In re Bufford

28 Citing cases

  1. In re Murray

    Case No. 05-48017 JTL (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2006)

    Debtors argue that § 1325(a) (*) goes further and that claims qualifying under the Section are not "allowed secured claims" for purposes of § 1325(a)(5) and its present value requirement.See In re Sparks, 2006 WL 2243076 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July 26, 2006); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). As to Debtors' third contention that the court did not consider the argument raised by Debtors at the April 4, 2006 hearing that the secured claim of Nuvell could still be bifurcated under the grant of authority in § 1322, which states that a Chapter 13 plan may modify the rights of a secured creditor, the Court holds that such argument has no basis. Congress adopted § 1325(a) (*) to specify treatment particular to claims qualifying under that Section. It would be misguided to presume that § 1322(b)(2), a general provision on modification, could be used to side-step § 1325(a) (*), a provision that specifically prohibits the type of modification Debtors are arguing can be done using § 1322.

  2. In re Murray

    352 B.R. 340 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that the creditor did retain a purchase money security interest in the vehicle despite the inclusion of a service contract, a documentary fee, and a certificate of title fee in the sales contract due to "the nature of the additional items purchased and the relationship between those items and the collateral, which were purchased at the same time and in the same transaction as the collateral. . . ."

    Debtors argue that § 1325(a) (*) goes further and that claims qualifying under the Section are not "allowed secured claims" for purposes of § 1325(a)(5) and its present value requirement.See In re Sparks, 2006 WL 2243076 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July 26, 2006); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). As to Debtors' third contention that the court did not consider the argument raised by Debtors at the April 4, 2006 hearing that the secured claim of Nuvell could still be bifurcated under the grant of authority in § 1322, which states that a Chapter 13 plan may modify the rights of a secured creditor, the Court holds that such argument has no basis. Congress adopted § 1325(a) (*) to specify treatment particular to claims qualifying under that Section. It would be misguided to presume that § 1322(b)(2), a general provision on modification, could be used to side-step § 1325(a) (*), a provision that specifically prohibits the type of modification Debtors are arguing can be done using § 1322.

  3. HORR v. JAKE SWEENEY SMARTMART, INC.

    NO. 1:07-CV-00010 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 5, 2007)   Cited 6 times

    In re Sparks, 346 B.R. 767, 770-71 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2006); In re Brown, 346 B.R. 868, 876 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 2006); In re Wright, 338 B.R. 917, 919-20 (Bankr.M.D.Ala. 2006); In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 340 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 2006); In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716, 722 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 2006); In re Montoya, 341 B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006); In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790, 812-13 (Bankr.S.D.Texas 2006); In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 543, 546 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Scruggs, 342 B.R. 571, 574 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 2006); In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417, 421 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827, 832-33 (Bankr.N.D.Texas 2006); In re Soards, 344 B.R. 829, 831 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 2006); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 620 (Bankr.D.Kan. 2006); In re Brown, 339 B.R. 818, 821 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. 2006), In re Murray, 346 B.R. 237, 243-44 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 2006); In re Brown, 346 B.R. 246, 248-49 (Bankr.M.D.Ga. 2006); In re Horn, 338 B.R. 110 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006); In re Robinson, 338 B.R. 70 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). Consistent with the majority of the case law, we find that the provisions of § 1325(a) are mandatory and where the debt meets the parameters of the hanging paragraph, the Debtors are prevented from cramming down the secured debt.

  4. Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson

    369 B.R. 36 (D. Kan. 2007)   Cited 39 times
    Adopting the dual-status rule

    N. D.Fla. 2006); In re Sparks, 346 B.R. 767 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006); In re Brown, 346 B.R. 246 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006); In re Soards, 344 B.R. 829 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Scruggs, 342 B.R. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006); In re Montoya, 341 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006); In re DeSardi, 340 B.R 790 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006); In re Wright, 338 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006); In re Enzell, 338 B.R. 330 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Robinson, 338 B.R. 70 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006); Lowder, 2006 WL at 1794737.See e.g., Brown, 339 B.R. at 820.

  5. In re Morris

    370 B.R. 796 (E.D. Wis. 2007)   Cited 7 times

    Other Code sections address whether a claim is `allowed' and `secured.'"); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827, 832-33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (A claim is determined to be "allowed" or not pursuant to Section 502 of the Code, and is determined to be either "secured" or not pursuant to state law). Debtor relies upon In re Carver, 338 B.R. 521 (S.D. Ga. 2006).

