The dissent disagrees and finds that the in camera procedure employed by the court was sufficient, particularly because the parties' attorneys were present during the examination and they were permitted to submit questions to the court. For support, the dissent relies on In re Rider, 113 Ill.App.3d 1000 (1983) and In re Brooks, 63 Ill.App.3d 328 (1978), but neither case supports its position. In Rider, the court found that the trial court's reliance on information it obtained from a child during the course of an in camera examination to determine that the father should be placed under a supervisory order of protection was improper, reasoning that "fundamental fairness requires that such an order not be entered before the person to be subjected to the order has a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and be heard on the matter."
Respondent moved for a directed finding with respect to David on the grounds that there was no testimony or evidence that showed his environment was injurious to him. The State argued that based upon In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872, David's environment was injurious to him because he was living in an environment where his sister was sexually abused even though there was no indication that David knew about or was exposed to the abuse of Latera. The court granted respondent's motion and dismissed the petition with respect to David.
( Baby Boy Butt, 76 Ill. App.3d at 593, 395 N.E.2d at 5.) This quote was also recited in In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 338, 379 N.E.2d 872, 880. In Nyce, however, the mother was thought to be immature but never had custody of the child.
• 1, 2 The standard of proof applicable in this case was stated in In re Simmons (1984), 127 Ill. App.3d 943, 948: "The standard of proof of abuse is that applicable in civil proceedings, i.e., a preponderance of the evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 704-6(1); In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 337, 379 N.E.2d 872, 879); and the primary consideration in such cases is the best interests and welfare of the child. (See In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872.)
An abused minor is defined, inter alia, as one whose parent, or a paramour thereof, inflicts, causes to be inflicted or allows to be inflicted upon such minor physical injury, by other than accidental means, which causes impairment of physical health or impairment of any bodily function (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 702-4(2)(a)(i)), or whose "environment is injurious" to his welfare (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 702-4(2)(b)). • 1, 2 The standard of proof of abuse is that applicable to civil proceedings, i.e., a preponderance of the evidence (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 704-6(1); In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 337, 379 N.E.2d 872, 879); and the primary consideration in such cases is the best interests and welfare of the child. (See In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872.)
( In re Nyce (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 481, 268 N.E. 233.) This rule, however, is tempered and qualified by the law as related in the case of In re Brooks (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872. The reviewing court in Brooks stated as follows: "It is true that a court may not speculate as to the future care of a child.
Although our appellate court has recognized the theory of anticipatory neglect for some time (see, e.g., In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339-40 (1978)), our courts have also held that there is no per se rule that the neglect of one child conclusively establishes the neglect of another child in the same household. In re S.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021 (2004); In re Edricka C, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 18.
¶ 80 Our own research indicates that findings of physical abuse are reserved for situations where these quite stringent statutory criteria are clearly satisfied. See, e.g., In re D.L.W., 226 Ill.App.3d 805, 811 (1992) (father struck son with a closed fist, kneed him in the groin, struck him with a 11/2 -foot-long board, and "threatened to beat him to death unless he learned not to wet the bed"); In re Brooks, 63 Ill.App.3d 328, 334 (1978) (boy's face "was bloody and swollen," he had "a swollen jaw and bruises under his right eye, back, chest and arms," and he stated that his mother had beat him with a cricket bat).
"When faced with evidence of prior abuse by parents, the juvenile court should not be forced to refrain from taking action until each particular child suffers an injury." In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 339, 379 N.E.2d 872, 881 (1978).¶ 21 At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court noted how both respondents demonstrated poor judgment and how Jena has "continued to show current affects of [her] mental disability," for example, driving to Springfield to visit friends during the COVID-19 pandemic while she was at full-term pregnancy.
Furthermore, a proceeding under the Act constitutes a civil proceeding — meaning that no sixth amendment right to confront witnesses is implicated (U.S. Const., amend. VI) — and is nonadversarial in nature. J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8, 566 N.E.2d at 1348-49; In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App.3d 328, 340, 379 N.E.2d 872, 881 (1978). Section 2-18(4)(d) of the Act does not expressly authorize a nonparty minor to testify outside the respondent's presence.