Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Super. Ct. No. 01CEJ300145-5, Jane Cardoza, Judge.
Michael P. McPartland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dennis A. Marshall, County Counsel, and William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Harris, Acting P.J., Gomes, J., and Kane, J.
Michelle T. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her nine-year-old daughter B.R. She contends the court abused its discretion by not finding termination was detrimental to B.R. based on their parent/child relationship (§ 366.26, sub d. (c)(1)(A)). She also claims the court should have found termination would be detrimental to B.R. on account of her sibling relationship (§ 366.26, sub d. (c)(1)(E)). On review, we disagree with both of appellant’s arguments and will affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Starting from her birth in 1997, B.R. has been a dependent child of the Fresno County Superior Court for much of her life. As a newborn, she tested positive for drugs and suffered severe seizures. This led to B.R.’s immediate removal from parental custody, foster care, and reunification services for appellant and the child’s father. After approximately one year, the court restored custody of B.R. to the parents. Three years later in 2001, respondent Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (the department) detained B.R. and her older siblings and initiated these dependency proceedings. The combination of appellant’s substance abuse and mental health problems coupled with the father’s me thamphetamine abuse caused them to seriously neglect the children. Appellant and the father never reunified with the children.
Long-Term Foster Care as Original Permanent Plan
In 2003, the court selected a permanent plan of long-term foster care for then 5-year-old B.R., and her older sisters, 11-year-old K. and 10-year-old C., and her 8-year-old brother D. The court found termination would be detrimental to the children on two independent grounds. One, the parents maintained regular visitation and contact with them and the children would benefit from a continued relationship (§ 366.26, sub d. (c)(1)(A)). It was undisputed to that point the parents visited weekly with the children. Two, the children lived with foster parents who were unable or unwilling to adopt because of exceptional circumstances but were willing and able to provide the children with a stable and permanent home (§ 366.26, sub d. (c)(1)(D)). After several failed placements, all four children had been placed together finally with these foster parents; the children appeared to do well.
B.R. and her three siblings lived together in the same foster home for approximately two years. In December 2004, however, the eldest child K. made allegations against members of the extended foster family. This led to the children’s removal and separation. The children reported to their CASA volunteer that they did not mind being separated; they thought they got along better when they met for visits.
Meanwhile, B.R. had been diagnosed with Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD) and was seeing a therapist on an ongoing basis. She exhibited “concerning behaviors related to poor boundaries, distractibility, and inappropriate bathroom/hygiene skills and smearing feces/defecating in inappropriate places.”
B.R.’s 2005 Change of Placement
In January 2005, B.R. was separately placed with foster mother S.J. Although this was B.R.’s seventh foster home placement, it has proven to be her most stable. She has lived in S.J.’s home ever since. S.J. is a school teacher with excellent children skills, wide experience with behaviors, and an ability to provide a wonderful balance of structure and nurturing. S.J. worked very hard to implement a treatment plan which B.R.’s therapist developed. As a result, B.R. made progress and gained stability. Her reactive attachment symptoms decreased in intensity to the point that B.R. could be discharged from regular therapy sessions in the fall of 2005.
Also, in 2005, the parents’ visits were reduced to once-a-month for two hours. And, in the latter half of the year, B.R.’s older sisters joined her in S.J.’s home. Although all three girls appeared to be doing very well, the older sisters’ placement in S.J.’s home ended sometime in early 2006, under circumstances which the appellate record does not describe.
By March 2006, S.J. was interested in pursuing a plan of guardianship or adoption for B.R. Meanwhile, however, appellant reportedly told the children they would be returning to her care within the next six months. She was once again in residential drug treatment. This led to some confusion in B.R.’s mind as well as to a resumption of her mental health therapy. B.R. had mixed feelings. She had expressed to S.J. a desire to be adopted but was worried about hurting her biological parents’ feelings. B.R. was concerned as well that she would not be able to see her siblings.
Order Setting a New Permanency Planning Hearing for B.R.
