Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. 2075-DEP
Margulies, J.
The mother of Brianna C. (Mother) appeals from a final judgment terminating her parental rights and setting adoption as the permanent plan for Brianna. Mother contends that: (1) her counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Brianna, (2) the juvenile court abdicated its duty to ensure that visitation continued after the termination of services, (3) no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s denial of the parental relationship exception, (4) the court failed to consider Brianna’s wishes, and (5) the court improperly based its decision on allegations concerning a nonparty who should have been provided services and an opportunity to establish his parental relationship with Brianna. Finding no error or deprivation of rights, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Brianna, born in April 2001, was first removed from Mother’s home in June 2001, when Mother was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance, operating a methamphetamine lab in her home, and child endangerment. In March and July 2003, Mother sought assistance from law enforcement because Brianna, who was two years old at the time, had “ ‘wandered off’ ” while in her father’s care. On January 27, 2005, the Clearlake Police Department conducted a welfare check on Brianna’s home at the request of Brianna’s school. With the permission of Mother and her live-in boyfriend, Larry L., the police entered the residence, a double-wide trailer, and observed it to be very messy and cluttered with miscellaneous items. Dirty dishes were stacked in the sink and an “extension wire” (apparently, a power strip) was lying across the floor in Brianna’s bedroom. Code enforcement officials inspected the residence and red-tagged it for unsafe conditions.
According to Mother, the under the influence charge was dismissed and no charges were ultimately filed regarding the methamphetamine lab. No evidence contradicting Mother’s assertions appears in the record.
Brianna was detained, and the Lake County Department of Social Services filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 alleging, among other things, that: (1) there was a substantial risk of physical harm or illness to Brianna due to Mother’s “chronic negligent failure to provide adequate protection and/or shelter for the child”; (2) Mother’s home was red-tagged because it was unsanitary and unsafe due to exposed wiring, excessive debris, and poor maintenance; (3) Mother received SSI benefits for a diagnosed mental illness that interfered with her ability to provide regular care and adequate supervision and protection of her child; and (4) Brianna’s father was incarcerated and unable to arrange for the child’s care.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal, and ordered Brianna detained under the department’s supervision. A jurisdiction hearing was held on February 22, 2005. Mother had moved by that time to her sister’s home in Santa Rosa. Jurisdiction was not contested. After finding jurisdiction, the Lake County juvenile court transferred the case to Sonoma County where Mother was living, which it found to be Brianna’s legal residence.
The disposition hearing was held in Sonoma County on April 13, 2005. Brianna’s natural father, Chris B., waived his right to appear at the hearing. In its disposition report, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) recommended that Mother be offered reunification services but that no services be offered to Chris B. The court ordered Brianna removed from the parents’ custody and control and required that reunification services be provided to Mother. Brianna was placed in a foster home.
At the six-month review hearing in September 2005, the court continued reunification services to Mother for another six months. At that time, Mother was sharing a Santa Rosa home with five roommates. Brianna continued to reside with a licensed foster parent who was prepared to provide a permanent placement if reunification was not successful. Mother was having day visits with Brianna in her home and was hoping to build up to overnight and weekend visits. Beginning in December 2005, Mother began having weekly unsupervised overnight visits as well as unsupervised day visits with Brianna.
Brianna has remained in the same foster home since April 26, 2005.
The 12-month review hearing was held on March 16, 2006. The Department’s status review report discussed the social worker’s concern about Mother’s continued relationship with Larry despite her recognition that the relationship was not beneficial for her or Brianna. According to the report, Mother allowed Brianna to talk to Larry who Brianna calls “ ‘daddy.’ ” Brianna returned from one visit and stated that she had a “ ‘big secret’ ” that her mom let her talk to “ ‘daddy’ ” and that he might live with them when she goes home. Brianna said that she was not supposed to tell the secret because her mom would get in trouble. Mother admitted to the social worker that she let Brianna speak to Larry on the speakerphone but she denied telling Brianna it was a “ ‘big secret’ ” and denied that Larry had said anything about living with them. The social worker reported that although Mother continued to make progress, she could not recommend that Brianna be returned to her because Mother continued to struggle with making appropriate decisions for Brianna and taking precautions to protect Brianna and herself. Nonetheless, the social worker believed there was a substantial probability that with continued services Mother would reunify with Brianna by the 18-month deadline for reunification services, and recommended that the court continue services for Mother.
