Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County Nos. DP005883, DP005884, DP005885, Caryl Lee, Judge.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Aristeo S.
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Maria P.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Paula A. Whaley, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Neil R. Trop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minors Jesus S. and Luis S.
Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minor Brenda S.
Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minors Marco S. and Andrew S.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
Aristeo S., also known as Aricio S. (father), and Maria P. (mother) appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights to Brenda S. (age 10), Marco (age 7), and Andrew (age 6). (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; all further statutory references are to this code.) Mother joins father in contending the juvenile court erred in finding the children adoptable and by failing to apply the sibling benefit exception to termination, since any future adoption would not include the children’s teenage brothers, Jesus and Luis. Father also argues the juvenile court erred in concluding the benefits of adoption outweighed any benefits from maintaining his parental rights to the children. Counsel appointed for Jesus and Luis sides with mother and father on the sibling exception, while counsel for the younger children agree with the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) that the juvenile court correctly freed them for adoption. Because substantial evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court, we may not substitute on appeal our judgment or that of the parents. We therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plight of these children comes before us for the fourth time in the six years they have languished as dependents. Most recently, we rejected father’s writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s order setting a permanent plan selection hearing (see Aristeo S. v. Superior Court (April 10, 2007, G038015) [nonpub. opn.]). For the sake of brevity and the reader’s convenience, we restate the following background information from that opinion:
“Jesus, Luis, Brenda, Marco, and Andrew, ranging in age from 8 years to 1 year old, were removed from the custody of their parents in December 2001. The parents, Aristeo and Maria S., had a history of severe domestic violence and some physical abuse of the children. Brenda disclosed sexual abuse by Aristeo. Dependency petitions were filed and sustained under section 300, subdivisions (b) [failure to protect], (c) [severe emotional abuse] and (d) [sexual abuse by a parent].
“The parents received 18 months of reunification services but were unsuccessful at reunifying with the children. In August 2003 the juvenile court terminated services and referred the children to a permanent plan selection hearing. (§ 366.26.) The parents filed petitions under California Rules of Court, former rule 39.1B, seeking relief from the referral orders. We denied the petitions in an unpublished opinion filed on December 8, 2003 (Aricio S. v. Superior Court (G032725)).
“The permanent plan selection hearing was continued several times. Shortly before the hearing was ultimately held, Aristeo filed a petition under section 388, seeking the return of his children or unmonitored overnight visits. The petition was denied, and Aristeo appealed. We affirmed the order denying the petition in an unpublished opinion filed February 28, 2005 (In re Jesus S. (G034115)).
“The first permanent plan selection hearing was held in May 2004. Luis and Jesus were placed together in the foster home of Jackie C., where they had been since June 2003. Brenda, Marco and Andrew were placed together in the foster home of Maria R. and Francisco M., where they had been since February 2003. The juvenile court found all five children ‘[have] a probability for adoption, but [are] difficult to place and there is no identified or available prospective adoptive parent. . . .’ The hearing was continued for 180 days, during which time SSA was ordered to ‘attempt to locate placement that will accept/adopt all minors[,] otherwise[ ] Brenda, Marco and Andrew to be placed together and Jesus and Luis are to be placed together and Social Services to ensure families that will allow contact between siblings.’
“In December 2004, SSA reported the children had been visiting with each other weekly for two hours. The parents visited the children once a month and kept in contact by telephone. Marco and Andrew, who were then five and four, respectively, were considered adoptable by the social worker because ‘[t]hough they are members of a sibling set, the children are in good health and are of a young age. The children are developmentally on target with some normal tantrum behavior.’ Brenda, who was then eight years old, was considered difficult to place because she was a member of a sibling set and over the age of seven. Her therapist was ‘working with Brenda about her feelings on being separated from her mother.’ When the social worker asked her about adoption, ‘she became very emotional and started to cry.’ However, Brenda also ‘stated that she would like to live with her older brothers and asked if they could come live with her. Brenda stated she would like to live with her current foster mother.’
