Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court No. DP018237 of Orange County, Gary G. Bischoff, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
Christina T. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her now two-and-a-half-year-old daughter, B.T. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all statutory references are to this code.) She contends the court erred in finding the child was adoptable and that the benefit exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) took the child into protective custody in March 2009 after mother was arrested on drug possession charges. The court declared the child a dependent, denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In the report prepared for the hearing, SSA advised the child had been placed with prospective adoptive parents, with whom the child was “content and comfortable.” The child “refer[red] to them... as ‘[m]ommy’ and ‘[d]addy, ’ [sought] them out for reassurance, and [was] becoming affectionate with them” as well with as their adoptive daughter.
As for visitation, although mother was given two, 2-hour visits a week, she was “unable to take advantage of these visits due to several incarcerations, failing to arrive on time, failing to confirm the visits, failing to show up, and most recently, entry to a drug detox and rehabilitation program.” Mother missed the first visit after the child was detained in March 2007 when she went to the wrong location despite a voicemail from SSA telling her the address and time for the visit. She canceled a visit in May to deal with an outstanding warrant. She was arrested and jailed until mid-June. Her next visit after her release was canceled because she was 50 minutes late.
Mother appeared at a visit two days later but “behaved erratically, ” “became hostile with the [social worker] and foster mother, ” and “appeared to be under the influence of an unidentified substance, or having a difficult time with her mental health, or a combination of both.”
Because mother had been late to a couple visits, she was “notified twice... that she needs to call by 8[]am to confirm the visit... [and] that the visit will be canceled if she confirms over 15 minutes late, or if she arrives 15 minutes late.” Nevertheless, she failed to confirm visits on June 30 and July 2, which were canceled as a result. Although she attended a visit a few days later, her probation officer also appeared because mother had failed to report within three days of her release from jail. A probation search of her purse revealed “hypodermic needles and a glass ‘meth’ pipe with residue....” After she was released from jail, mother missed additional visits.
By the time of the hearing, mother had attended a total of seven out of a possible 14 visits following her release from jail in June. Of these, she acted as if she was under the influence during one visit and was arrested during another. Additionally, “[o]ut of six possible authorized... telephone calls, ... mother has made one call to her daughter, and received one made by the prospective adoptive mother.”
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court found the child adoptable and terminated parental rights. In ruling the benefit exception did not apply, the trial court concluded “there has not been consistent or regular visits” and that “50 percent visitation is not what I think anyone would consider to be consistent or regular visitation.” It further determined the child would not benefit from a continuation of the relationship with mother.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights because substantial evidence does not support the court’s rejection of the “benefit exception” under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We disagree.
Once the court decides under section 366.26 a child is likely to be adopted, it “shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)) unless it “determin[es] that termination would be detrimental to the child due to” one of the statutory exceptions (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B). One exception is where a “parent[] ha[s] maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); see also In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) Mother bears the burden of proving both these factors and that “she occupies a ‘parental role’ in the child’s life. [Citations.]” (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) She failed to carry her burden.
Mother acknowledges that she “missed seven visits” and that “her visitation record appears to be spotty and inconsistent.” But she maintains “a closer look” shows she “was able to maintain a regular contact with her daughter while she addressed her substance abuse, mental health and legal problems.” That is not the test. Application of the benefit exception required “regular visitation, ” which mother did not maintain. And even assuming attending only 50 percent of her visits qualified as “regular visitation, ” she failed to meet her burden of showing a beneficial relationship.
“A beneficial relationship is one that ‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206.) “A parent must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits. [Citation.]... The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent. [Citations.]” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207, fn. omitted.) “In other words, for the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt. [Citation.]” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) There must also be evidence a child would suffer detriment from the termination of the parent-child relationship. (Ibid.) The parent carries the burden to show that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) If supported by substantial evidence, we will not disturb the court’s determination that a beneficial relationship does not exist. (In re Autumn H. (1994)27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
Here, mother failed to present any evidence the child would suffer detriment from the termination of her parental rights. She did not consistently visit the child and there was no evidence the child would be harmed if the visits ended. This alone is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights. (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 468.) The absence of regular visitation or any evidence of detriment distinguishes this case from the case cited by mother, In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, where the mother “visited as often as she was allowed” and a bonding study showed that it would be detrimental to sever the mother’s relationship with her child. (Id. at p. 690.)
Mother contends the visits she did have “were very positive in nature and revealed the depth of the bond they shared.” The record shows she brought presents and cupcakes for the child’s birthday, and they played, smiled, hugged and kissed each other. But this does not show the relationship between them was anything more than that of a friendly visitor.
Claiming otherwise, mother asserts “she acted in a parental role during her visits, ” citing evidence that she wiped the child’s face, changed her diaper, and redirected her when necessary. Although this may show she was appropriate during some visits, she nevertheless acted erratically at others, appearing to be under the influence of a controlled substance during one visit and having drug paraphernalia in her purse at another.
Mother maintains the child referred to her as “Mama Tina” and “mommy” and had lived with her for 19 months but only 3 months with the prospective adoptive parents as of the time of the section 366.26 hearing. But the child also called her prospective adoptive parents “‘[m]ommy’ and ‘[d]addy, ’ [sought] them out for reassurance, and [was] becoming affectionate with them” and their adoptive daughter. Additionally, during one of the latter visits, SSA reported “[t]he child had no difficulty separating [from mother], and again went willingly with the [social worker].... Upon seeing the prospective adoptive mother’s vehicle, [the child] squealed in delight, and ran toward her.” We “presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order. [Citations.]” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Because substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling, we will not overturn it. The mere fact mother presented other evidence that may have supported a contrary result does not suffice to nullify the juvenile court’s findings.
None of the evidence cited by mother shows the child’s relationship with her was so significant that its termination would cause the child any detriment. Thus, the juvenile court did not err by concluding the exception provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply.
DISCUSSION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, J., IKOLA, J.