Opinion
1-23-1279
06-28-2024
In re ESTATE OF JOSEPH BRICK, An Adult with a Disability
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County 21P6680 Honorable Aicha Marie MacCarthy, Judge Presiding.
Howse, Presiding Justice and Ellis, Justice concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
McBRIDE, JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The trial court properly denied appellant's petitions for attorney fees where appellant provided no relevant authority, in the trial court or appellate court, which would allow appellant to recover her attorney fees.
¶ 2 The instant appeal arises from guardianship proceedings regarding Joseph Brick, the nonminor child of Carolyn Brick and Bryan Brick. Carolyn appeals the trial court's order denying her motion to assess fees and costs against Bryan, and the trial court's subsequent order striking her motion to reconsider that order after the guardianship had been transferred to the state of Texas.
¶ 3 The record shows that Carolyn and Bryan were previously married, and they divorced in 2016. On September 17, 2021, approximately one month before Joseph's 18th birthday, Carolyn filed a "Petition for Appointment of Guardian of a Person with a Disability." In the petition, Carolyn alleged that Joseph was a person with a disability "due to Mild Intellectual Disability and Autism." Carolyn requested that she be appointed as guardian of Joseph's estate and person.
¶ 4 On October 14, 2021, the court appointed a Guardian ad Litem (GAL), and on October 21, 2021, the GAL submitted a report to the court. The GAL stated that, since being appointed, he had reviewed the petition and a report from Joseph's petition, and he had met with Joseph via teleconference. Based on the GAL's investigation, the GAL believed that Joseph indeed had a "disability meriting guardianship" under the Probate Act, and that appointment of a guardian was in Joseph's best interest.
¶ 5 Thereafter, Bryan filed his own "Petition for Appointment of Guardian of a Person with a Disability" on November 19, 2021, requesting that he be appointed to serve as Joseph's guardian. Bryan withdrew that petition on January 13, 2022.
¶ 6 Also on January 13, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Carolyn's petition for appointment of a guardian. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Joseph lacked sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning the care of his person, and that he was unable to manage his estate or financial affairs. The court ordered that Carolyn be appointed as plenary guardian of the estate and person of Joseph.
¶ 7 Following Carolyn's appointment as plenary guardian, the record suggests that tempers began to rise, with various disputes erupting between Carolyn and Bryan. On March 10, 2022, Carolyn filed a petition for an order of protection against Bryan, on behalf of herself, her husband, and Joseph. Carolyn alleged that, "due to his disability, [Joseph] is extremely vulnerable to abuse and emotional manipulation." Carolyn described a number of incidents in which she contended that Bryan and Joseph's adult sibling "manipulated]" Joseph in an attempt to "disparage" Carolyn and cause Joseph to "cut off ties and communication with" her. In the petition, Carolyn asked that Bryan be ordered to pay her attorney fees "for losses caused by abuse neglect, or exploitation," in the amount of $29,367.82.
¶ 8 Also on March 10, 2022, Carolyn filed a "Proposed Care Plan," in which she alleged that, after Joseph reached the age of majority, she and Bryan had previously continued the visitation plan set out in their joint parenting agreement, however, "recent events" had occurred, "in which [Joseph] was secreted away from [Carolyn], manipulated and isolated away from Carolyn during one of his stays at Bryan's house." Carolyn asserted that "years of animosity and struggles during the divorce proceedings and even thereafter" between her and Bryan, caused her to believe that it was in Joseph's best interests that he "live full-time with Carolyn in her home," and "Bryan should not have any further contact with [Joseph], either in person or by phone or otherwise until further order of Court."
¶ 9 On March 16, 2022, the GAL filed a report, observing that "discord ha[d] arisen between" Carolyn and Bryan, and that "[u]nfortunately, [Joseph] is aware/'in the middle' of the strife." The GAL did not "point fault at either individual" but expressed concern about Carolyn and Bryan's "apparent animosity for each other." The GAL concluded, "All things equal, [Joseph] should have the benefit of seeing/contact with both parents however the *** care plan and petition for order of protection raises issues certainly concerning to [the] GAL."
¶ 10 On March 18, 2022, the trial entered an order granting Bryan time to respond to Carolyn's order of protection and proposed care plan, and Carolyn time to reply. The court also set a temporary visitation schedule, and directed the GAL to engage a professional case manager.