“Jackie C. did not want to adopt Jesus and Luis, and the two boys were emphatic that they did not want to sever ties to their parents. [Fn. omitted.] Maria R. and Francisco M. felt attached to the three younger children, but they were concerned about the mother's ‘past threats . . . to run away with the children and bring harm to the foster parents and their family.’ A bonding study revealed that all the siblings ‘recognize one another as a set of siblings, who share a common origin, history and relatives. Particularly in the long-term, it would be invaluable for them to have one another as they go on in life.’ The social worker recommended long-term foster care for the children in the absence of an adoptive home. The foster parents agreed to provide a home for the children until an adoptive family could be found.
“In January 2005, the juvenile court continued the permanent plan selection hearing for Marco and Andrew to July ‘to allow SSA to continue to search for adoptive home for minors.’ The court found Brenda was not adoptable and ordered long-term foster care as her permanent plan. Her periodic review hearing was also set for July, and SSA was ordered to ‘continue to make efforts to locate an adoptive home.’
“The children remained in long-term foster care for the next 18 months while SSA searched for an adoptive home. At a hearing in October 2005, the juvenile court found Andrew and Marco not adoptable and ordered them into a permanent plan of long-term foster care; Brenda’s plan of long-term foster care was ordered to continue. For a while, SSA considered separating Andrew and Marco from Brenda to facilitate the younger children’s placement, but by the time of the report in June 2006, the social worker had changed his mind. ‘The children . . . have never been separated. They have been placed together since removal from their parents’ care. The children seek each other out when they feel sad or hurt, and they like to talk about each other’s progress. Brenda is always looking after her brothers. They get along well, and are happy being together. [¶] . . . [¶] [I]n pursuing an adoptive home, separating these children should not be an alternative.’ Aristeo visited with the children every two weeks, and the children enjoyed the visits very much. The visits were supervised by the foster parents.
“In July 2006, SSA found a family, Oscar and Maria H., who were interested in adopting the three children. The children and the family visited during August, and on August 26, the children were placed with the H. family. The H.’s met with, inter alia, the social worker and the father and agreed to continue the visits between the children, the father and their siblings. SSA recommended that the juvenile court schedule a permanent plan selection hearing the upcoming periodic review because long-term foster care was no longer appropriate.
“Aristeo disagreed with SSA’s recommendation, so the periodic review hearing was continued and then trailed to December 2006. The SSA reports admitted into evidence revealed that the children were adjusting well to their new home. At first, Brenda was ‘sad’ because she missed her foster mother, but after a few months she was ‘no longer demonstrating any depressive moods or discomfort.’ She liked living with the H. family, but still missed her previous school and friends. The juvenile court found the permanent plan of long-term foster care was no longer appropriate and that it would be in the children’s best interests to set a permanent plan selection hearing.” (Aristeo S. v. Superior Court, supra, G038015.)
As noted, father challenged the juvenile court’s order setting the permanent plan selection hearing. He contended the juvenile court should have ordered the children directly into long-term foster care without conducting a hearing because, in his view, clear and convincing evidence demonstrated Brenda, Marco, and Andrew were not proper subjects for adoption since their relationships with their siblings and with father outweighed the benefits of an adoptive home. We disagreed, reasoning: “The juvenile court is subject to a presumption that foster care is ‘inappropriate’ and adoption is preferred. [Citation.] Section 396 provides: ‘It is the policy of the Legislature that foster care should be a temporary method of care for the children of this state [and] . . . that reunification with the natural . . . parents or another alternate permanent living situation such as adoption or guardianship [is] more suitable to a child’s well-being than is foster care . . . .’ After five years in foster care, these three children have a chance at a permanent home. Under the circumstances here, in our view, the juvenile court was required to set a permanent plan selection hearing. At that hearing, the juvenile court will consider the options and decide which permanent plan is best for the children. Then, Aristeo will be able to present evidence and argue that the children’s bonds to him and their siblings should outweigh the benefits of adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) & (E).)” (Aristeo S. v. Superior Court, supra, G038015.) Following remittitur, the juvenile court set a permanent plan selection hearing (.26 hearing).
