Opinion
No. 60982-3-I.
November 10, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 98-3-00150-3, James A. Doerty, J., entered November 20, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
A court has discretion to place reasonable restrictions on any litigant who abuses the judicial process. After Keith Brown filed multiple unwarranted motions, the trial court limited his ability to file future motions. Because the record supports the trial court's determination that the motions were part of a continuing pattern of intransigence and Brown retained a reasonable opportunity to seek judicial resolution of legitimate parenting disputes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the restrictions. The record also supports the trial court's imposition of CR 11 sanctions. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
Keith Brown and Rebecca Garth separated in 1997 and dissolved their marriage in 1998. The parties have had numerous disputes over the terms of the final parenting plan.
In June 2006, following a lengthy trial, the trial court granted Garth's petition to modify the parenting plan, severely restricting Brown's residential time with his two children and granting Garth sole decision-making authority. The court also ordered Brown to pay Garth's attorney fees, totaling about $100,000, because of Brown's intransigence. The court found, among other things, that Brown had intentionally used the legal process to harm Garth financially and that the financial consequences of his conduct were "devastating" to Garth.
The modified parenting plan provided that if either party filed a court action to enforce the parenting plan, the prevailing party would receive full reimbursement for all reasonable attorney fees and expenses. But the plan also restricted Brown's ability to file such actions
prior to initiating any such court action, should [Brown] not have fully paid all prior court ordered fees and expenses to mother or is not current on all child support, tuition, guardian ad litem, therapy or other similar obligations, [Brown] shall be required to post a bank issued letter of credit with terms and conditions reasonably acceptable to mother to guarantee full payment of any reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees and expenses.
Except for directing a minor recalculation of the amount of attorney fees, this court affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects. See In re Marriage of Garth and
Brown, noted at 142 Wn. App. 1007 (2007).
In October 2006, while his appeal of the parenting plan modification was pending, Brown filed a petition in bankruptcy court, seeking to discharge the attorney fees and costs awarded Garth for his intransigence. The current status of that petition is unclear, although it appears that the bankruptcy court has rejected Brown's attempts to discharge the attorney fee award.
On August 23, 2007, Brown filed a motion for declaratory relief on the family law calendar, seeking a ruling that the 2006 award of attorney fees for intransigence was not "child support" for purposes of bankruptcy. Because it was not properly served, Brown renoted and then refiled the motion on August 30, 3007. Garth filed an objection, arguing, among other things, that because there was no proceeding pending under chapter 7.24 RCW or chapter 26 RCW, the court lacked jurisdiction to provide the requested declaratory relief and that, in any event, the court commissioner lacked authority to provide such relief on the family law calendar. Garth also asked the court to impose CR 11 sanctions.
On September 7, 2007, the commissioner sustained Garth's objection, finding that there was no pending action for declaratory relief, but denied the request for CR 11 sanctions. The commissioner also concluded that, in any event, she had no authority to grant the requested relief on the family law calendar and advised Brown that if the motion were re-noted, it should be before the chief judge of the Unified Family Court (UFC).
On September 11, 2007, Brown filed a motion for declaratory relief before the chief judge of the UFC. Garth opposed the motion, arguing that Brown had simply refiled essentially the same motion without correcting the procedural defects that the commissioner had identified and that there was still no proceeding pending under chapter 7.24 RCW or chapter 26 RCW. Garth maintained that Brown's motion was a continuance of his past intransigence and asked the court to impose CR 11 sanctions.
On September 19, 2007, the trial court denied Brown's motion. The court found that the motion was not well founded in fact or law, that Brown had failed to file any action that would permit the court to grant the requested declaratory relief, and that the motion was part of a continuing pattern of intransigence. The court imposed CR 11 sanctions of $2,500 to reimburse Garth for having to respond twice to Brown's motion.
Brown moved for reconsideration. On October 30, 2007, the trial court denied the motion, finding that despite the two prior rulings, Brown had failed to identify any legal authority supporting his claim that the court had authority to grant declaratory relief. The court also found that the motion was part of a continuing pattern of intransigence and imposed CR 11 sanctions of $1,950 against Brown's counsel. The order prohibited Brown or his counsel "from filing any further motions in this matter in the Superior Court until the outstanding judgments for attorney's fees and CR 11 sanctions previously entered herein are paid in full."
On November 9, 2007, after discharging both of his attorneys, Brown filed a pro se "Emergency Motion," seeking reconsideration and "clarification" of the October 30, 2007 order. Brown also claimed that he was entitled to emergency relief because Garth was violating the terms of the parenting plan by preventing the couple's son from attending the required monthly lunches with Brown. Brown acknowledged that he might have erred in seeking declaratory relief without filing a supporting action, but maintained that he was acting in good faith. Through newly retained counsel, Brown claimed that the prohibition against further motions violated his constitutional rights.
The trial court denied Brown's motion on November 20, 2007, finding that there was no "emergency," that the motion was not well founded in law or fact, and that the motion was part of the continuing pattern of intransigence. The court declined to reconsider its original order for a second time and concluded that the order did not require "clarification." The court imposed $1,500 in CR 11 sanctions against Brown personally and affirmed its prior order prohibiting Brown "from filing any further motions in this matter in the Superior Court until the outstanding judgments for attorney's fees and CR 11 sanctions previously entered and entered hereon are paid in full."
Brown appeals.
II
CR 11 Sanctions
Brown contends that the trial court erred in imposing CR 11 sanctions against counsel in the October 30 order denying Brown's motion for reconsideration and against Brown in the November 20 order denying emergency relief. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it relied on factual errors and on an erroneous understanding of CR 59.