¶ 11 On April 11, 2022, the GAL filed another report. The GAL asserted that since the March 18, 2022, court appearance, "the temperature/tenor seems to have settled down a bit," and the new case manager "has made substantial headway in building rapport, establishing contact with both parents *** and work[ing] toward an eventual report/recommendation on the situation." The GAL expressed his belief that both Carolyn and Bryan "love [Joseph] very much," and the GAL was "hopeful [that] with the [case manager's] involvement, this matter will be on a good path forward."
¶ 12 On April 13, 2022, the trial court set Carolyn's petition for the order of protection for hearing on June 7, 2022.
¶ 13 Bryan responded to Carolyn's petition for the order of protection on April 15, 2022, generally denying the allegations, and asserting that he "did not express, nor would [Bryan] ever encourage anything, but a healthy relationship between [Joseph] and his mother." Bryan denied that Joseph was "exposed to verbal manipulation, emotional and mental abuse" while in Bryan's care, and expressed concern that Carolyn "inten[ded] to permanently remove [Joseph] from the State of Illinois" and to "prohibit contact between" Joseph and Bryan. Bryan accused Carolyn of "manipulating [Joseph] into wanting to move" from Illinois to Texas or Florida.
¶ 14 On May 16, 2022, Carolyn filed a "Petition to Assess Fees and Costs." Carolyn alleged that since the initiation of the guardianship proceedings, Bryan's actions had been "inexcusable, disruptive, combative, unreasonable, harassing, misinformed, and at times, dangerous." Carolyn asserted that Bryan "consistently attempted to usurp the guardianship process and role of the guardian, effectively treating the guardianship as a second round of divorce proceedings." Carolyn again asked for attorney fees and costs related to her petition for the order of protection in the amount of $29,367.82. She also asserted that she had since "incurred additional attorneys' fees and expenses attributable to Bryan, totaling $11,770.00," and asked that the court order him to pay those "fees and costs associated with Bryan's actions, inactions, and behaviors." Carolyn asserted that, "While the Probate Act allows for fees to be assessed against a petitioner should the Ward's estate be insufficient to pay, fees incurred due to Bryan and his actions rather than fees incurred in the best interests of and for [Joseph] should be assessed against Bryan and Bryan alone. See 755 ILCS 5/11a-10."
¶ 15 Also on May 16, 2022, Carolyn filed a petition to relocate Joseph and transfer his guardianship "out of state." Carolyn requested court "approval to relocate [Joseph] to Texas and for approval to transfer the guardianship proceedings and file to Texas." Carolyn alleged that she "and her family have gained new employment in Texas, sold their home in Illinois, and have leased a new home outside of Austin, Texas." Carolyn believed that it was "in [Joseph]'s best interest to move with her to Texas where he will also enroll in an appropriate life skills program as he is set to graduate from high school on May 18, 2022."
¶ 16 On May 31, 2022, Bryan filed a petition for relief under section 2-1401 requesting to vacate or modify Carolyn's appointment as plenary guardian. Bryan alleged that he had agreed to withdraw his petition for guardianship, because he had been led to believe that the "status quo" would remain unchanged. He asserted, however, that Carolyn had "intentionally concealed material facts" including her "intention to permanently remove" Joseph from Illinois to Texas, and that Carolyn "has [used] and continues to use her authority as Plenary Guardian as a weapon against Bryan." Bryan asked the court to vacate the plenary guardianship order, and deny Carolyn's request to remove Joseph from Illinois.
¶ 17 Also on May 31, 2022, the court entered an order. The court noted that Carolyn voluntarily withdrew her petition for the order of protection. The court set briefing schedules on Carolyn's petition to relocate and Bryan's section 2-1401 petition.
¶ 18 An evidentiary hearing was set for August 22, 2022, on Carolyn's petitions to relocate and for fees, and Bryan's 2-1401 petition. However, on August 16, 2022, Bryan filed an emergency motion to reschedule. Bryan asserted that he and Carolyn had engaged in settlement negotiations, and relying on those negotiations, he had not filed responsive pleadings as a "cost saving measure." Carolyn, however, had recently indicated that she was no longer interested in settlement. Bryan asked to strike the current trial dates, and reset briefing schedules on the petitions.
