Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. 08JVSQ2537302, 08JVSQ2537402, 08JVSQ2537502, 08FVSQ2537602, 08JVSQ2537702, 08JVSQ2572802.
SCOTLAND, P. J.
Appellants, the mother and father of six children declared dependents of the juvenile court, appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.) They claim the petition failed to state a cause of action, and there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings and removal of the minors from parental custody. They also raise claims relating to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2008, a juvenile dependency petition was filed by the Shasta County Department of Social Services (the Department) concerning appellants’ six children, 12-year-old D.R., 10-year-old Bre. R., eight-year-old R.R., seven-year-old Bri. R., five-year-old M.R., and three-year-old C.R. (collectively, the minors).
Under section 300, subdivision (b) (risk of serious physical harm or illness as a result of parental neglect), the petition as amended alleged that the trailer in which the family lived was cluttered with dirty clothing, trash, and debris; knives and sharp objects were accessible to the minors, there was insufficient food; pornographic material was within view of the minors; R.R. had bite and burn marks; appellants had a history of referrals for general neglect; appellants had criminal records involving child endangerment and child cruelty; and the minors’ mother had a history of substance abuse.
Under section 300, subdivision (c) (risk of serious emotional damage caused by parental conduct), the amended petition alleged that, while living with appellants, the minors displayed symptoms of withdrawal, anxiety, depression, and untoward aggression at school and that, upon their removal from appellants’ custody, the minors’ symptoms decreased or disappeared completely.
According to the jurisdictional report, the Department learned that R.R. had a burn mark on her arm. When a social worker met with R.R. at school, there also appeared to be human bite marks on her. Her injuries “appeared significant enough that they would have caused [her] great pain.”
A police officer went to appellants’ home to “assess the situation.” The minors’ father initially denied knowing about R.R.’s injuries, but he eventually disclosed that D.R. bit and burned R.R. and that D.R.’s behavior was out of control. A neighbor approached the officer and said “he consistently listens to both the parents using numerous profanities and threats towards their children from early in the morning until late at night.”
The father reluctantly gave the officer permission to enter the trailer. Dirty clothes were scattered all over, and the carpet was covered with various items, including garbage and debris. There were knife blades, broken glass, and other sharp objects on the floor throughout the home. The officer noted that three-year-old C.R. was not wearing shoes and, “based upon the filth and the sharp objects lying around, it would have been very easy for her to become injured by these items.”
The bed in one of the bedrooms used by the minors “was so filled with trash and garbage that it was un[]useable as a bed”; and there were pornographic magazines littering the room. One of the bathrooms did not have a working shower, and “[t]here was additional filth on the floor[,] including toilet paper that appeared to be used....” The front bedroom had a bathroom with a functioning shower and toilet, but the bedroom, which was where the minors supposedly slept, “was so filthy[] it was also uninhabitable.”
The officer also observed there were three dogs living in the residence; “[i]t appeared that these dogs were allowed to urinate and defecate in the home.” While the officer was present, C.R. appeared to defecate in her diaper, after which she took the diaper off, and the father placed dirty underwear on C.R. without cleaning her or retrieving the dirty diaper. There was very little food in the home, and the refrigerator was “filthy.”
The same officer had responded to the home a week earlier, after receiving a report that the mother appeared to be under the influence of methamphetamine while driving with the minors in the car. The officer was not able to confirm that the mother was under the influence of a stimulant, and the home at that time “was unkempt but not filthy.”
Following the removal of the minors, appellants failed to appear for drug testing. After an assessment of the mother recommended hair follicle testing to rule out current substance abuse, appellants cut their hair short, and the mother dyed her hair.
According to a staff member at the minors’ school, the minors, particularly Bre. R., had “dirty clothes and... a fecal smell” prior to their removal from parental custody, and attempts by the school to help the family met with only temporary relief. A teacher reported that, before removal, Bre. R. would “play[] with himself,” had occasional emotional outbursts, and “would wear the same clothing days in a row.” After his removal, he had only one outburst, which occurred the first day back at school after his removal, and his other problems ceased. Bre. R. also began to display a sense of humor and to interact positively with his classmates. Similarly, R.R.’s teacher noted that, whereas R.R. had been “a very angry and socially maladjusted young lady” when she first entered the class, she “made remarkable progress in her social skills” and started turning in her homework after entering foster care.
