balance of any mortgage owed on property held by the deceased and a surviving spouse as tenants by the entirety."

  5. Sanders v. Sanders

    52 Ariz. 156 (Ariz. 1938)   Cited 19 times

    This court is known as the superior court, and by our Constitution it is expressly given jurisdiction of all cases of law, equity and probate, together with all special proceedings not otherwise provided for. But the Constitution which adopted this system did not thereby abolish the different remedies which previously existed under the common law, equity and the statutes of probate. It merely provided, as was said in Re Burton's Estate, 93 Cal. 459, 29 P. 36, 37: ". . . The superior court, while sitting in matters of probate, is the same as it is while sitting in cases in equity, in cases at law, or in special proceedings; and, when it has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a case falling within either of these classes, it has power to hear and determine, in the mode provided by law, all questions of law and fact, the determination of which is ancillary to a proper judgment in such case.

  6. In re Baxter's Estate

    54 P.2d 869 (Mont. 1936)   Cited 12 times

    The particular phase of the matter now presented has been troublesome in many jurisdictions. The matter arose in the state of California as early as 1892. ( In re Burton's Estate, 93 Cal. 459, 29 P. 36, 37.) There the court said: "The superior court, while sitting in matters of probate, is the same as it is while sitting in cases in equity, in cases at law, or in special proceedings; and, when it has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a case falling within either of these classes, it has power to hear and determine, in the mode provided by law, all questions of law and fact, the determination of which is ancillary to a proper judgment in such case." The court then emphasized the fact that in such a proceeding the superior court was required to follow substantially the mode prescribed by the statute authorizing the proceeding, and called attention to the fact that, although no claim adverse to the estate itself could be entertained, the proceeding did contemplate and include the ownership of grantees of the heirs and all those who were claimants through them, and that the proceedings authorized expressly and necessarily the consideration of the question of title to the property of the

  7. Gravelin v. Porier

    77 Mont. 260 (Mont. 1926)   Cited 36 times
    In Gravelin v. Porier, 77 Mont. 260, 274, 250 P. 823, 826, [15] this court said: "In fact, any act which recognizes the case as in court constitutes a general appearance, and even in the face of a declared contrary intention, a general appearance 'may arise by implication from the defendant seeking, taking, or agreeing to some step or proceeding in the cause beneficial to himself or detrimental to the plaintiff,' other than one contesting only the jurisdiction of the court, 4 C.J., p. 1333."

    It is significant that the Colbert decision does not mention the case of Burns v. Smith; had this court there intended to announce a rule contrary to its former holding, on facts which it deemed analogous, such mention would have been made and the former decision distinguished or overruled; its reason for not so doing is apparent. In the case of Burns v. Smith the contention now under consideration was made, and the case of In re Burton's Estate, 93 Cal. 459, 29 P. 36, was cited as supporting defendant's position, just as here the case of In re Colbert's Estate is cited. In the matter of Burton's Estate parties sought, as in the matter of the Colbert Estate and in the case of Kirk v. Baker, to establish an interest in privity with the estate.

  8. Swiss v. Flanagan

    329 So. 3d 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    We conclude these circumstances, coupled with the provisions of the will, were more than sufficient to give rise to a rebuttable presumption of undue influence. See In re Burton's Est., 45 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1950) (quoting Gardiner v. Goertner, 110 Fla. 377, 149 So. 186, 190 (1932) ) ("Undue influence is not usually exercised openly in the presence of others, so that it may be directly proved, hence it may be proved by indirect evidence of facts and circumstances from which it may be inferred."); Steven G. Nilsson, Florida's New Statutory Presumption of Undue Influence: Does It Change the Law or Merely Clarify?, 77 Fla. B.J. 20, 24 (2003) ("Undue influence is rarely susceptible of direct proof because of secret or private dealings between the decedent and the alleged wrongdoer; the latter typically testifies that he did nothing wrong, and the decedent never testifies to the contrary."). Although Swiss presented an explanation as to her actions, the trial court found her testimony unpersuasive.

  9. Schubert v. Allstate Ins. Co.

    603 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 11 times
    In Schubert, for example, this court reversed the judgment because the "cumulative effect of the improper comments" warranted a new trial.

    That alone should mean the appellant loses. See Applegate v. BarnettBank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1979); In re Burton's Estate, 45 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1950); Allen v. Town of Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949). However, based on the partial trial transcript furnished to us, I would still affirm.

  10. Jackson v. State

    572 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

    However, the record does not support this contention and we cannot consider it on appeal. In re Burton's Estate, 45 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1950); Hastings v. Hastings, 45 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1950); Allen v. Largo, 39 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1949). Sections 921.161(1) and (2) require that a defendant be credited with all time served in county jail including that time spent between sentencing and being placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Because Jackson was shortchanged by 93 days, we reverse and remand to the trial court with directions to correct Jackson's sentence.