¶ 19 On August 19, 2022, the court granted Bryan's emergency petition to reschedule, over Carolyn's objection. The trial court allowed Bryan 28 days to respond to Carolyn's petitions to relocate and for fees, and to reply to Carolyn's response to his 2-1401 petition. The court set the petitions for trial beginning October 11, 2022. The court noted, however, that Joseph was "currently registered and set to attend programming in Texas," and the parties agreed "to reasonably work together for [Joseph] to visit with Bryan *** between the date of this order and October 11, 2022, so long as the visitation does not interfere with [Joseph]'s programming."
¶ 20 On September 16, 2022, Bryan responded to Carolyn's petition to assess fees. Bryan asserted that Carolyn "must cite some legal authority," for her request for fees, but the only authority Carolyn relied on was Section 5/11a-10 of the Probate Act, which provides that the allocation of GAL fees and costs is "within the discretion of the court," and allows the court to award "counsel of the respondent reasonable compensation." Bryan asserted, however, that the statute did not allow "allocation of fees for Petitioner's Counsel against another party." Because Carolyn "cited no legal authority for the request she has made," Bryan asked that her petition for fees be denied.
¶ 21 On September 30, 2022, Carolyn replied in support of her petition for fees. She alleged that Bryan "has done nothing but impede what could otherwise be a smooth and functioning guardianship for the best interests of Joseph." She also alleged that Bryan "has taken every single opportunity to make simple things complicated and to abuse the judicial system to his benefit and to the detriment of [Joseph], not only to the emotional, physical, and mental detriment of [Joseph], but also to the financial detriment of [Joseph]." Carolyn asserted that her initial fee petition sought fees and costs to be assessed against Bryan in the amount of $41,137.82, and that she subsequently "incurred an additional $38,472.50 in fees and costs due to the actions, delays, and ongoing interference by Bryan." Carolyn alleged that "Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 allows a Court discretion to assess fees against a party that engages in bad-faith pleading," and asked the court to assess fees against Bryan for his "actions, inactions, and behaviors."
¶ 22 On October 11, 2022, Bryan filed a petition for appointment of a standby guardian, asking that he be appointed as standby guardian of Joseph's estate and person. Bryan also filed a petition for visitation, asking the court to establish a visitation schedule for Bryan to visit Joseph, who was currently in Texas.
¶ 23 The same day, the court held the first of a several-day trial on Bryan's 2-1401 petition requesting to vacate or modify Carolyn's appointment as plenary guardian, and Carolyn's petition to relocate. Although the details of the testimony and evidence are not relevant to the resolution of this appeal, the court heard testimony from Carolyn, Bryan, Joseph's sibling, the coordinator for the school Joseph was attending in Texas, Joseph's former doctor, the case manager, the GAL appointed in these probate proceedings, and the GAL appointed in Carolyn and Bryan's postdecree domestic relations proceedings.
¶ 24 On December 6, 2022, the court entered an order denying Bryan's 2-1401 petition, and on March 10, 2023, the trial court entered an order granting Carolyn's petition to relocate. The court found that Joseph was "physically present in Texas," and that Bryan had not established that the transfer would be contrary to Joseph's interests. The court further found that Carolyn's plans for care and services for Joseph in Texas were "reasonable and sufficient" and that she had "made adequate arrangements for management of Joseph Brick's property." Accordingly, the court granted Carolyn's petition, authorized Carolyn to relocate Joseph to Texas, and directed Carolyn to "petition for guardianship to be accepted in Texas." The court further noted that Carolyn and Bryan "agree[d] that the Court continues to have jurisdiction over all currently pending matters until the guardianship is finally accepted by a Texas court," including, in particular, Carolyn's petition for fees.
¶ 25 On March 17, 2023, Carolyn filed a supplemental petition for fees and costs. Carolyn continued to assert that Bryan's "action, inactions, and behaviors" in the guardianship proceedings had caused her to expend significant fees and costs. Carolyn alleged that those actions had "not been done in good faith, but rather to harass and cause needless costs to the Estate," and to "harass and abuse Carolyn." Carolyn asserted that she had incurred fees totaling $99,003.93 since September 30, 2022, "solely attributable to Bryan," and asked the court to assess those fees "against Bryan and Bryan alone." In closing, Carolyn added, for the first time, that Joseph "is a non-minor child with a disability as defined by the Illinois Domestic Relations Act. See 750 ILCS 5/513.5. *** Therefore, any fees and costs assessed against Bryan in favor of Carolyn for the expenses incurred in these proceedings shall be characterized as support for a non-minor child with a disability as [Joseph] is in Carolyn's custody as his Plenary Guardian of Estate and Person, and without an Estate of his own, the Guardian's personal funds are necessary to maintain [Joseph] 's living expenses and needs. All such fees and costs assessed against Bryan and in favor of Carolyn are therefore necessary for [Joseph]'s benefit and best interests as well."