By the time of the April 2007 .26 hearing, all three children had been residing in their prospective adoptive home with the H.’s for eight months. Brenda and Marco reported they liked living with the H.’s. Neither suffered any medical or developmental problems. Marco performed grade-level schoolwork and Brenda worked diligently to bring her academics up to par. Although Marco needed a lot of one-on-one attention, his behavior improved with the structure the H.’s provided.
Andrew had recently exhibited some concerning behaviors, such as bumping his head and talking to himself. SSA scheduled psychological evaluations for all three children at the H.’s request. The adoptions social worker noted that, as to Andrew, the H.’s “Would like to have the results of the neurological and psychological evaluation to know what resources they would need and see how [SSA] will be able to help them before committing.”
Upon approving the H.’s home study, another social worker noted favorably: “The children appear supported in school and sports activities; are kept healthy and safe through loving structure, good choices of diet and exercise; and are addressing old emotional and trauma wounds with the support of well[-]qualified therapists.” The three children referred to the H.’s as their mom and dad. In the worker’s view, none of the children really comprehended the permanency of adoption. According to the worker, the H.’s appeared to have resolved to adopt all three children whatever their mental health needs might require.
Herself a social worker in Los Angeles County, Mrs. H. and her husband followed through with their commitment to facilitate visits between the three children and their older siblings and father and mother. Father enjoyed monthly visits, and the children were openly affectionate with him. The children also enjoyed several visits with mother at the jail. The children visited Jesus and Luis during visits with father or on separate visits arranged by SSA. According to senior social worker Monica Wilson, the children “seemed very close and enjoyed each other’s company.”
Senior social worker Wilson recommended that the juvenile court find Brenda, Marco, and Andrew adoptable and terminate parental rights. SSA had deemed the trio “difficult to place” due to their composition as a sibling set with two members over the age of seven, but the H.’s had committed to providing permanency through adoption for all three children. Wilson recognized the importance to the children of maintaining contact with their birth family, but concluded “the need for permanence and stability in the children’s life far outweighs the detriment of terminating parental rights.”
Brenda testified she liked living with the H.’s, had lived with them a “long time” and, if she could not live with father or mother, she wanted to live permanently with the H.’s. She spoke on the telephone weekly with father, wanted to see him more often, and would be sad if she did not see him again. She would not want to be adopted if she could not see father; her preference was to live with the H.’s but still see father and mother. It seemed like a long time ago that she had lived with Jesus and Luis and, while she enjoyed visiting with them and would be sad if she could no longer see them, she never felt like calling them on the phone and they never called her. According to Brenda, Mrs. H. told her she would still see her older brothers if the H.’s adopted her.
Marco testified he enjoyed living with the H.’s and, if he could not live with father or mother, he wanted to stay with them permanently. Marco alternated between saying he did not remember ever living with his older brothers and he did not look forward to their next visit to recalling that living with Jesus and Luis was “fun” and he would be sad if he could not see them again.
Andrew did not relish living with the H.’s when Mrs. H raised her voice or pushed him along, but he liked the H.’s son, Eric, who was “like my brother,” and he liked playing soccer with Eric, Marco, and the H.’s. He enjoyed visits with father because they would eat and “have fun.” When asked who transported him to school in the morning, Andrew replied, “My mom or my dad,” referring to the H.’s. He did not remember ever living with his older brothers. His favorite thing about visits with Luis and Jesus was just “play[ing] with them.” After initially denying he would miss Jesus and Luis if he could not see them again, he changed his mind and said he would be sad.
Luis could not recall his three younger siblings’ birthdays, but he had a “good” relationship with them, visiting for two hours every other week. He did not call them because he did not have their phone number and was busy with school. He met Mrs. H. once and believed she loved Brenda, Marco, and Andrew but, based on a friend’s experience, he expected he would not see his siblings if they were adopted.
As the oldest of the five siblings, 14-year-old Jesus felt it was his job to “look out for all of them,” and his understanding of adoption was that Brenda, Marco, and Andrew would live with the H.’s until they were 18, but he would still get to visit with them. He was not “close” with the three youngest because they had not lived together and did not see each other often, but he enjoyed their two-hour visits and wanted to spend more time with them. Wilson described Brenda as “intelligent,” “adorable,” and free of developmental delays. She noted Marco and Andrew were affectionate, healthy boys who were both doing well in school. Wilson initially testified the H.’s wanted to know the results of Andrew’s psychological testing before committing to adopting him but revised her testimony after conferring with the H.’s, who informed her they were committed to adopting all three children even though Andrew’s results were still pending.