There had been 15 referrals concerning the family during the preceding decade, and this was not the first time the minors were removed from appellants’ care. In 2004, the minors were detained because the condition of appellants’ residence was unsanitary and unsafe. Due to the condition of the home, appellants were convicted of child endangerment. Although the mother denied any substance abuse at that time, she tested positive for amphetamines when C.R. was born in 2005. The minors were experiencing myriad problems at the time of their previous detention. Then eight-year-old D.R. was being sent home from school several times a week for violent and threatening behavior, had punched a hole in the wall of his home, and urinated on the floor, the bed, the wall and on his sibling’s clothing. Bre. R., who turned seven while the previous jurisdictional hearing was pending, urinated and defecated in his pants and “appeared withdrawn and needy.” R.R., who turned five during the proceedings, got “what she wanted [by] pushing and shoving, mostly the younger children, and screaming” and deliberately ran over her younger sibling with a bicycle. Then two-year-old M.R. had “severe dental neglect” requiring oral surgery. As in the current proceedings, the minors made remarkable progress once removed from appellants’ care. Appellants participated in over two years of reunification and family maintenance services, during which reports and concerns continued to arise regarding the condition of the home and the supervision the minors were receiving.
Prior to the jurisdictional hearing in the current matter, appellants filed a demurrer to the allegation that the minors came within section 300, subdivision (c). In their view, the petition “fail[ed] to allege the offending parental conduct, causation by the parents, and is not clear or precise enough to enable [them] to ascertain what they must defend against.” The demurrer acknowledged the letters from the minors’ school, but complained that they did “little more than attest to the fact that the [minors] are now cleaner than before.” Prior to commencing the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court overruled appellants’ demurrer, finding that the amended petition and the addendum report filed on the same date were sufficient to state a cause of action.
According to a subsequent report, appellants had “completed some improvements on their [trailer] home and stocked it with additional food and supplies.” In addition, they completed a parenting class and intended to continue working with the instructor. They visited the minors and brought healthy snacks, creative activities, pictures, and favorite toys. They also attended “family team meetings” and most of the minors’ school and health appointments. Nonetheless, the social worker opined that the minors “remain[ed] at substantial risk of neglect due to [appellants’] recurring unhealthy living conditions and faulty child care, as well as their refusal to take responsibility for the issues that caused their children to be detained.”
At the jurisdictional hearing, the father testified the parents had just purchased the trailer and “were getting rid of the junk” that was there when the police officer came to the trailer. According to the father, the mother had gone to pick up her pay check and grocery shop when the officer arrived.
The mother testified that, in February or March, the family began to move into the trailer, but appellants could not dispose of the prior tenant’s possessions until mid-April, when the property was deeded to them. According to the mother, they had stacked the property on a covered patio and were in the process of “moving everything from the back patio through to go to the dumpster” when the officer came to the home.
The juvenile court sustained the petition’s allegations.
Appellants continued to deny that their behavior warranted intervention; however, during more recent meetings, they identified some of the family’s therapeutic needs and requested that the case plan include additional mental health services for the family.
Claiming that they had finished repairs on their trailer and had restored it to a safe condition for the minors, appellants filed written opposition to continued removal of the minors from their custody.
At the dispositional hearing, appellants introduced photographs of their trailer in its current condition and proof that they had acquired ownership of the trailer less than two weeks before the minors were removed. As to the minors’ mental health issues, appellants argued that, without psychological evaluations, the evidence was insufficient to warrant removal.
The juvenile court ordered the continued removal of the minors, noting as “significant concern[s]” that the family had previously been before the court due to similar problems in their living conditions and that appellants had been unable to protect the minors, as demonstrated by R.R.’s injuries.
DISCUSSION
I
Appellants claim the petition failed to state a cause of action under section 300, subdivision (c) because it did not set forth allegations establishing a connection between appellants’ conduct and the minors’ emotional problems. We reject this claim.
The mother also claims it was improper for the juvenile court to rely on an addendum report to supplement the allegations. Because we conclude the allegations in the petition were adequate, we do not address this claim.
“To state a cause of action, a dependency petition must contain the ‘code section and the subdivision under which the proceedings are instituted,’ as well as ‘an allegation pursuant to that section’ [citation] and a ‘concise statement of facts, separately stated, to support the conclusion that the child upon whose behalf the petition is being brought is a person within the definition of each of the sections and subdivisions under which the proceedings are being instituted.’ [Citation.] ‘This does not require the pleader to regurgitate the contents of the social worker’s report into a petition, it merely requires the pleading of essential facts establishing at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.’” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 410; see § 332, subd. (f).) To satisfy the notice requirements of due process, the statement of facts must link the statutory language to the circumstances alleged. (In re Jeremy C. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 384, 397; see also In re Stephen W. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 629, 640.)