¶ 26 Accordingly, Carolyn asked that the court enter an order "assessing attorneys' fees and costs incurred due to the actions, inactions, and behaviors, whether individually or through counsel, of Bryan Brick against Bryan Brick, individually, and in favor of Carolyn Brick in the amount of $99,003.93 for the period of September 30, 2022, through current, and totaling $178,614.25, for the period of October 27, 2021, through current, finding that this sum is assessed against Bryan as support for a non-minor child with a disability pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/513.5."
¶ 27 On April 7, 2023, Bryan filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss Carolyn's supplemental petition to assess fees and costs. Bryan alleged that Carolyn was also seeking attorney fees and costs in their pending domestic relations post-decree proceedings, that Carolyn did not detail the attorney fees she was seeking in this probate proceeding, and that "[c]learly, Carolyn [w]as seeking the very same relief in two different venues."
¶ 28 On April 21, 2023, Carolyn responded to Bryan's section 2-619 motion to dismiss her supplemental fee petition. Carolyn denied that she was seeking the same fees as in the domestic relations proceeding, asserting that her petition was only seeking those fees and costs incurred in the probate proceedings.
¶ 29 On May 12, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Carolyn's petitions for fees and Bryan's motion to dismiss. Counsel for Carolyn stated that she was "stand[ing] on [her] pleadings," and did not have anything "new to add that wasn't already argued." Counsel for Bryan made one comment, stating that Carolyn's fee request was "very vague" and that it "could include some of the fees that are also sought [in the domestic relations proceedings]. We have no idea because there is no detail." Counsel for Carolyn responded that she was "not the lead attorney in the domestic relations case" and that she "ha[d] no idea what was *** being sought" in those proceedings. Counsel stated, however, that Carolyn's petitions were only seeking "fees that have been incurred *** in these proceedings."
¶ 30 In ruling, the court stated, "I am going to deny the motion to dismiss. And I'm also denying the supplemental petition to assess fees and costs. Parties are responsible for their own attorneys fees."
¶ 31 That same day, the trial court entered a written order denying Bryan's motion to dismiss, and Carolyn's petitions to assess fees and costs against Bryan.
¶ 32 On June 5, 2023, Carolyn filed a petition to confirm transfer of guardianship and to terminate the guardianship proceedings in Illinois. Carolyn alleged that on "June 5, 2023, the State of Texas, *** accepted transfer of the guardianship from *** Illinois." Carolyn attached a copy of the certified order accepting guardianship. Carolyn requested that the court "issue a final order confirming the transfer and terminating the guardianship in Illinois."
¶ 33 On June 9, 2023, the trial court entered an order stating: "The Order of Acceptance entered in the State of Texas *** entered on June 5, 2023, accepting jurisdiction of this guardianship and issuing Letters of Office to Carolyn *** in Texas is hereby accepted." The court found that the guardianship "shall be transferred to *** Texas" and "the guardianship proceedings in *** Illinois are hereby terminated." The court struck Bryan's pending petitions to appoint a standby guardian, and for visitation, and further ordered that the GAL was "discharged with leave to file a fee petition."
¶ 34 Also on June 9, 2023, Carolyn filed a motion to reconsider the order of May 12, 2023, denying her petitions for fees. Carolyn stated that the "theory upon which [she] [wa]s attempting to seek contribution for attorneys fees from Bryan [ ] is pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/513.5 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act." She asserted that, although this proceeding was in the probate division, the probate division "has subject matter jurisdiction to rule upon an order setting support for a disabled adult." Carolyn asserted that section 5/513.5 sets forth relevant factors that the court "shall consider" when making an award of support under that section, and that the court "made no specific findings as to" those factors, and "incorrectly applied the factors" in denying her fee petitions. Carolyn also contended that the statute provided that the court "may consider factors that are just and equitable" and that "[e]quity should prevail in this case to order [Bryan] to pay all or a substantial portion of' Carolyn's fees.
¶ 35 On June 15, 2023, the GAL filed a final fee petition, seeking fees and costs totaling $467.50.