Mother met Larry two months before Brianna’s removal. She met him when he offered her and Brianna a ride home from a Wal-Mart, after which he spent the night with her and wound up staying the next two months until Brianna’s detention. The status review report states that Larry was on felony parole and was in drug rehabilitation. Mother reported that Larry had made strange comments to her concerning Brianna to the effect that God was punishing her by taking her daughter away and that she should sacrifice her daughter as God sacrificed his only son. The Department later obtained information from Larry’s parole officer that Larry had never successfully completed parole, and that he had a history of mental illness and of making threatening statements to women with whom he was involved.
The court found there was a “substantial probability” that Brianna would be returned to Mother’s physical custody during the extended service period based on Mother’s: (1) consistent contact and visitation with Brianna; (2) significant progress in resolving problems that led to Brianna’s removal; and (3) demonstration of the ability to complete the treatment plan objectives and provide for Brianna’s safety, protection, well-being, and special needs.
Brianna’s overnight visits with Mother increased to twice per week in April 2006. On April 15, 2006, a concerned party called to advise that Larry was at Mother’s home with a U-Haul trailer attached to Mother’s car and that the “family” was planning to move. Law enforcement was immediately dispatched to Mother’s home. Mother denied any plans to move and claimed she did not know Larry would be visiting. Mother and Larry told police that Larry was taking Mother’s car to fix it. Brianna told the social worker that Mother had told her that if the social worker knew Larry was at their house the social worker would take Brianna away. The social worker learned that Larry’s parole officer had given him a two-day pass on April 12, 2006 so that Larry could come to Sonoma County to help his friend “Louise” move. As a result of this incident, Mother’s visits with Brianna became supervised and took place at the California Parenting Institute. Mother told the parent educator, Karen Church, that the “April event was closure for her, and that Brianna would not be seeing Larry again.” Mother testified at trial that she told the social worker in May that the April incident was the end of her relationship with Larry.
In its 18-month status review report, the Department recommended termination of reunification services to Mother and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing. The report states, “Unfortunately, [Mother] has a difficult time keeping her daughter away from unsafe/inappropriate situations.” The social worker was particularly concerned about Mother’s relationship with Larry, her conflicting statements about her intention to end that relationship, and her inability to appreciate that Larry presented a danger to her daughter. The social worker also emphasized Mother’s unwillingness to accept her own responsibility for events such as the red-tagging of her residence and Larry’s April 2006 visit. The report noted that despite the extensive services that had been provided to improve her parenting skills, “[Mother] has been unable to utilize the tools offered to her to keep her and her daughter in safe, appropriate situations.” The report concluded: “Unfortunately, there are no more Family Reunification services to offer to [Mother] and the only decision before the Court is whether or not Brianna should return to her mother’s care. The Department cannot recommend return of the child to the mother.”
Mother contested the Department’s recommendation and the matter proceeded to trial on August 29, 2006. At the outset of the hearing, Mother revealed that she had married Larry four days earlier. She acknowledged having informed the social worker three weeks earlier that her relationship with Larry was over. The social worker testified about Mother’s history of developing relationships with individuals who were controlling and dominant. Mother had previously been in an 11-year relationship with a violent person who had inflicted serious head injuries on Mother and many other minor injuries. She had met Brianna’s father while he was incarcerated and he had also engaged in threatening and sometimes violent behavior toward her. The social worker explained that she was very concerned based on this history, and Mother’s apparent repetition of the pattern with Larry, that Mother was unable to protect Brianna from individuals who posed a threat to her.