We construe well-pleaded facts in favor of the adequacy of the petition (see Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318), “drawing reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded.” (City of Pomona v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 793, 800.)
Subdivision (c) of section 300 states in pertinent part that a child may be made a dependent of the court if “[t]he child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian....”
Here, the amended petition alleged pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 300 that the minors were suffering or at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior as a result of conduct by appellants. In support of this allegation, the petition stated that the minors displayed symptoms of emotional damage while living with appellants, which decreased or disappeared upon their removal from appellants’ custody.
Although the supporting facts alleged in the petition are minimal, they are sufficient to allege a causal connection between the parental conduct and a risk of serious emotional damage to the minors. We construe the petition to reasonably imply appellants’ conduct and the environment in their home were causing the emotional problems experienced by the minors; indeed, the petition avers that these problems decreased or ceased altogether following removal of the minors from appellants’ custody. The minors’ change in behavior gave rise to a reasonable inference linking their emotional problems with appellants’ conduct. The mother argues that “there are many other plausible explanations for the [minors’] change in behavior” once they were removed from appellants’ care. However, one obvious explanation is that the lack of adequate care being provided by appellants was causing the minors’ emotional problems.
Accordingly, the allegations were sufficient to state a basis for jurisdiction under subdivision (c) of section 300.
II
Appellants next contend that the evidence was not sufficient to support jurisdiction under section 300 subdivision (b) or (c). Again, we disagree.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court “‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’” -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.) “‘All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the [ruling], if possible. Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact....’ [Citations.]” (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.)
Section 300, subdivision (b)
Appellants claim there was insufficient evidence that the minors were at continuing risk of harm at the time of the jurisdictional hearing.
The relevant portion of section 300, subdivision (b) states that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child... or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse....”
The purpose of section 300, subdivision (b) is to protect children from parental conduct or omissions that place the minors at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. (§ 300, subd. (b); see § 300.2.) “[U]nder subdivision (b) a child may be considered dependent ‘only so long as is necessary’ to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388.) “While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm. [Citations.] Thus the past infliction of physical harm by a caretaker, standing alone, does not establish a substantial risk of physical harm; ‘[t]here must be some reason to believe the acts may continue in the future.’” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824, italics and fns. omitted.)
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. “Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court and not the reviewing court. The power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” (In re Christina T. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 630, 638-639.)
Appellants argue that, by the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the problems that resulted in the minors’ removal from appellants’ custody were no longer present; the home had been cleaned up, and appellants had tested negative for drugs. However, as explained by the social worker, appellants had “repeatedly been in homes that have become unsafe for the [minors] and repeatedly clean it up and repeatedly it becomes an issue again.” The events leading to the prior dependency were strikingly similar to the current circumstances in terms of the condition of the home. It was a reasonable inference that the pattern would continue without juvenile court intervention.
In addition, the minors’ condition at removal, as described by school personnel and the investigating officer, gave rise to a reasonable inference that the problems concerning appellants’ home and the neglect of the minors were not a temporary situation. The fact that C.R., a three-year-old, was permitted to walk around barefoot in a virtual obstacle course of hazards is indicative of the level of appellants’ inattention and poor parenting, as was their attitude regarding the burn and bite marks that 12-year-old D.R. inflicted on one of his siblings.
The mother argues that bite marks are common among young children who are in daycare. But R.R. was in fourth grade at the time of her removal from appellants’ care. Moreover, it was R.R.’s 12-year-old sibling, not a young child, who inflicted the injuries, which included a burn as well as bite marks.
The mother also asserts there was no evidence that R.R.’s injuries were serious or that they would recur. To the contrary, the investigating officer reported that R.R.’s injuries “appeared significant enough that they would have caused [her] great pain.”
Section 300, subdivision (c)
Appellants contend there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the minors were suffering or at risk of suffering serious emotional damage or that appellants’ conduct caused their emotional problems.
As previously noted, subdivision (c) of section 300 states that a child may be adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court who “is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing appropriate care.”
Because we have already concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b), we need not address appellants’ claims with regard to subdivision (c). (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875.)
We note, however, there was ample evidence to support that several of the minors were suffering serious emotional damage as defined by the statute, and that the other minors were at risk of suffering such damage.
