In re Budget Rent-A-Car

16 Citing cases

  1. Fox v. Prime Grp. Realty Trust

    No. 12 C 9350 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2012)   Cited 2 times

    In re Budget Rent A Car Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 10418, 1991 WL 36472, at *225 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1991); see Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) ("[T]he exclusive standard of judicial review in examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or dominating shareholder is entire fairness"). "Directors are 'interested' if they 'appear on both sides of a transaction [or] expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally." In re Budget Rent A Car Corp., 1991 WL at 36472, at *225 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). In these circumstances, the entire fairness standard applies "even when an interested merger receives the informed approval of a majority of the minority stockholders or an independent committee of disinterested directors."

  2. In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

    2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 51293 (N.Y. App. Term 2004)

    Contrary to the determination of the court below, we find that petitioner submitted documentary proof as to the payments it made to its subrogor by its submission of the affidavit of its claims representative, as well as the other documents included in Exhibit D which was attached to its petition ( see CPLR 4518 [a]; People v. Kennedy, 68 NY2d 569). We further find that the arbitrator's award dismissing the claim as barred by the statute of limitations was not based on the evidence, and it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrator to dismiss the claim since petitioner timely made its demand for arbitration within three years of its first no-fault payment ( see CPLR 214; Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 219-220; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 AD2d 153; Empire Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 25 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]; Allcity Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Misc 3d 41 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]; Allcity Ins. Co. v. GEICO, 2003 NY Slip Op 50898 [U] [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]).

  3. Empire Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co.

    4 Misc. 3d 25 (N.Y. App. Term 2004)

    Furthermore, the court's reliance on Nationwide is misplaced inasmuch as the court therein specifically stated that its decision was distinguishable from Motor Veh. Acc. Indem.Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. which, like the case at bar, involved statutorily created obligations and rights, whereas Nationwide was in the nature of a common-law subrogation. Consequently, we find that the arbitrator's award dismissing the claim as barred by the statute of limitations was not based on the evidence, and it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrator to dismiss the claim since petitioner timely made its demand for arbitration within three years of its first no-fault payment (see CPLR 214 [2]; Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d at 219-220, supra; Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986]; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 AD2d 153 [1997]; Matter of Allcity Ins. Co. v GEICO-Government Empls. Ins. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 50898[U]). Accordingly, the petition seeking to vacate the July 2002 arbitrator's award is granted and the matter is remanded for arbitration before a different arbitrator.

  4. Allcity Ins. Co. v. Eagle Ins. Co.

    1 Misc. 3d 41 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)

    By order entered August 7, 2002, the court denied Allcity's second petition, finding that it was not based on one of the limited grounds upon which such an award may be vacated pursuant to CPLR 7511 and that the arbitrator applied the correct statute of limitations. The Civil Court determined, upon granting Allcity's first petition and remanding the matter for arbitration, that the arbitrator's award dismissing the claim as barred by the statute of limitations was not based on the evidence and that it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrator to dismiss the claim since Allcity timely made its demand for arbitration within three years of its first no-fault payment (see CPLR 214 [2]; Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986]; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 AD2d 153 [1997]; Allcity Ins. Co. v American Tr. Ins. Co., NYLJ, Feb. 8, 2000, at 28, col 3 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Upon a review of the record, we agree with the October 30, 2000 determination of the court below and note that inasmuch as the parties had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate this issue, said determination constituted the law of the case and the August 2002 order of the court below erroneously fails to abide by same (see People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 755 [2001]). Moreover, in Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (89 NY2d 214 [1996], supra), the Court of Appeals determined that closer judicial scrutiny is required, and the arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable, if arbitration is compulsory pursuant to a statutory mandate (id. at 223).

  5. Allcity Insurance Company v. Eagle Insurance Company

    1 Misc. 3d 41 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)

    By order entered August 7, 2002, the court denied Allcity's second petition, finding that it was not based on one of the limited grounds upon which such an award may be vacated pursuant to CPLR 7511 and that the arbitrator applied the correct statute of limitations. The Civil Court determined, upon granting Allcity's first petition and remanding the matter for arbitration, that the arbitrator's award dismissing the claim as barred by the statute of limitations was not based on the evidence and that it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrator to dismiss the claim since Allcity timely made its demand for arbitration within three years of its first no-fault payment ( see CPLR 214; Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214; Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 A.D.2d 153; Allcity Ins. Co. v American Transit Ins. Co., NYLJ, Feb. 8, 2000 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]).