Wilson acknowledged the H.’s schedule changed in February, preventing all five children from visiting father at the same time and that earlier, after the three youngest were placed with the H.’s, SSA reduced father’s visits from every other week to once per month to facilitate their transition to their new home. Despite the adjustments, Wilson observed the children continued to have a “strong relationship” with their father during his visits. But this relationship, while pleasant, resembled that of a friendly visitor rather than a parent because “they just eat and play and he observes the children playing.” Wilson presumed father would continue to have contact with the children after adoption. She believed the children would suffer some negative repercussions if father’s visits were terminated but, if a choice had to be made, adoption would be more beneficial for the children to be adopted than to continue contact with father. Noting the last time the younger children had lived with Jesus and Luis was in 2002, Wilson recommended termination of parental rights even if it meant loss of contact with the older children, based on the stability a permanent home would provide Brenda, Marco, and Andrew. But Wilson believed the H.’s intended to continue sibling contact and would monitor the visits post-adoption.
Father described pleasant visits with the children in which he would play with them, bring them food, and peruse any schoolwork they brought to show him. The children called him “Papi.” Father telephoned the children once per week for five- to seven-minutes at a time. He acknowledged he did not know what grade Brenda was in, the name of her teacher, how she or any of the children got to school, or who made them breakfast. In six years of dependency, father had not met any of the children’s teachers or gone to any of their medical appointments but defended himself: “How can I act as a parent in the two hours that I have?” He denied molesting Brenda or bearing any responsibility for the children’s removal. He felt badly about the prospect of the children’s adoption, and believed they would blame him for abandoning them and that he would not see them if they were adopted. Father did not want the children separated from their older siblings.
The juvenile court concluded all three children were generally adoptable based on their desirable attributes. The court found “they all were very attractive children. They were articulate. They appeared to process information well. The court didn’t note any learning disabilities or difficulty in processing . . . responses to questions. [T]here was some shyness involved, but that would certainly be expected under the circumstances . . . .” The court further noted: “By father’s own admission, the children are beautiful children and smart children, active, happy, [and] loving. There is . . . nothing that the court saw that gave the court concern about the adoptability of these three children. The caretakers’ commitment, this court believes, is clear from the reports, as well as the testimony by the worker.” Finding the children adoptable, the court concluded neither the sibling benefit exception, nor maintaining the father or mother’s parental relationship with the children outweighed the benefits of adoption. The juvenile court therefore terminated parental rights, and father and mother now appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Adoptability Finding
Father and mother contend the juvenile court erred by finding the children adoptable, a prerequisite to termination of parental rights. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1) [juvenile court must determine child is likely to be adopted before court may terminate parental rights].) We review the juvenile court’s adoptability determination for substantial evidence. (In re Y.R. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 99, 112.) If any credible evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, we must uphold the finding. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424-425.) Our circumscribed role on appeal and limited vantage point require that we draw all inferences and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the juvenile court’s order. (In re Y.R., supra, at p. 112.) Our review of the record confirms substantial evidence supporting the children’s adoptability.
The juvenile court’s inquiry at the .26 hearing focuses on whether the children’s age, physical condition, or emotional state make it unlikely anyone will adopt them within a reasonable time. (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061.) “[T]he fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650, original italics.)
Here, father and mother rely on Wilson’s initial testimony that the H.’s sought the results of Andrew’s psychological tests before they would commit to adopting him. Father and mother then leverage the open question of Andrew’s test results to undercut Brenda and Marco’s adoptability, as members of a sibling set with Andrew. But Wilson confirmed the H.’s commitment to adopt the children during an overnight break in her testimony, and we must resolve all evidentiary conflicts in support of the juvenile court’s order. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The juvenile court had no doubt the H.’s were committed to adopting Andrew and we may not second-guess that determination where, in addition to Wilson’s testimony, the adoptions social worker reported the H.’s firm resolve to adopt Andrew and his siblings “even though there are many unanswered questions about their special needs.”