Prior to his most recent removal from appellants’ custody, Bre. R. would not communicate or make eye contact with his teacher or other students; banged his head on the table, and hit himself in the face with his fist when he did not want to complete an in-class assignment; exhibited aggressive behavior at school; and, on one occasion, screamed at another student who got too close to him in line. R.R. was described as “very angry and socially maladjusted,” with “many incidences of aggression with other students.” D.R. burned and bit his younger sibling, and even the father described D.R. as being out of control. At a minimum, these minors were exhibiting severe anxiety, aggression, or withdrawal, which constitutes serious emotional damage for purposes of section 300, subdivision (c). Their siblings, who were exposed to the same parenting and home environment, were at risk of developing the same or similar problems.
Appellants complain that no psychological evaluations or testimony were presented to support the juvenile court’s finding of serious emotional damage. Unavailing is the father’s reliance on In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1380, which held there was insufficient evidence to establish serious emotional damage. In that case, the child did not exhibit any emotional problems other than a deep dislike of his father. The appellate court observed that there was no psychological evidence to support the finding of serious emotional damage, implying that such evidence might have filled the void in the evidence. (Ibid.) Here, there was much more.
Likewise, although In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, at pages 329-330, relied on psychological evidence to affirm a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (c), the case does not stand for the converse proposition that a finding under this subdivision may not be made without such evidence.
Appellants also complain there was no evidence that they were the cause of the minors’ emotional problems. It is true that a finding under section 300, subdivision (c) requires “abusive, neglectful and/or exploitive [parental] conduct toward a child which causes any of the serious symptoms identified in the statute.” (In re Alexander K. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 549, 559.) However, the condition of appellants’ home, as well as the condition of the minors observed by school personnel and a police officer, established serious parental neglect by appellants. And the fact that the minors displayed “a consistent decrease in depression, aggression and isolation from their peers upon their removal from [appellants’] home” gave rise to a reasonable inference that appellants’ neglectful parenting had been the cause of the minors’ emotional problems.
The mother argues Bre. R.’s behavior was explained by the fact that he had been diagnosed with autism and that D.R.’s “ADHD” was the basis for his problems. Although appellants reported that Bre. R. had been diagnosed with autism, they refused to sign releases so that this information could be confirmed; and in the prior dependency proceedings, the social worker had expressed doubts regarding this diagnosis. Nor did appellants present any evidence that this condition could have accounted for Bre. R.’s troubling behavior. As for D.R., the reason that his doctor took him off medication for ADHD after he was placed in foster care was that D.R. no longer displayed any of its symptoms, supporting the conclusion that his problematic behavior was not the result of his diagnosis.
The mother also suggests the minors would not have wanted to return to appellants’ home or have more visits if their emotional problems stemmed from appellants’ conduct. As we so often remind litigants, our task is not to reweigh the evidence considered by the juvenile court, but only to determine whether that evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings and orders. The evidence was sufficient in this case.
III
Next, appellants claim there was insufficient evidence at the time of the dispositional hearing to warrant continued removal of the minors from appellants’ custody. They are incorrect.
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) states in pertinent part: No “dependent child [shall] be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents... unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence... [¶] [that t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s... physical custody.”
Evidence of past conduct is probative of current conditions, particularly where there is reason to believe the conduct will continue in the future. (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) “A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and proof of a potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, overruled on other grounds in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
Removal findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence test, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the findings and recognizing that issues of credibility are matters for the juvenile court. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)
We have already concluded there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that the minors were at substantial risk of harm in appellants’ care. We reach a similar conclusion with regard to the removal of the minors from appellants’ custody. Although appellants had cleaned up their trailer to a great extent by the time of the dispositional hearing, they had been able to maintain their residence at an acceptable level for periods in the past, only to again allow conditions to deteriorate.
Contrary to the mother’s suggestion, the uninhabitable condition of the home was not the only problem facing the family. When the minors were removed from appellants’ custody, the issues of neglect that had characterized the family four years earlier had resurfaced. Several of the minors had long-standing emotional problems, dating back at least four years to filing of the first dependency proceeding. And despite appellants’ participation in two years of services during the previous proceedings and their compliance with services in the present matter, they continued to resist taking responsibility for the issues facing the family as of the time of the dispositional hearing. Under such circumstances, the juvenile court was warranted in concluding that removal from appellants’ custody was necessary for the minors’ protection.