  6. In re Pringle

    No. 05-CV-144S (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006)   Cited 1 times

    E.D. Pa. 2005) (upholding the bankruptcy court's determination of an 8 percent interest rate on the basis of Till); In re Books, 344 B.R. 417, 422 (Bkrtcy. E.D.N.C. 2006) (stating that "[t]his district has adopted the prime-plus rate used in Till to calculate interest on a secured claim pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)"); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827, 839 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that the Till rate applies to secured claims, even in light of the 2005 amendments to the BAPCPA); In re Pokrzywinski, 311 B.R. 846, 849-50 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Wisc. 2004) (upholding the debtor's objections and applying an interest rate based on the Till formula); In re Harken, Bankruptcy No. 04-02914, 2004 WL 3019467, at *2 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Iowa Nov. 29, 2004) (applying the Till formula over the objections of the creditor); In re Smith, 310 B.R. 631, 634 (D. Kan. 2004) (remanding four Chapter 13 cases for further proceedings before the bankruptcy court consistent with the Supreme Court's directive in Till to apply "prime plus risk"); but see In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 343 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that because Till contains no majority legal rationale, the formula rate articulated therein is "confirmable" but not binding).

  7. In re Baker

    No. 5:19-bk-71061 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Dec. 3, 2019)

    Initially, 910-car claimants argued that the hanging paragraph required debtors to pay their pre-petition, contractual interest rates in their chapter 13 plans. Almost unanimously, bankruptcy courts held that the hanging paragraph had not affected or abrogated Till. See In re Robinson, 338 B.R. 70 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) (finding that Congress did not modify § 1322(b)(2); therefore, Till still applied and the debtor was not required to pay the contract interest rate on 910-car loan); In re Scruggs, 342 B.R. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006) (applying Till even when contractual rate was zero); In re Harrison, 394 B.R. 879 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding that Till rate applied during pendency of chapter 13 because no part of § 1325(a) prohibits a debtor from employing § 1322(b)(2) to modify the rights of a 910-car creditor); In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006) (BAPCPA did not alter § 1322(b)(2)); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. N. Am. LLC v. Griffin (In re Wilson), 374 B.R. 251 (10th Cir. 2007); and In re Brown, 346 B.R. 246 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006). -------- /s/_________

  8. In re Powell

    Case No. 12-12716 (Bankr. D. Kan. May. 1, 2013)   Cited 2 times
    Discussing cases holding both ways on the issue of whether proposing a plan with a lower interest rate shortly after buying a car is bad faith under § 1325

    See § 1322(b)(2); In re Velez, 431 B.R. 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (hanging paragraph does not prohibit modification of interest rate on 910-car loan from 24.99% to 5.75%.); In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006) (Even if bifurcation of 910-car claim is prohibited, a plan may still modify the term of the loan and interest rate); In re Robinson, 338 B.R. 70 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006) (debtor not required to pay the contract interest rate on 910-car loan); In re Brill, 350 B.R. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006) (Till is appropriate interest rate to satisfy present value requirement of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii), not the contract rate); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (hanging paragraph does not alter the present value requirement of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) or the ability to modify a 910-car creditor's contractual rights under § 1322(b)(2)); In re Vandernick, 2008 WL 901685 at *4 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2008) (hanging paragraph does not prohibit modification of interest rate). B. The applicable rate of interest in this case is the Till rate; Till makes clear that contract, cost of money or other similar standards do not apply to § 1325.

  9. In re Hayes

    376 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007)

    ams, No. 06-32921-KRH, 2007 WL 2122131 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 19, 2007); In re Hopkins, 371 B.R. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Marshall, No. 06-81935, 2007 WL 1725196 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. June 11, 2007); In re Lorenz, 368 B.R. 476 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Adaway, 367 B.R. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007); In re Phillips, 362 B.R. 284 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re McCormick, No. 06-23358-SVK, 2006 WL 3499226 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2006); In re Henry, 353 B.R. 261 (Bankr. D. Or. 2006); In re Grunau, 355 B.R. 334 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In re White, 352 B.R. 633 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006); In re Brill, 350 B.R. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Turner, 349 B.R. 437 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Ross, 355 B.R. 53 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Sparks, 346 B.R. 767 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006); In re Brown, 346 B.R. 246 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006); In re Murray, 346 B.R. 237 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006); In re Soards, 344 B.R. 829 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006); In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In re Parish, No. 05-BK-15702-JAF, 2006 WL 1679710 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006); In re Staten, No. 05-84077, 2006 WL 4458705 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 11, 2006); In re Scruggs, 342 B.R. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006); In re Shaw, 341 B.R. 543 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Brown, 339 B.R. 818 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006); In re Fleming, 339 B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006); In re Wright, 338 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006); In re Robinson, 338 B.R. 70, 73-75 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006). But see In re Taranto, 344 B.R. 857 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006), rev'd, 365 B.R. 85, 89-91 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007); In re Kinsey, 368 B.R. 888 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Robinson, 355 B.R. 920 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006); In re Wampler, 345 B.R. 730 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Carver, 338 B.R. 521 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006).

  10. In re Hayes

    376 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007)

    2006); In re Brooks, 344 B.R. 417 (Bankr.E.D.N.C.2006); In re Bufford, 343 B.R. 827 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2006); In re Parish, No. 05-BK-15702-JAF, 2006 WL 1679710 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. May 12, 2006); In re Staten, No. 05-84077, 2006 WL 4458705 (Bankr.