  6. In re Arbitration Btwn. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.

    307 A.D.2d 40 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 7 times

    In other words, a loss-transfer claim is timely if the demand for arbitration of such claim is made within three years of the payment for which reimbursement is sought. Thus, all claims for payments made "`more than three years before the date of the demand'" are time-barred, while those made within three years of the demand are timely asserted ( Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 A.D.2d 153, 153, quoting Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 89 N.Y.2d at 222; see Matter of Progressive Ins. Co. v. Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 248 A.D.2d 390; see also Matter of State Ins. Fund [Country-Wide Ins. Co.], 276 A.D.2d 432). Here, respondent's payment to Linda Stanek as a result of the arbitration sought by her was made on July 17, 2001, and respondent filed its demand for arbitration on August 2, 2002, well within the three-year period.

  7. State Farm Ins. v. EAGLE INS.

    6 Misc. 3d 27 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)

    y order entered August 7, 2002, the court granted Eagle Insurance Company's cross petition to confirm the award and denied State Farm's petition to vacate same, finding that it was not based on one of the limited grounds upon which such an award may be vacated pursuant to CPLR 7511 and that the arbitrator applied the correct statute of limitations. The Civil Court determined, upon granting State Farm's first and second petitions and remanding the matters for arbitration, that the arbitrators' awards dismissing the claims as barred by the statute of limitations were not based on the evidence and that it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrators to dismiss the claims since State Farm timely sought reimbursement of the no-fault payments it made within three years of its arbitration demand (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986]; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 AD2d 153 [1997]; Allcity Ins. Co. v American Tr. Ins. Co., NYLJ, Feb. 8, 2000, at 28, col 3 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists]). Upon a review of the record, we note that although some of State Farm's payments may be time-barred, others were made within three years of its arbitration demand. Moreover, inasmuch as the parties had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate this issue, the foregoing determinations were binding on the court below and its May 2002 order erroneously fails to abide by the law of the case (see People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 502 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 755).

  8. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Eagle Ins.

    762 N.Y.S.2d 773 (N.Y. App. Term 2003)   Cited 2 times

    By order entered August 7, 2002, the court granted Eagle Insurance Company's cross petition to confirm the award and denied State Farm's petition to vacate same, finding that it was not based on one of the limited grounds upon which such an award may be vacated pursuant to CPLR 7511 and that the arbitrator applied the correct statute of limitations. The Civil Court determined, upon granting State Farm's first and second petitions and remanding the matters for arbitration, that the arbitrators' awards dismissing the claims as barred by the statute of limitations were not based on the evidence and that it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrators to dismiss the claims since State Farm timely sought reimbursement of the no-fault payments it made within three years of its arbitration demand ( see Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214; Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 A.D.2d 153; Allcity Ins. Co. v American Transit Ins. Co., NYLJ, Feb. 8, 2000 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]). Upon a review of the record, we note that although some of State Farm's payments may be time barred, others were made within three years of its arbitration demand.

  9. In re State Ins. Fund v. Country-Wide Ins. Co.

    276 A.D.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 4 times

    Before: Rosenberger, J.P., Nardelli, Ellerin, Lerner, Friedman, JJ. Petitioner paid workers' compensation and medical expense benefits to an employee of its insured injured in an automobile accident involving a car insured by respondent. It appears to be undisputed that petitioner's claim against respondent to recover these payments must, as a matter of statute, be arbitrated. That being so, the motion court correctly held that the arbitrator's acceptance of respondent's Statute of Limitations defense is subject to judicial review under an arbitrary and capricious standard (see, Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214, 223-224), and that it was arbitrary and capricious of the arbitrator not to follow clear precedent establishing that claims like petitioner's are subject to a three-year limitations period that commences to run from the date of the first payment to the injured party, not the date of the injury (cf., id., at 224; see, Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car v. State Ins. Fund, 237 A.D.2d 153), and that only precludes recovery of payments more than three years prior to the commencement of suit. THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

  10. Matter, Liberty Mutual v. State Farm Mutual [2d Dept 1999

    (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 21, 1999)

    Thereafter, on April 30, 1998, State Farm served on the respondent Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter Liberty Mutual) a petition seeking to arbitrate a claim for $15,433.46 of "personal injury protection benefits" it had paid to its insureds as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court properly stayed the arbitration on the ground that the three-year Statute of Limitations to recover first-party benefits had expired (see,Matter of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214, 221; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car, 237 A.D.2d 153;City of Syracuse v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 83 A.D.2d 116, 118-121, affd 61 N.Y.2d 691). State Farm failed to demonstrate that it had timely interposed a claim for first-party benefits in its litigation against the insureds of Liberty Mutual. Therefore, it was not entitled to the benefit of 11 NYCRR 65.10(d)(5)(i), which would permit arbitration on the issue of first-party benefits to go forward where initially a claim for such benefits was timely but mistakenly placed in litigation rather than made the subject of an arbitration (cf., Matter of Brinks, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 217 A.D.2d 620).