Relying on In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684 (hereafter Isayah C.), a decision by the Second Division of the First Appellate District, the mother argues that, to warrant removal, the danger must be to the minors’ physical health, not merely the minors’ emotional well-being. The same court rejected this interpretation of the language in Isayah C. (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 718-723.)
In any event, removal of a minor from parental custody is appropriate when the “minor is suffering severe emotional damage, as indicated by extreme anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward himself or herself or others, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s emotional health may be protected without removing the minor from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(3).) The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (c) mirror the findings necessary for the removal of the minors from appellants’ custody on this basis.
Finally, the mother contends the juvenile court should have considered reasonable alternatives to removing the minors from appellants’ custody. She claims that “welfare checks, counseling, and school monitoring” would provide adequate protection against recurring problems with the condition of the home and injuries of the type suffered by R.R. The mother relies on In re Jeannette S. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 52 (hereafter Jeannette S.), in which jurisdiction was premised on the dirty condition of the parent’s home, and the appellate court reversed a removal order because alternatives such as intensive supervision and homemaker assistance services were available to assist the parent.
However, here unlike in Jeannette S., supra, 94 Cal.App.3d at page 56, there was evidence that a minor had suffered trauma or abuse. The importance of assuring that appellants could provide the minors with an environment free from physical and emotional neglect was heightened due to appellants’ history in this regard and the problems suffered by some of the minors as a result. While counseling is an important component for accomplishing this goal, it is not a short-term solution for safeguarding the minors’ well-being in appellants’ care given the extent of the issues faced by the family. The juvenile court’s unwillingness to adopt other alternatives to removal, such as welfare checks and monitoring at school, that were more likely to detect emerging problems than to prevent them, was warranted under the circumstances.
IV
Lastly, appellants claim the juvenile court failed to comply with provisions of ICWA. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We disagree.
The mother reported she was “one quarter Blackfeet, Cherokee and Sioux.” On a form signed by appellants on May 20, 2008, they provided information concerning the mother’s parents and one set of grandparents, indicating the claimed Indian ancestry was through the maternal grandmother and maternal great-grandfather.
The first ICWA notice was sent to the tribes and the Bureau of Indian Affairs on May 21, 2008, and included a declaration dated May 20, 2008, stating the notice included all information that had been provided to the Department. The notice included information regarding only appellants. Two weeks later, notice marked “UPDATED INFORMATION” was sent to the tribes and included the information provided by appellants regarding the mother’s relatives. The tribes were renoticed when the hearing date was continued, although this notice omitted information about the maternal great-grandfather. At the dispositional hearing, the court deferred ruling on ICWA.
The father complains that notice to the tribes was inadequate because the notices sent for two of the hearing dates did not contain information concerning the maternal great-grandfather. He concedes this information was contained in another notice sent to the tribes but suggests this was insufficient.
Regarding notice, ICWA provides: “In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).)
Here, the tribes were provided notice containing information regarding the maternal relatives, including the maternal great-grandfather who was the relative through whom the mother claimed to have Indian ancestry. The fact that information about this relative was omitted (presumably inadvertently) from a later notice does not invalidate the earlier notice, which we conclude was adequate to satisfy the requirements of ICWA.
The mother contends the juvenile court erred by not following the substantive provisions of ICWA, claiming that, “[o]nce ICWA notice is triggered in a proceeding, the court must proceed as if the child were an Indian child.” She relies on California Rules of Court, rule 5.482(d)(2), which states: “If at any time, based on the petition or other information, the court knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child, the court must proceed as if the child were an Indian child.”
However, “[a]side from its notice provisions,” ICWA applies “only to Indian Children.” (In re L.B. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1427.) To be considered an Indian child under ICWA, a child must be a member of an Indian tribe or eligible for membership and the biological child of a member. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) “Only when information before the juvenile court is sufficient to show that the child is a member of a tribe, or is eligible for membership and is the child of a member, does [California Rules of Court,] rule 1439(e) [now rule 5.482(d)(2)] require compliance with all of the provisions of the ICWA.” (In re L.B., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1427.)
At the time of the dispositional hearing, none of the tribes had responded that the minors were Indian children, and there was no other evidence before the court to indicate that the minors were Indian children. The juvenile court was not required to proceed as if the minors were Indian children unless it knew or had reason to know they were Indian children. It did not in this case. Thus, it had no obligation to follow the substantive provisions of ICWA.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
We concur: HULL, J., ROBIE, J.