¶ 36 On June 26, 2023, the parties appeared before the court. The court initially expressed confusion as to why the parties were appearing, as the case was "not on the call sheet" and the matter had been transferred to Texas. Counsel for Carolyn explained that Carolyn had filed a motion to reconsider the May 12, 2023 order. The court stated that it was not aware of the motion- the court had not received courtesy copies, and had not reviewed it. Counsel for Bryan expressed that the court had previously stricken Bryan's pending petitions because the matter had been transferred to Texas, that counsel "was not sure that the court has jurisdiction any longer," and counsel believed that "any proceedings going forward were going to be heard in Texas." The court explained that it had "retain[ed] jurisdiction" solely "for payment of *** GAL fees," and expressed confusion as to why the court's time was being spent "on a case that was transferred and it's closed here, and now you filed a motion to reconsider and the case is closed." Counsel for Carolyn responded that the court "retain[ed] jurisdiction to hear the issue of fees," and the court replied, THE COURT: "No, not to hear the issue of fees. It's to make sure that the GAL *** [is] paid. That's what I was retaining jurisdiction for." COUNSEL FOR CAROLYN: And a timely filed motion to reconsider, that's - THE COURT: I didn't say anything about a timely filed -- I mean, that's not contemplated. COUNSEL FOR CAROLYN: No, you did not. You did not. THE COURT: That's not even contemplated. I've never had a motion to reconsider when the case is closed, and the case is closed because your client lives in Texas and wanted the guardianship transferred there."
¶ 37 Counsel for Bryan then argued that it was Carolyn who sought and obtained the transfer to Texas and the termination of proceedings in Illinois, and if she had wanted to "pursu[e] something else, perhaps she should have spoken with her attorneys." The court agreed. The court then stated: COURT: My position is that the case is closed. It was transferred to Texas and *** I'm going to strike your motion to reconsider because the case is closed. *** COUNSEL FOR CAROLYN: Is the court denying the motion or just striking it? COURT: No, I didn't deny it. I struck it because the case is closed here. COUNSEL FOR CAROLYN: Is the court saying that I do not have jurisdiction or the court does not have jurisdiction to hear this? COURT: I'm saying the case is closed as of June 9th, so I'm striking your motion to reconsider.
¶ 38 That same day, the court entered a written order. The order, which was prepared by counsel for Carolyn, stated that Carolyn's motion to reconsider was "stricken from the call because this Court lost jurisdiction of this cause when this matter was transferred to the State of Texas on June 9, 2023." The trial court, however, struck the language "this Court lost jurisdiction of this cause when," from the order before it was entered.
¶ 39 Thereafter, on July 11, 2023, the parties appeared before the court on the GAL's petition for final fees. Counsel for Carolyn stated, "I think the Court would recall that I appeared on June 26th to present a motion to reconsider. And the Court struck the motion; saying this cause has been transferred to Texas. So I would assume that the same motion [ sic ] by the Court is going to be made today but I'm just here out of caution."
¶ 40 The court responded, "Well, no, it's because I retained jurisdiction for payment of [GAL] fees. So this is just another $467.50 of GAL fees." Counsel for Carolyn stated that the GAL's fee petition should not "be given different consideration than [Carolyn]'s fee petition." Counsel asked the court to "put [the GAL]'s petition in the same status as [Carolyn's]. *** [Either] it should be litigated in Texas or I'm asking Court *** set [Carolyn's] motion to reconsider on our fee petition for hearing."
¶ 41 The court responded, "No. Because the case is closed again. I retained jurisdiction for payment of [the GAL] fees. The Court appointed [the GAL]. I'm approving the $476.50. I guess over [Carolyn]'s objection. I don't know. *** I retained jurisdiction for payment of [the GAL's] fees. He's adding $467.00 and I'm approving it."
¶ 42 Following the hearing, the court entered an order awarding the GAL $476.50 in fees. Two days later, on July 13, 2023, the court amended that order to provide that those fees would be assessed "equally ('50/50')" against Carolyn and Bryan.
¶ 43 On July 17, 2023, Carolyn filed a notice of appeal from the May 12, 2023, order denying her petitions for fees, and the June 26, 2023, order striking her motion to reconsider.
¶ 44 In this court, Carolyn argues that the court erred in its May 12, 2023, order denying her request to assess fees against Bryan, and in striking her motion to reconsider that order based on transfer of the guardianship to Texas.
