Opinion
June 19, 1951.
Petition from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, F.M. Robles, J.
Branch Goff, Tampa, and Talton Branch in pro. per., for petitioner.
John T. Wigginton, President, Tallahassee, for the Florida Bar.
Petitioner was admitted to the Florida Bar June 10, 1921. He was later tried and convicted of a felony and was disbarred by the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County. In due course he applied to the same Court for reinstatement to his former status as a practicing attorney on the ground that he had been granted a full and complete pardon. His petition was dismissed and that order was, on appeal, affirmed by this Court. Branch v. State, 120 Fla. 666, 163 So. 48.
On authority of paragraph 11, Article XI, Integrated Rule of the Florida Bar, petitioner has applied to this Court for reinstatement. His petition was filed January 2, 1951 and alleges that he is forty-eight years of age, that he is a citizen of the State of Florida, that he is a man of good moral character and that his reputation now warrants his reinstatement as a practicing attorney. Due notice was given and the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar filed a reply to the petition, which was supported by a large volume of evidence.
The cause was heard on the issues so made. The Board of Governors on recommendation of two members of the Committee who took the evidence, recommended that the petition be denied, because Section 39.18 F.S.A. prohibits one from practicing law who has been convicted of a felony, but they say that if this Court should construe Section 39.18 otherwise, then they think the petition should be deferred until a "sufficient period of time has elapsed to establish a reasonable assumption that the present good conduct will continue indefinitely."
Section 39.18, in so far as pertinent to this case, provides that no person "who has been convicted of an infamous crime be entitled to practice" law. In the case of In re Stoller, 160 Fla. 769, 36 So.2d 443 and In re Hurtenbach, 157 Fla. 871, 27 So.2d 348, this Court committed itself to the doctrine that reinstatement of a disbarred attorney is dependent on rehabilitation. It is true, that petitioner was convicted of a felony, but since he was pardoned and his reinstatement depends on rehabilitation, we do not think the statute bars him from being reinstated, provided he has returned to civil life, established a reputation for good character, square dealing and upright conduct. While the point was not directly presented, we think the doctrine promulgated in the following cases concludes the point. Branch v. State, supra; State v. Snyder, 136 Fla. 875, 187 So. 381; In re Pine, Fla., 41 So.2d 546; In re Stalnaker, 150 Fla. 853, 9 So.2d 100.
As to his moral conduct the evidence shows that petitioner was for a long time addicted to the use of alcoholic liquors, that this was the case when he committed the felony referred to in the forepart of this opinion, but that for the past two and one-half years he has been entirely free of this habit, that he has joined Alcoholics Anonymous and pledged himself to stay on the water wagon, that all four of the Circuit Judges of Hillsborough County think he has rehabilitated himself and should be reinstated, that his brother, State Senator John Branch of Hillsborough County and a member of the Hillsborough County Bar, will take him in his office and assist him in every way possible to refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages if he should be tempted, that one of the three members of the Committee of the Integrated Bar which took the evidence, thinks he should be reinstated, that a large number of distinguished lawyers and citizens of Hillsborough County who have known him for many years, attest his good character and recommend that his petition be granted.
In Branch v. State, supra, this Court indicated that petitioner might renew his application for reinstatement on a showing of good moral character. Petitioner's weakness was liquor, no other charge of bad conduct has been lodged against him. We have never indicated just what length of time one must show that he has been in the process of rehabilitation before he may petition for reinstatement, but we have reached the conclusion that the showing made by petitioner is sufficient to give him a new lease on professional life. The theory and philosophy of our law is to prosecute wilful violations vigorously at the same time we hold out every inducement for rehabilitation. When the victim becomes penitent and exemplifies a will to re-establish himself as a good citizen and retrieve public confidence, we give him a chance to do so. Our system of Federal, State and local paroles is predicated on this.
It would hardly be possible for one to make a more persuasive showing for reinstatement than petitioner has made. He has not indulged in liquor for almost three years, he is connected with an organization that will aid him in every way possible to keep his pledge. Others have volunteered him their support and confidence. Rational communion and the feeling that friends are supporting him is a most effective and stabilizing prop to the potential inebriate. In fact, there is no better therapy for one who is making the fight to come back. The sense of being alone and the feeling that no one cares will do more than any other factor to break down his will. Confidence bestowed does something for the best of us.
We think petitioner has made a good showing of rehabilitation. His petition is therefore granted and he is restored to the office of attorney at law with all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. This order is conditioned upon good behavior for a period of three years as per opinion in Re Pine, Fla., 41 So.2d 546.
It is so ordered.
SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS, ADAMS, HOBSON and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
CHAPMAN, J., dissents.