The adoptions worker noted in her report that the H.’s “have worked hard to get the services in place to support this placement; they also can see how attached their young biological son is to these children.” According to the adoptions worker, as a social worker herself, “[t]he prospective adoptive mother’s knowledge of the ‘system’ has made her a strong advocate for the sibling group of three,” obtaining “special help” for Brenda to avoid failing fifth grade, “therapeutic support[]” from “two excellent therapists,” and “Victim/Witness funding for the appropriate children.” Because of the H.’s demonstrated commitment to meeting the children’s needs and the children’s strong bond formed over nearly a year with the H.’s, who they called “mom” and “dad,” and with the H.’s biological son, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude Andrew and his siblings were likely to be adopted.
Father argues the better procedure would have been for the juvenile court to continue the .26 hearing until Andrew’s test results came back. But substantial evidence shows the H.’s commitment did not depend on the outcome of testing. Consequently, there was no need to delay permanency for the children any longer. (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 254 [once reunification fails, dependent children are “entitled to stability now, not at some hypothetical point in the future”].) Father and mother also argue Wilson’s opinion the children are adoptable is insufficient evidence by itself to support the adoptability finding, relying on In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498 and In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616. Unlike those cases, however, SSA performed an adoption study confirming the children are adoptable and here a prospective adoptive family has stepped forward with a commitment to adopt them. As in In re Y.R., the H.’s reaffirmed adoption commitment “constitutes substantial evidence they would likely adopt the children” and “demonstrated any challenges the children presented were not likely to dissuade others from adopting them.” (In re Y.R., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 113.) In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s adoptability conclusion.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Conclusion No Exceptions to Termination Applied
1. The Benefit Exception
Father contends the trial court erred in declining to apply the so-called benefit exception to termination of parental rights provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). That exception authorizes the juvenile court to avoid terminating parental rights if it finds “‘termination would be detrimental to the child [because] . . . [t]he parents or guardians have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’” (In re Cliffton B., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.) Once a parent fails to reunify with a child during the prescribed statutory period and the juvenile court terminates reunification services, the parent bears the burden of proving termination of parental rights will be detrimental to the child. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) The benefit exception does not permit a parent to derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. (Id. at p. 1348.)
Instead, the exception applies only if the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) “In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the juvenile court must engage in a balancing test, juxtaposing the quality of the relationship and the detriment involved in terminating it against the potential benefit of an adoptive family.” (In re Cliffton B., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 424-425.)
Factors bearing on the parent-child bond include “[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parents custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs . . . .” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Even if these factors reveal a strong bond, the parent faces a heavy burden to overcome the Legislature’s preferred permanent plan of adoption. (See 366.26, subd. (b)(1) [identifying adoption as preferred plan]; see In re Jasmine D., supra,78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348 [“Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full emotional] commitment from a responsible caretaker”].) Thus, the statutory exceptions “merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) We review the juvenile courts conclusion concerning whether the benefit exception applies for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the children, and that termination was in the children’s best interest. Father bore the burden of establishing termination of his parental rights would greatly harm the children (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350), and he failed to meet that burden.
In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200 and In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681 illustrate the compelling evidence necessary to establish the benefit exception. In Jerome D., the child “seemed lonely, sad, and . . . ‘the odd child out’” in his placement. (Jerome D., at p. 1206.) He wanted to live with his mother and had enjoyed unsupervised night visits in her home. (Id. at p. 1207.) A psychologist opined the child and his mother “shared a ‘strong and well[-]developed’ parent-child relationship and a ‘close attachment’ approaching a primary bond.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that keeping parental rights intact would prevent Jerome’s “position as the odd child out in [placement] from becoming entrenched by a cessation of visits and the loss of his mother while [his half-siblings] continued to enjoy visits and remained Mother’s children.” (Id. at p. 1208.)