¶ 45 Carolyn completed her opening appellate brief in November 2023. After Bryan did not file a responsive brief within the time prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 343(a), this court entered an order on February 21, 2024, taking the case for consideration on the record and appellant's brief only. We will consider the merits of the appeal because the record is simple and the claimed error can easily be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 133 (1976).
¶ 46 Carolyn first contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for attorney fees to be assessed against Bryan. Two questions are involved in a trial court's decision as to attorney fees: first, whether the court has authority to grant attorney fees, and second whether to award fees in a particular case. See Forest Preserve District of Cook County v. Continental Community Bank &Trust Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 170680, ¶ 32. "[W]hether the court has authority to grant attorney fees is a question of law we review de novo, whereas a court's decision to as to whether to award authorized fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing Spencer v. Di Cola, 2014 IL App (1st) 121585, ¶ 34).
¶ 47 "Illinois follows the 'American Rule,' which provides that absent statutory authority or a contractual agreement, each party must bear its own attorney fees and costs." McNiff v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 384 Ill.App.3d 401, 404 (2008). "Statutes permitting the recovery of attorney fees are thus in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed." Lopez v. RenderedServs., Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 181869, ¶ 16." 'A statute, to be construed strictly, should be confined to such subjects or applications as are obviously within its terms and purposes.'" Erlenbush v. Largent, 353 Ill.App.3d 949, 952 (2004) (quoting Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 82, 86, 107 N.E. 837 (1915)). When considering whether a statutory section permits a party to recover attorney fees, "[o]ur task *** is to determine whether [the statutory section] obviously includes within its fee-shifting provision an award of attorney fees." Lopez, 2019 IL App (1st) 181869, ¶ 17.
¶ 48 In this appeal, Carolyn contends that her request for attorney fees was made pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/513.5 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which governs support for non-minor children with disabilities. Section 5/513.5 provides that the "court may award sums of money out of the property and income of either or both parties or the estate of a deceased parent, as equity may require, for the support of a child of the parties who has attained majority when the child is mentally or physically disabled and not otherwise emancipated." 750 ILCS 5/513.5 (West 2022); see also In re Marriage of Moriarty, 2024 IL App (1st) 230270, ¶ 15. The statute further provides that,
"(b) In making awards under this Section, *** the court shall consider all relevant factors that appear reasonable and necessary, including:
(1) the present and future financial resources of both parties to meet their
needs, including, but not limited to, savings for retirement;
(2) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved. The court may consider factors that are just and equitable;
(3) the financial resources of the child; and
(4) any financial or other resource provided to or for the child including, but not limited to, any Supplemental Security Income, any home-based support provided pursuant to the Home-Based Support Services Law for Mentally Disabled Adults, and any other State, federal, or local benefit available to the non-minor disabled child."
¶ 49 Carolyn presented no authority in the trial court to explain how section 5/513.5 may be interpreted to extend beyond awards of support for a non-minor child with a disability, but to allow for the recovery of attorney fees incurred by the child's parent or guardian. A party's "[f]ailure to raise an issue before the trial court forfeits review of that issue on appeal." Finko v. City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, 2016 IL App (1st) 152888, ¶ 24.
¶ 50 Moreover, even if we were to excuse Carolyn's forfeiture in the trial court, Carolyn also offers no authority in this court to explain how section 5/513.5 allows a trial court to award attorney fees. Rule 341(h)(7) requires the appellant to present reasoned argument and citation to legal authority and to specific portions of the record in support of his or her claim of error. Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7); see McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 15. "[A] party forfeits review of an issue on appeal by failing to support its argument with citation to authorities." International Union of Operating Engineers Local 965 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, 2015 IL App (4th) 140352, ¶ 20; Vine St. Clinic v. HealthLink, Inc., 222 Ill.2d 276, 301 (2006), citing People v. Ward, 215 Ill.2d 317, 332 (2005) ("a point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority fails to satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), and is thus forfeited"); Holzrichter, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 80 (the appellate court is "not a depository in which the burden of argument and research may be dumped.").
¶ 51 In our research, we have similarly found no authority to support Carolyn's claim that Section 5/513.5 could allow the trial court to grant her the relief she seeks. And examining the language of section 5/513.5, we cannot conclude that it "obviously includes" any provision allowing for fee-shifting or an award of attorney fees. See Lopez, 2019 IL App (1st) 181869, ¶ 17. The statute allows for awards of "support" for a non-minor child with disabilities, and contains no reference whatsoever to attorney fees.
