Opinion
F043007.
9-30-2003
In re BRET C. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KIRSTEN C., Defendant and Appellant.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Phillip S. Cronin, County Counsel, and Howard K. Watkins, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Gomes, J.
Kirsten C. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her children, Bret and Brooklyn C. Appellant contends the court should have found termination was detrimental to the children by virtue of her relationship with them. On review, we disagree and affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
In September 2001, the Fresno County Superior Court adjudged six-year-old Bret and three-year-old Brooklyn dependent children of the court and formally removed them from appellants custody. Respondent Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (department) detained the children in February 2001 when a third party found the children unsupervised and the mother passed out due to alcohol consumption. Further investigation revealed Brooklyn, who suffered from hepatitis and cystic fibrosis, was awaiting a liver transplant and had not timely received her medication. The children were also exposed to domestic violence and appellant struck Bret with a spatula and a spoon, causing the child harm. The court exercised its jurisdiction over the children under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).
Because appellant had a lengthy history of drug and alcohol abuse and failed to rehabilitate despite previous reunification services, the court denied her reunification services in this case. It did order, however, supervised visitation. It also set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for the children. The court also ordered a bonding study between the children and appellant.
The psychologist who completed the study in February 2002 reported there was a positive emotional parent-child relationship "on the surface, but the strength of that bond is questionable due to [the mothers] overbearing presence and manipulative behavior with the children." As the psychologist proceeded to explain:
"These qualities suggest an unhealthy and needy adult who looks to the children to meet her needs rather than the parent being there to meet the childrens needs. It is likely that Brett would be adversely effected if the relationship with Kirsten was severed since he states he wants to live with her and wanted to know when he would see her again. She has told him they are going to live together and given him hope about a new future, living with his sister and with her.
"However, it is just as likely that he is at risk of enduring another relapse with his mothers chronic alcohol problem and all that goes along with that lifestyle. It would be traumatic for him to go through this again.
"Brooklyn would be less effected by severing the relationship due to her young age when removed from mothers care. She seemed very secure about leaving Kirsten at the end of the sessions, taking her foster mothers hand and walking to the car."
Although the court originally calendared the section 366.26 hearing for February 2002, there were numerous continuances. Many of the initial continuances were due to efforts to place the children together in a prospective adoptive home. By September 2002, that goal was accomplished. The court in turn set a new section 366.26 hearing for early January 2003.
Because the department was unable to locate Brets father and give him notice, another lengthy continuance became necessary. By the further hearing date in early March 2003, it was undisputed that the children were adoptable. At that hearing, counsel, with the exception of appellants attorney, extolled the benefits of the childrens placement.
Appellants attorney, however, reported his client had information that the children may not be doing as well as expected. He claimed the children had been diagnosed with anxiety disorder which "may be indicative of the difficulty of the placement." He in turn asked the court to continue the hearing further to be certain the placement was going to be appropriate. The attorneys representations led to considerable discussion and eventually three additional hearings spanning into April 2003.
Over time, the record discloses that the department caused the children to participate in a mental health assessment in late December 2002. According to the assessments, each child suffered symptoms consistent with anxiety and depression. In the therapists opinion, the childrens symptoms were related in different ways to their visits with their mother. She had apparently commented to Bret that he would return to live with her which made the child confused. As for Brooklyn, she was fearful she would have to leave her adoptive home and go to her mothers home. The therapist recommended a reduction in the childrens visits with appellant and relationship therapy between them and their adoptive mother.
The court, however, had not reduced the visits despite the departments request in January 2003 to do so. Also, the relationship therapy did not start immediately due to a variety of logistical problems. For her part, appellant claimed she was entirely appropriate with the children during the visits and the children wanted to be with her.
In response, the court first ordered future visits should be unforced and the children should start the recommended therapy session. Meanwhile, another concern arose over whether the mother was giving or withholding gifts to the children depending on if they visited with her. Without resolving the factual question, the court ordered the mother not to bring gifts to the children at visits. Finally, at an April 1, 2003, hearing, the court terminated visitation due to the conflict the children experienced. Although the court explained it still intended to terminate parental rights, it continued the matter for another four weeks to see if the prospective adoptive parents were still committed to adopting Bret and Brooklyn. Appellants attorney had questioned the level of the prospective adoptive familys commitment based on the following comment in an addendum report by the department.
"At this time the childrens placement is at risk of disrupting due to the emotional hardship the careproviders are experiencing as the result of their first hand experience of seeing how the children react after the visits with [their mother]. As any parent would, the careproviders, are pained to see the children conflicted. The prospective adoptive parents have stated that if the visits are not reduced they will be forced to request that the children be placed somewhere else."
At the final hearing in late April, the department prepared yet another addendum attesting to the prospective adoptive parents commitment. The parties then submitted the matter. The court in turn terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant claims there was substantial evidence that termination would be detrimental to her children because she maintained regular visitation and contact with them and they would benefit from the continuing the relationship (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)). When a juvenile court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is not one of substantial evidence but whether the juvenile court abused its discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) On review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion.
A section 366.26 hearing is designed to protect childrens compelling rights to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.) If, as in this case, the children are likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
In this case, appellant certainly maintained regular visitation with her children. However, there was no evidence to compel the juvenile court to find that the children would benefit from a continued relationship. Indeed, we are frankly surprised by appellants argument given the history of this case. While she urges, based on the 2002 bonding study and other earlier evidence, that there was a positive parent-child relationship, she ignores evidence developed at the same time that: (a) the strength of the bond was questionable due to her behavior, and (b) she seemed to look to the children to meet her needs rather than her being there to meet their needs. There was also later evidence regarding her childrens symptoms of anxiety and depression. In the trial court, appellant clearly tried to attribute her childrens distress to their adoptive parents. However, the court apparently did not share appellants point of view.
In addition, the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), requires that the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Here, appellant presented no such evidence. Thus, we conclude the court properly exercised its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.