Opinion
4899.
11-09-2017
In re BRANDON D., A Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant. Presentment Agency.
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Elina Druker of counsel), for presentment agency.
Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Raymond E. Rogers of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Elina Druker of counsel), for presentment agency.
Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Adetokunbo O. Fasanya, J.), entered on or about June 8, 2016, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding determination that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of assault in the second and third degrees, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest, and placed him on probation for 12 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.The court's determination that appellant committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of assault in the second and third degrees, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Luis L., 58 A.D.3d 543, 544, 873 N.Y.S.2d 4 [1st Dept.2009], citing People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). There is no basis for disturbing the court's determinations concerning credibility. The testimony firmly established that appellant assaulted a police officer and interfered with an arrest while the officer was performing her official function ( Matter of Davan L., 91 N.Y.2d 88, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 689 N.E.2d 909 [1997] ). His physical intrusion and actions were not justified, nor can they be excused simply because it was his mother who was being arrested and he was upset. Appellant also resisted arrest when the police attempted to handcuff him.
The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in placing appellant on probation for a period of 12 months (see Family Ct. Act § 352.2[1][b] ; Matter of Cindy A., 31 A.D.3d 440, 817 N.Y.S.2d 662 [2d Dept.2006] ). The court appropriately took into account the nature of the incident, the Department of Probation's recommendation that appellant would benefit from probation, the appellant's poor school performance, and his attendance and disciplinary record, and made its determination, despite the fact that this was appellant's first offense ( Matter of Javed K., 57 A.D.3d 899, 870 N.Y.S.2d 412 [2d Dept.2008] ).
MANZANET–DANIELS, J.P., ANDRIAS, GISCHE, KERN, SINGH, JJ., concur.