In Amber M., the court reversed where a psychologist, therapists, and the court-appointed special advocate believed a “beneficial parental relationship . . . clearly outweigh[ed] the benefit of adoption.” (In re Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.) Additionally, two older children had a “strong primary bond” with their mother, and the younger child was “very strongly attached to her.” (Ibid.) If the adoptions had proceeded, the children would have been adopted in separate groups. (Id. at pp. 690-691.)
Here, father presented nothing remotely resembling the harm that would have ensued in Amber M. or Jerome D. from termination of parental rights. Father emphasizes that 10-year-old Brenda testified she would not want to be adopted if it meant she could not see father, and her younger siblings similarly also wanted to continue visits with him. The evidence, however, does not establish father’s visits will cease, given that the H.’s acknowledged the importance of maintaining contact with the children’s biological family. But even if visits were to end, the juvenile court was charged with determining the children’s best interests. “A child may not be able to understand the concept of adoption” and, in any event, “the court need not follow the child’s wishes unless he or she is over the age of 12.” (In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 201; § 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(B) & (h).)
The juvenile court could reasonably conclude the stability of a permanent home with adoptive parents like the H.’s, who went the extra mile to secure services for the children, outweighed the benefits of maintaining a legal, parental relationship with father, who neither knew the names of their teachers nor had attended any medical or counseling appointments with them. Father correctly points out the benefit of his relationship “must be considered in the context of the very limited visitation [he] was permitted to have.” (In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1538.) But it is also true the juvenile court could consider the reasons for the limits on father’s visitation and that he never progressed beyond monitored visitation. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51 [requisite benefit showing “difficult to make” where parents never advance beyond supervised visitation].)
In the final analysis, the benefit derived from continuing a parent-child relationship may not be assessed in isolation, but must be juxtaposed against the potential benefit of adoption. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The children had spent more than half of their young lives outside father’s care as dependents of the court (see id. at p. 576 [noting child’s age and time in parent’s care as factors]), and the juvenile court could reasonably conclude the permanency of adoption served their best interests over the vicissitudes of long-term foster care.
Father argues the option of a guardianship obviated the need to choose between preserving his parental rights and affording the children stability. “The Legislature has decreed, however, that guardianship is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded them. In decreeing adoption to be the preferred permanent plan, the Legislature recognized that, ‘Although guardianship may be a more stable solution than foster care, it is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent placement intended by the Legislature.’ [Citation.]” (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419.) Father’s argument is therefore without merit.
2. The Sibling Benefit Exception
Father, joined by mother and the children’s two teenage siblings, assert the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the sibling benefit exception to termination. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) To determine whether this exception applies, the juvenile court follows a two-step procedure. First, it determines whether a termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship by assessing, for example, whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house, shared significant common experiences, or have existing close and strong bonds. (In re L.Y.L . (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952.) Second, if a court concludes terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with a sibling relationship, the court must then weigh the child’s interest in continuing the relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption. (Ibid.) The parent bears the burden of showing that a sibling relationship exists and that its severance would be detrimental to the child. (Id. at p. 952.) On appeal, we review the record for substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s sibling bond determination. (In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.)
Substantial evidence amply supports the juvenile court’s ruling. According to Brenda, Mrs. H expressly confirmed visits would continue with her older siblings after adoption. And even if terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude the benefits of adoption outweighed the children’s interest in continued contact. The younger children could barely remember living with their older siblings, most recently in 2002, and while on the whole their visits with their brothers were positive, both the older and younger children admitted to some ambivalence. Separated in age and for so long in their placements, their common experiences had become limited to two-hour visits every two weeks. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude the certainty of maintaining the younger, bonded siblings together in a permanent adoptive placement served their best interests, both individually and as a sibling set. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 54 [sibling benefit exception focuses on the child being considered for adoption, not his or her siblings declining adoption].)
Advocating a guardianship, counsel for the older children complains that “proponents of adoption are not required to present the results of a long range controlled study or any other evidence rooted in empirical study to establish the degree of benefit afforded by adoption.” But counsel mistakes his forum, as the preference for adoption is a matter of state policy declared by the Legislature, not the courts. (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71.)
III
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J., IKOLA, J.