In order to impose sanctions under CR 11, the trial court must find that the claim is not well grounded in fact or warranted by law or that the pleading was filed for an improper purpose. Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 201, 876 P.2d 448 (1994). We review the trial court's imposition of CR 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 338, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
Contrary to the trial court's finding, Brown did submit a declaration from another family law practitioner, who opined, with no citation to authority, that Brown could seek declaratory relief without filing a supporting action. But Brown fails to address the primary basis for the trial court's decision to impose sanctions: his failure to support the repeated motions for declaratory relief with any relevant legal argument or citation to authority and the determination that the motions were part of a continuing pattern of intransigence.
Brown claims that he identified multiple errors of law that justified the motion for reconsideration under CR 59. But he fails to identify those errors of law or make any showing that they warranted reconsideration, and he acknowledges that he is not challenging the trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion for declaratory relief. Instead, Brown relies almost exclusively on an unpublished decision of this court, in violation of GR 14.1(a).
Brown also contends that the trial court erred in finding that there was no "emergency" justifying emergency relief. As support for his emergency motion, Brown alleged that Garth had prevented the couple's son from attending court-ordered lunches in August, September, October, and November 2007. The trial court did not err in refusing to find that this allegation, raised for the first time in November, constituted an "emergency."
Intransigence includes the filing of excessive and unsubstantiated motions. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 873, 56 P.3d 993 (2002); In re Marriage of Wallace, 111 Wn. App. 697, 710, 45 P.3d 1131 (2002). In assessing the nature of Brown's actions, the trial court could also consider Brown's prior conduct. Given the nature, frequency, and substance of Brown's motions, the record supports the trial court's determination that they were part of a continuing pattern of intransigence. Because the motions were brought for an improper purpose, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing CR 11 sanctions.
Prohibition on Motions
Brown contends that the trial court's orders prohibiting him from filing any further motions until he pays prior judgments for attorney fees and CR 11 sanctions have effectively denied him access to the courts. He argues that because the trial court retains jurisdiction over continuing parenting and child support issues, the prohibition unreasonably interferes with the fundamental relationship between a parent and child. But Brown's contentions rest on a faulty premise and mischaracterize the scope of the trial court's orders.
As Brown concedes, courts in Washington have the "inherent power to control the conduct of litigants who impede the orderly conduct of proceedings." Yurtis v. Phipps, 143 Wn. App. 680, 693, 181 P.3d 849 (2008); see also RCW 2.28.010(3). A court therefore has discretion to place reasonable restrictions on any party who abuses the judicial process. In re Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. 74, 78, 787 P.2d 51 (1990). Generally, an order enjoining a party from litigation may not be based on mere litigiousness. Whatcom County v. Kane, 31 Wn. App. 250, 253, 640 P.2d 1075 (1981).
Brown maintains that the trial court's prohibition was disproportionately punitive and should have, at the very least, included a "safety valve" for emergencies. See Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. at 77-78 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a four-month restraining order that provided a safety valve for emergency motions). But Brown's arguments rest on the premise that he has effectively been denied complete access to any judicial resolution of legitimate parenting and child support issues. The challenged orders do not support such an assumption when viewed in context.
The 2006 parenting plan required that Brown — before initiating any court action to enforce the parenting plan — either pay all prior court-ordered fees and expenses and ongoing obligations or post an acceptable letter of credit guaranteeing the reimbursement of reasonable attorney fees should the opposing party prevail in the proceeding. The record shows that Brown expressly agreed with the inclusion of this provision in the parenting plan.
At the time it entered the orders, the trial court was also well aware of the parenting plan provision, and nothing in the record supports Brown's apparent assumption that the trial court's orders replaced or modified the parenting plan. Indeed, such an interpretation would effectively modify the parenting plan without compliance with the requirements of RCW 26.09.260.
Consequently, the trial court's orders must be viewed in conjunction with the parenting plan, which clearly permitted Brown to seek judicial resolution of parenting disputes after posting an acceptable letter of credit guaranteeing the payment of attorney fees and costs for that proceeding; he did not have to pay all outstanding attorney fees and sanctions. The parenting plan therefore provided a reasonable "safety valve" that allowed Brown to seek judicial resolution of legitimate parenting disputes. Nonetheless, Brown chose to circumvent the requirements of the parenting plan by raising his allegations that Garth was withholding access to his son in the guise of his "emergency" motion for reconsideration.
In support of his emergency motion, Brown also alleged that the trial court's orders prevented a previously planned court-ordered review hearing regarding a postsecondary education issue. But Brown fails to indicate how the prohibition against filing further motions prevented him from noting — or participating in — a court-ordered proceeding. Brown has not identified any prejudice resulting from the challenged orders as to child support issues. See Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. at 76-77.
Brown maintains that the court's authority to prohibit the filing of motions must be used to further the administration of justice and not merely as a tool for punishing zealous, tenacious, or merely annoying litigants. We fully agree. But implicit in the right of access to the courts is a requirement that the litigants also proceed in good faith and in compliance with court rules. Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. at 77. And as the prior history of this case illustrates, extreme abuse of process by one party may inflict such severe consequences as to deny the opposing party the right to meaningful access to the courts. In such cases, if "access is to be guaranteed to all, it must be limited as to those who abuse it." Marriage of Giordano, 57 Wn. App. at 77-78.
In summary, contrary to Brown's repeated assertions, the trial court's prohibitions did not amount to a total denial of access to the courts. Given the presence of a reasonable procedure permitting judicial resolution of legitimate parenting disputes and the ample support for the trial court's determinations that Brown's repeated motions were part of a continuing pattern of intransigence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing limits on Brown's filing of motions.
Affirmed.