The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 2007. The court advised Mother that “pending the section 366.26 hearing . . . visits with the child will be based upon the child’s needs which may result in a reduction of visitation.” Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition, but no writ was ever filed. The contested selection and implementation hearing was later continued to March 2, 2007.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Brianna was likely to be adopted and that the termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to her. The court ordered a permanent plan of adoption for Brianna and terminated the parental rights of Mother and Chris B. Mother timely appealed.
The parties had stipulated that Brianna was adoptable.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends that: (1) her counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Brianna, (2) the trial court abdicated its duty to ensure that visitation continued after the termination of services, (3) no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s denial of the parental relationship exception, (4) the Department improperly failed to obtain Brianna’s input into whether she wanted to maintain a relationship with Mother and the court failed to consider her preferences, and (5) the court improperly based its decision on allegations concerning a nonparty who should have been provided services and an opportunity to establish his parental relationship with Brianna.
A. Ineffective Assistance
A counsel’s failure to object to jurisdiction or appeal a jurisdictional ruling may be raised on appeal from a section 366.26 termination of parental rights when “ ‘there simply could be no satisfactory explanation’ ” for counsel’s failure to act. (In re S. D. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077.) Mother claims this is such a case.
Mother argues that there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s failure to object to jurisdiction because the Department asserted shifting grounds for juvenile court jurisdiction over the course of this proceeding, none of which was sufficient. First, the Department claimed that Mother’s house was messy and cluttered. Then, when Mother had moved out of the home by the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the Department asserted Mother’s mental health as a basis for dependency jurisdiction. Finally, the social worker cited Mother’s allegedly subservient relationships with dangerous individuals as the ground for maintaining jurisdiction.
In our view, Mother mischaracterizes the record. The initial section 300 petition alleged Mother’s “chronic negligent failure to provide adequate protection and/or shelter for the child” and further alleged that her diagnosed mental illness interfered with her ability to provide regular care and adequate supervision and protection of her child. The petition also cited Brianna’s past involvement with the dependency system going back to 2001 and alleged that “[t]he issues warranting intervention were the same as those noted at the current detainment: general neglect in providing basic necessities, poor supervision, and an unsafe home.”
The theme of Mother’s chronic inability to adequately protect Brianna from harm has been predominant and consistent throughout the current proceeding. This was manifested graphically in the condition of Mother’s home when Brianna was first detained. It was not simply “messy and cluttered.” The trailer home was in fact filled with debris and presented obvious dangers to a three-year-old child, as illustrated by the pictures in the record and by the fact that it was red-tagged. Just because the immediate danger ended when Brianna was removed from the home, the court was not required to ignore the decisions by Mother that had created those dangerous conditions in the first place. To the contrary, before returning Brianna to her custody the court was obligated by law to evaluate whether Mother’s decisionmaking abilities regarding Brianna were impaired and whether Brianna would in fact be safe in her care. In that context, Mother’s ongoing relationship with Larry—in spite of copious warning signs that he presented a serious risk to Brianna—was highly pertinent evidence. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Brianna was not predicated on the condition of the trailer or on her mother’s relationship with Larry, but on Mother’s capacity to protect Brianna from harm.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mother must show that: (1) counsel failed to act in a manner expected of reasonably competent attorneys practicing in the field of juvenile dependency law, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1667–1668; In re Dennis H. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 103.) We find no evidence in this record to demonstrate that counsel acted unprofessionally by failing to contest jurisdiction, nor in our view would taking such an action have altered the outcome of the proceeding. This is not a case where Mother’s factual and legal arguments against dependency jurisdiction were so strong that there can be no satisfactory explanation for her counsel’s failure to make them. (In re S. D., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.)
