Reading between the lines, by the time he realized it, presumably on Friday, November 15, 2013, he was pressed into a wall by the impending sheriff's sale set for Monday morning, November 18, 2013. Regardless of the court's sympathy for Debtor, the fact is he did not attempt to obtain the counseling as required in (ii). In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). He didn't make any requests for counseling and is therefore not entitled to a temporary waiver.
Post-petition credit counseling may only be done by leave of Court and may only be granted where the filing is prompted by exigent circumstances and where the debtor has actually tried to obtain credit counseling pre-petition. In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). In the case at bar, there was no request for a waiver of the filing of the credit counseling certificate pre-petition.
In re Tam, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3254 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2011). Circumstances that rise to this level have involved things such as: an impending foreclosure sale, see, In re Murray, 2008 WL 732730 (E.D. Va. 2008); In re Mason, 412 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Dist. Col. 2009); In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005); In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006), In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, 2005), but see, In re Dixon, 338 B.R. 383 (8th Cir. BAP 2006) (debtor had ample notice of foreclosure sale and any exigent circumstances were of the debtor's own making); In re Shear, 2010 WL 3463382 (Bankr.
2005); In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623 (Bankr.D.Md.2005); In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.2006), In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio, 2005), but see, In re Dixon, 338 B.R. 383 (8th Cir.BAP2006) (debtor had ample notice of foreclosure sale and any exigent circumstances were of the debtor's own making); In re Shear, 2010 WL 3463382 (Bankr.D.N.D.2010) (discovery that residence was being foreclosed on and sold at sheriff's sale insufficient); imminent wage garnishment, see, In re Manalad, 360 B.R. 288, 293 fn. 12 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2007); Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, but see, In re Anderson, 2006 WL 314539 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2006) (not all wage garnishments constitute exigent circumstances); repossession of the debtor's only vehicle, see, In re Davenport, 335 B.R. 218 (Bankr.M.D. Fla.2005); and (“arguably”) the termination of utilities.
Section 109(h)(3) gives the bankruptcy court the option of extending the deadline by up to an additional 15 days. See In re Mendez, 367 B.R. at 114; In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. W.D.Mich.2006). The language of the statute is permissive and not mandatory. Accordingly, the fact that the bankruptcy court granted an extension of less than the full 15 days is not clear error.
See, e.g., In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664, 666-67 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 296-97 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005); In re Fields, 337 B.R. 173, 179-80 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2005); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 434-35 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005). "[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute."
A certificate of exigent circumstances must show, in addition to some looming exigent circumstance, that the debtor diligently attempted to obtain credit counseling but was unable to receive counseling within five days of the request for the counseling.See In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). The request for counseling must be made at least five days prior to filing the petition.
A certification that does not meet the first and second requirements cannot be "satisfactory to the court." In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). The bankruptcy code does not define "exigent circumstances."