Opinion
Master File No. IP 00-9373-C-B/S, MDL No. 1373 (centralized before Hon. Sarah Evans Barker, Judge), Individual Case No. IP 00-5005-C-B/S
May 13, 2002
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire LLC ("Firestone") has filed a motion seeking "summary judgment declaring that: 1) Florida law will govern Firestone's seatbelt defense in this case (making decedent's failure to wear a seatbelt admissible as evidence of comparative negligence); and 2) plaintiff's decedent was comparatively negligent as a matter of law." For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Firestone's motion for summary judgment, without prejudice to the substantive arguments contained therein.
Discussion
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides the mechanism by which a court renders "judgment" when the evidence demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis added.) Summary judgment can also be rendered under Rule 56 "on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." (Emphasis added.)
The "declaration" sought by Firestone is not appropriate under Rule 56(c). Firestone does not and cannot maintain in its motion that it is entitled to judgment in its favor on any of the plaintiffs' claims; rather, it seeks only this court's opinion on the availability of the plaintiffs' non-use of seatbelts as a defense. Even if we agreed with Firestone that it can maintain this defense (and we intend to express no view on the issue), a jury would still be required to hear the relevant evidence and make what it deemed to be the proper attribution, if any, of comparative fault. Victory on the motion therefore would provide Firestone with neither a "judgment" nor a determination of its "liability" on any claim in this case. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Moreover, Firestone cannot bring its motion under Rule 56(d), which allows a court to determine certain facts even when the case is not fully adjudicated on the motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Antenor v. D S Farms, 39 F. Supp.2d 1372, 1375 n. 4 (S.D.Fla. 1999). Although Rule 56(d) gives this court the discretion to determine "the facts that appear without substantial controversy" (see, e.g., Hampton v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 18 F. Supp.2d 1256, 1265-66 (D. Kan. 1998)), we do not find the issue presented here to warrant the exercise of that discretion. First, Firestone asks us to determine the law applicable to the plaintiffs' claims, not a fact. Its motion presents evidentiary and jury instructions issues that can be properly addressed by the transferor court at (or before) trial. Second, the court's discretion to determine issues — as opposed to claims — is most prudently exercised when, for example, a decision on the issue presented could significantly pare down the presentation of proof at trial or materially advance the settlement of the case. See First Nat'l Ins. V. F.D.I.C., 977 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.Cal. 1997). We have no reason to believe that resolution of the issue raised by Firestone would substantially further either of these goals.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Firestone's motion for summary judgment without prejudice to the substantive arguments contained therein.
Counsel contemplating similar motions for summary judgment in other cases are admonished to consider the guidelines provided by this order.
It is so ORDERED this day of May, 2002.