B. Abdication of Duty to Ensure Visitation
Mother maintains that the juvenile court abdicated its duty to ensure that visitation continued after the termination of services. At the 18-month review hearing held on September 1, 2006, the court stated: “The parents are advised that pending a section 366.26 hearing, visits with the child will be based upon the child’s needs which may result in a reduction of visitation.” Thereafter, Mother had supervised visits every other week in September and October 2006. Visits were reduced to one supervised visit in November on the recommendation of Brianna’s therapist and the social worker. The last time Mother was allowed to visit Brianna was December 12, 2006. At that time, the selection and implementation hearing was set for hearing on January 4, 2007. Mother contested the Department’s recommendation for adoption, and the matter was set for a settlement conference and placed on the master calendar for February 7, 2007. It was continued again to March 2, 2007 and the section 366.26 hearing was completed on that date.
Section 366.21, subdivision (h) provides that after the termination of services “[t]he court shall continue to permit the parent or legal guardian to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child. The court shall make any other appropriate orders to enable the child to maintain relationships with individuals, other than the child’s siblings, who are important to the child, consistent with the child’s best interests.”
In this case, Mother’s visitation was first reduced and then ended in December 2006, based on Brianna’s anxiety concerning the visits. The social worker testified that she recommended that visits be terminated because “Brianna continues to have anxiousness and worries about her safety after every visit. . . . And the therapist was concerned about the behaviors that Brianna was showing and was hoping she would be able to really settle down and feel safe if the visits were ending and reunification services had ended. We were moving towards this hearing, and . . . towards the adoption.” In the Department’s section 366.26 report, the social worker wrote that she and Brianna’s therapist recommended termination of visitation due to Brianna’s “continued fear and anxiousness for her safety and safety of her [foster mother], following visits with her mother.” There is no indication in the record that Mother sought increased visitation at any time after her visitation was first reduced in September or after it was ended in December.
Relying primarily on In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 (Hunter S.), Mother argues that it was improper for the court to delegate to the Department the decision of “whether or not to allow any visitation.” (See also, In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008–1009 [“[t]he juvenile court has the sole power to determine whether visitation will occur and may not delegate its power to grant or deny visitation to the [social services agency]”]; In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1476–1478 [court cannot leave visitation rights to the children’s therapists’ sole discretion].) In Hunter S., the minor refused contact with his mother for a three-year period and the court refused to compel visitation despite the mother’s repeated requests. (Hunter S., at pp. 1501–1504.) Although there was a visitation order in place, the juvenile court held in response to the mother’s requests that it did not have “the power or duty to ensure visits actually took place.” (Id. at p. 1505.) The appellate court in Hunter S. found that the juvenile court had thus abdicated its duty by delegating to the minor and his therapist the power to decide whether visitation would take place. (Ibid.)
We do not find the facts here comparable to those in cases that have found an impermissible abdication of duty. First, the purpose of the trial court’s statement regarding visitation was simply to put Mother on notice that her “interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child [would] no longer [be] paramount” once reunification services were terminated, and that issues of visitation would henceforth be determined by focusing on the child’s needs for permanency and stability. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) That is a correct statement about how visitation issues would be approached if they arose in the period after services have been terminated. It cannot be construed as an order delegating the question of whether to allow visitation to a third party. Although Mother now asserts that she wanted more visitation, she never in fact presented the court with a visitation issue to decide and is therefore in no position to complain, based solely on the language cited, that it abdicated its duty to do so.
Hunter S. is plainly distinguishable because in that case the trial court expressly held that it had no power to grant the mother’s repeated requests for visitation if the minor objected. The trial court made no such holding here. In re Christopher H. upheld a reunification-period order for “ ‘reasonable’ visitation” against a claim of unlawful delegation, sharply distinguishing such an order from a juvenile court directive ceding exclusive control over whether any visitation would occur at all to the social services agency: “The court may . . . delegate discretion to determine the time, place and manner of the visits. Only when the court delegates the discretion to determine whether any visitation will occur does the court improperly delegate its authority and violate the separation of powers doctrine.” (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009, italics added; see also In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756–759, to the same effect.)