¶ 52 Moreover, even if section 5/513.5 could be interpreted as Carolyn suggests, her petitions for fees did not clearly indicate that her requests for attorney fees were being brought pursuant to that section. Prior to her supplemental petition, Carolyn either provided no authority for attorney fees, or asserted that fees should be assessed against Bryan pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137, which she contended, "allows a Court discretion to assess fees against a party that engages in bad-faith pleading." All along, the basis for Carolyn's request was not that Joseph was in need of an award of support, but that Bryan was "abus[ing] the judicial system," engaging in "bad faith pleading," and "harassing] and abus[ing]" Carolyn by his "actions, inactions, and behaviors," during the probate proceedings. The first time Carolyn mentioned section 5/513.5 was in her supplemental petition for fees and costs, in which she asserted only that Joseph qualified as a non-minor child with a disability under that section, and asked that any fees assessed be "characterized as support for a non-minor child with a disability." She did not, however, provide any argument or authority regarding how that section applied to her request, nor she did argue or mention the statutory factors under that section, or submit any evidence as to those factors.
¶ 53 Despite the above failures, Carolyn's specific complaint in this appeal is that the court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, and by failing to make specific findings pursuant to 750 ILCS 5/513.5, before denying her requests. Carolyn contends that the statute provides that the court "shall" consider the delineated factors, and that such language should be "strictly construed" to dictate that "it was mandatory [for] the trial court *** [to] conduct an evidentiary hearing" and to make specific findings, before ruling on her petitions. In particular, Carolyn complains that there was "no testimony as to" certain statutory facts, including, in particular, "the parties['] income or resources."
¶ 54 While Carolyn now complains that the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on her petitions, she did not request an evidentiary hearing, or indicate that such a hearing was necessary. To the contrary, at the hearing on Carolyn's fee petitions, her counsel explicitly stated that she was "stand[ing] on [her] pleadings," and she did not have anything "new to add that wasn't already argued." To the extent that evidence was missing from the record regarding the parties' income or resources that Carolyn wished the trial court to consider in assessing her request, it was incumbent on Carolyn, as the petitioner, to present such evidence to the court in support of her petitions. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Malarz, 2021 IL App (2d) 190984, ¶ 18 (arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.) And if Carolyn believed that section 5/513.5 mandated an evidentiary hearing, she had the opportunity to raise that issue in the trial court, but she did not do so. Id.
¶ 55 In sum, Carolyn has provided no authority-in the trial court or this court-suggesting that section 5/513.5 can be used to recover attorney fees from another party; she did not properly raise that issue in the trial court; and, in any event, she did not request an evidentiary hearing or provide any evidence to the trial court which would have allowed the court to assess her request under that section. In these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's denial of her petitions to assess fees and costs against Bryan.
¶ 56 Carolyn next contends that the trial court wrongly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion to reconsider. She does not provide any particular argument on why, after the trial court transferred the case to Texas at her request, the trial court should have considered her motion to reconsider. Carolyn's only specific complaint is that, because the trial court heard the GAL's fee petition, it should have also heard her motion to reconsider. She asserts that "if the trial court believe[d] it c[ould] hear [the GAL's] petition for fees" after the guardianship was transferred to Texas, it "should have been able to hear C[arolyn]'s motion to reconsider."
¶ 57 Although Carolyn couches her challenge in term of "jurisdiction," contending that the trial court actually had jurisdiction over her motion to reconsider, the record is clear that the trial court did not strike her motion to reconsider "for lack of jurisdiction." Indeed, the court specifically struck language from the order prepared by Carolyn's attorney that the court "lost jurisdiction of this cause." Instead, the trial court struck her motion to reconsider, because Carolyn had previously moved the court to transfer the case to Texas and close the case in Illinois, and it had done so. In allowing Carolyn's motion, however, the court explicitly retained jurisdiction over the matter, so that the GAL, who had been appointed by the court and who had provided services to the parties in Illinois, could file a final fee petition without having to travel to Texas. The trial court's limited retention of the cause, however, did not require it to consider Carolyn's motion to reconsider, where she had previously maintained that Texas was the appropriate forum to handle any further disputes.
¶ 58 Finally, we also note that because we previously found that Carolyn's underlying petitions for fees were legally meritless where section 5/513.5 did not provide authority for the trial court to grant her requested relief, we find no error in the trial court's striking of her motion to reconsider the denial of those petitions.
¶ 59 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 60 Affirmed.