Opinion
E044847
9-5-2008
In re B.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.R., Defendant and Appellant.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey J. Koch and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for plaintiff and respondent.
Not to be Published
A juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging that defendant and appellant B.R. (minor) committed a battery against two different victims. (Pen. Code, § 242, counts 1 and 2.) A juvenile court found the allegation in count 1 to be true but found the allegation in count 2 to be not true. Minor was placed on probation for a period of six months and released to the custody of his parents. On appeal, minor contends the court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when it prevented his counsel from asking the victim what the victim has generally lied about in the past. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 24, 2007, minor and the victim, V.J., lived in the same group home in San Bernardino. Around 7:00 a.m., V.J. was watching television when minor walked up to him and hit him on the head with his fist. V.J. did not yell at or push minor before minor hit him. Officer Steve Desrochers was dispatched to the group home at around 6:00 p.m. Officer Desrochers interviewed minor and the victims. V.J. told Officer Desrochers that minor punched him on the left side of his jaw. After minor was arrested, he told Officer Desrochers that nothing happened between him and V.J.
ANALYSIS
The Juvenile Court Did Not Violate Minors Right of Confrontation
Minor argues the court violated his constitutional right of confrontation when it prevented defense counsel from cross-examining V.J. concerning what he generally lied about. We disagree.
A. Background
V.J. testified that minor hit him on the head one morning at the group home where they lived. On cross-examination, minors counsel questioned V.J. about the circumstances surrounding the battery. The following exchange took place:
"Q: You know the difference between a truth and a lie?
"A: Yes.
"Q: Do you ever lie?
"A: Sometimes.
"Q: Sometimes. What do you lie about?
"A: Forgot.
"Q: Im sorry. You say sometimes you lie. What do you lie about?
"A: Some things.
"Q: Like what?
"THE COURT: I dont think its too relevant what he may have lied about on some other occasion or anything like that. Were interested in what happened on this occasion. [¶] . . . [¶]
"[Minors counsel]: For the record, his credibility is an issue. Hes testified he lies. I need to inquire what he lied about.
"THE COURT: [Evidence Code section] 352.
"[Minors counsel]: For the record, the Court has denied me cross-examination of the 6th Amendment."
B. Standard of Review
"Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time. [Citation.] Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion `must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] [Citation.]" (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124 (Rodrigues), italics in original.)
C. The Court Properly Limited the Cross-examination
"[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term, `the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. [Citation.]" (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 (Van Arsdall), emphasis in original.)
In People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 374 (Lewis), the defendant sought to cross-examine the prosecutions main witness, Paul Pridgon, on certain issues to undermine his credibility. The trial court "sustained objections to questions whether Pridgon ever hit anyone with a stick, and whether he ever carried a knife at night for protection." (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant contended the trial court committed error based on these rulings. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court "properly limited questions to Pridgon about whether he ever hit anyone with a stick or whether he ever carried a knife for protection. These questions were unlimited in time and of marginal relevance." (Id. at pp. 375-376, italics added.)
Similarly, in the instant case, after establishing the unremarkable fact that V.J. has lied before in his lifetime, defense counsel asked V.J. what things he lied about. This question was not limited in time, subject matter, or context, and was, therefore, of marginal relevance. As noted by the court, what V.J. may have lied about on some other occasion was not relevant, since the court was only interest in what happened in the instant case. The court was well within its discretion in determining, under Evidence Code section 352, that the probative value of the particular evidence sought was outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice. Because the evidence sought was only of marginal relevance, the trial court did not violate defendants right to confrontation in limiting the cross-examination. (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679.)
In any event, assuming there was an abuse of discretion, reversal is not warranted. It is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have occurred had the court permitted defense counsel to question V.J. on what types of things he lied about. (Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) For the purpose of enabling the court to assess V.J.s credibility, evidence of what he lied about in general would have added little, in this case, to his testimony that he sometimes lied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
RAMIREZ, P.J.
GAUT, J. --------------- Notes: The factual background in this opinion includes only facts relating to count 1.