Mother also cites In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941 (David D.). David D. involved a unique factual setting in which the juvenile court had indefinitely suspended a mother’s visitation rights during the reunification period as a punitive measure to force her to turn over medical records pertaining to her attempted suicide. (Id. at pp. 952–953.) Despite the suspension of visitation, the juvenile court found that reasonable reunification services had been provided to the parents, terminated those services, and set a section 366.26 hearing. (David D., at p. 953.) At that hearing, in the face of overwhelming evidence of a strong parental bond, the social services agency used the court-ordered prohibition against visitation as an argument against applying the statutory exception to the termination of parental rights under subdivision (c)(1)(A) of section 366.26 (parent has maintained regular visitation with the minor and the minor would benefit from continuing the relationship). (David D., at pp. 954–955.) On these facts, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s termination of parental rights and ordered that the mother receive six more months of reunification services as well as visitation. (Id. at p. 956.)
In this case, Mother received a full 18 months of reunification services accompanied by increasing visitation rights. Unsupervised home visitation was only curtailed after the Department became concerned that Larry and Mother were attempting to leave the area with Brianna in April 2006. The juvenile court here did not act to gain leverage over Mother by interfering with her visitation and it did not use the lack of visitation as a reason to terminate her parental rights. In fact, the juvenile court specifically advised Mother’s counsel that in deciding whether any exception to termination applied it would not consider “the fact that your client has had no regular visits since December of 2006 in light of the fact [that] it was governmental action that prevented your client from having the contact.” David D. is not apposite here.
If Mother had requested that visitation continue after December 12, 2006, and the court had declined to consider the request on the grounds that it was up to the Department to decide whether visitation was in Brianna’s interests, that would have been an unlawful delegation under the case law. But on the factual record we have before us, no such claim can be sustained.
C. Substantial Evidence
Mother argues that no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s denial of the parental relationship exception provided for in subdivision (c)(1)(A) of section 366.26.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides in relevant part as follows: “If the court determines . . . by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. . . . A finding . . . that the court has continued to remove the child from the custody of the parent . . . and has terminated reunification services, shall constitute a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child [because] . . . [¶] (A) [t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) expresses the Legislature’s preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) The parent carries the burden of demonstrating that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor under one of the statutory exceptions. (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164.) Some reviewing courts have evaluated determinations under subdivision (c)(1) under the substantial evidence standard. (See, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575–577.) It has also been held that a finding as to whether there is a “ ‘compelling reason’ ” under subdivision (c)(1) not to terminate parental rights is a “quintessentially discretionary determination” that is subject to review for abuse of that discretion. (See In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) We subscribe to the latter view. However, our conclusion under either standard of review would be the same. The abuse of discretion standard is very similar to the substantial evidence standard when, as here, the reviewing court examines a factual determination made by the juvenile court based on its evaluation of conflicting evidence. (Ibid.)
The parental relationship exception has been construed to apply in the following circumstances: “the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
There is no dispute whether the first prong of the exception was satisfied. The Department concedes that Mother maintained regular visitation and contact with Brianna. Mother maintains that she also satisfied her burden of proving the second prong—that continuation of the parent-child relationship would be so beneficial for Brianna that it outweighs the well-being she would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.
Mother testified as follows: Mother was Brianna’s sole caregiver for almost four years until Child Protective Services removed her. Brianna called Mother her “[r]eal mommy” and referred to her foster mother as her “pretend mommy.” According to Mother, Brianna had told her in October or November of 2005 that she would sometimes wake up at night and would want to “run away home.” Mother testified that Brianna told her “she really, really wants to come home” and that Brianna believed and told her that “God [was] going to bring her home some day.” Mother did not address the impact that her marriage to Larry would have on Brianna if her parental relationship with Brianna continued.
Mother also suggested, without explicitly saying so, that Brianna had actually tried to run away from her foster home and her school, and that her foster mother had even installed an alarm system to prevent this. However, no substantial evidence was presented to support Mother’s insinuations on these points. The social worker testified that the alarm system makes Brianna feel safe and that she looked forward to her foster mother turning it on every night.
Considerable evidence in the record contradicted Mother’s testimony. According to the section 366.26 report, Brianna was thriving in her prospective adoptive home. Her mental and emotional status had greatly improved, she felt “comfortable and happy” in the home, and she had a close and affectionate relationship with her prospective adoptive mother. The report concluded that Brianna “would benefit from the establishment of a permanent parent/child relationship through adoption.” At the hearing, the social worker testified that Brianna felt safe with her foster mother and “doesn’t want to go anywhere. She wants to stay with her foster mom.” She further testified that Brianna was anxious and worried about her safety after every visit with her mother, and that she settled down after the visits ended.
Mother argues at some length that Brianna exhibited “text-book” signs of attachment disorder, stemming from the loss of her relationship with her mother. Although the record shows that Brianna had ongoing behavioral issues, it is sheer speculation to attribute those to the disruption of her child-parent relationship rather than to her entire childhood history, including injurious and traumatic events that predated her removal.
Thus, the evidence here was in sharp conflict. The juvenile court was not required to accept Mother’s testimony and reject the contrary evidence. The court could reasonably conclude that Mother’s testimony was self-serving and that the social worker had greater objectivity about the facts. Moreover, the burden of proof on Mother was considerable. It was not enough for her to put in evidence that Brianna might derive some benefit from a continuation of the parental relationship. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.) At this stage of the proceedings, after 18 months of reunification services had been provided, all presumptions are turned in favor of Brianna’s interest in a stable and permanent placement. (Ibid.) Mother had to credibly demonstrate that Brianna would be “greatly” harmed if her parental rights were terminated. (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.) On this record, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to hold that she fell short of doing so.
D. Failure to Determine Brianna’s Preferences
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in failing to require that Brianna’s preferences be determined either by direct testimony or by some less formal means.
While a child’s wishes must be considered at the permanency planning hearing, a direct statement from the child is not required where this is contrary to the child’s best interests. (§ 366.26, subd. (h)(1); In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.3d 681, 687.) In a section of its section 366.26 report entitled “Children’s Attitude Toward Placement and Adoption,” the Department stated that Brianna had not been interviewed overtly concerning her attitude toward placement and adoption in order to spare her from the anxiety and uncertainty this might evoke. The Department instead relied in that portion of its report on observable indications that Brianna was comfortable and happy in her prospective adoptive home, and engaged in affectionate, reciprocal interactions with her foster mother. The Department also reported that Brianna referred to her mother as her “ ‘old mommy’ ” and her foster mother as her “ ‘new mommy.’ ” In addition, the juvenile court obtained input about Brianna’s preferences from the attorney appointed to represent her interests, who was charged by statute with ascertaining the child’s wishes, and who strongly supported the adoption plan. (§ 317, subd. (e).)
The form in which the child’s wishes are presented to the juvenile court is left to the court’s discretion. (See In re Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 687; In re Jesse B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 845, 853.) We find no abuse of discretion here.
E. Failure to Join Larry as a Party
Mother complains that the termination of her parental rights was based largely on the fact that she married Larry and on negative conduct and attitudes attributed to him, yet he was never represented in or made a party to the proceedings. According to Mother, Larry qualified to be considered Brianna’s presumed father because he helped to raise her and she considers him to be her “daddy.”
Mother did not challenge the determination that Chris B. was Brianna’s presumed father at any time in the juvenile court proceedings. She has therefore waived her present claim that Larry was the presumed father. (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 590.) Since Larry never asserted that he was Brianna’s presumed father, it is not clear why Mother should have standing to assert his alleged rights. (See In re Jenelle C. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 813, 818.) In any event, Mother cites no facts or legal authorities that would justify elevating Larry’s two-month stay in Brianna’s home into presumed fatherhood status.
Larry had no due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in this case, and the juvenile court did not lack jurisdiction to proceed in his absence.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Stein, J.