At a status review hearing in September 2006, the department recommended that the court set a new section 366.26 hearing for B.R. B.R. had developed a strong bond with S.J. and stated she would like to be adopted by S.J. A department social worker had spoken with B.R., her foster mother S.J., and B.R.’s therapist about an adoption plan. B.R. stated she was worried that her parents would be upset with her for wanting to be adopted. However, she still wanted S.J. to adopt her.
In therapy, B.R. was able to verbalize her conflicting feelings regarding her biological family. According to a September 2006 therapist update, B.R. had begun to decompensate slightly from her previous level of functioning. This was due to the unconditional loyalty B.R. felt she must exhibit towards her biological family so they would not reject her. It was agonizing for B.R. to never know how her biological family would react towards her visit to visit; it seemed to depend on how her siblings, especially the eldest child K., treated her. B.R. felt like a scapegoat with her siblings, often being teased, feeling left out, and verbally put down by some siblings during family visits. The therapist described this as an “agonizing tight rope [B.R.] has to walk visit to visit.” Despite this, B.R. sensed she was a traitor to her biological family for wanting to be adopted. Consequently, she regressed with her RAD symptoms in her foster home, testing S.J.’s love for her by being oppositional. According to the therapist, B.R.’s reaction was typical of a child who had RAD and still maintained contact with her biological family.
For instance, as the CASA volunteer later reported, during a 2006 summer camp which B.R. attended with her siblings, K. gave her a bad time about her wish to be adopted.
Under these circumstances, the therapist recommended B.R. be freed for adoption and, in any event, questioned the wisdom of maintaining regular biological family visits. In the therapist’s view, it clearly was the family dynamics and the abandonment and neglect which produced the RAD symptoms within B.R. The visits had the potential of undermining any progress B.R. would make on a long-term basis.
The therapist acknowledged B.R. wanted contact with her biological family but even B.R. would say she was not sure “‘so much’” contact was good for her. A visit twice a year or even once a year would be okay in B.R.’s view although she “‘might’” miss them too. The therapist also predicted if B.R. were told it would hurt her biological family by being adopted, B.R. might even say she would rather not be adopted.
According to the family’s CASA volunteer, B.R. was pleased S.J. wanted to adopt her. S.J. had been successful in previously adopting foster children, with whom B.R. now lived. The volunteer, who had served the family since July 2002, also recommended that B.R. be assessed for adoption with S.J.
At the status review hearing in September 2006, the court set a new section 366.26 hearing for B.R. It ordered a family bonding study as well to include a sibling attachment assessment. Although the court calendared the new section 366.26 hearing for January 2007, it conducted the hearing in May and June 2007.
The Department’s Case in Favor of Termination
In the interim, the department filed a “366.26 WIC Report” with the court recommending it find B.R. adoptable and terminate parental rights. The department reported B.R. developed a strong bond with S.J. and wanted to be adopted. She continued to worry nonetheless her parents would be upset at her for wanting to be adopted. Visits had been problematic as members of the family discussed the issue of B.R.’s adoption. This created some stress in B.R.’s life.
Along with its report, the department submitted reports from the foster care agency and the children’s CASA volunteer. The foster care agency reported that B.R. seemed less anxious at the prospect of being adopted and less emotionally torn between adoption and feelings of biological family loyalty. Her certitude about adoption had been replaced with more an attitude of “‘sitting on the fence’” with regard to the prospect.
The CASA volunteer reported B.R. was “pleased and full of anticipation for her potential adoption, and ha[d] chosen a new name to accompany her possible adoption.” The volunteer believed B.R. deserved to have her wish seriously considered. In the CASA volunteer’s estimation, B.R. flourished under S.J.’s care. She had grown from an immature child anxious to attach herself to anyone who might show her caring and love to a cheerful young girl, able to share her foster mother with other children in the home. She was also full of enthusiasm for new experiences, was doing well in school and had developed a supportive network of good friends.
After adoption, B.R. wanted to continue birth family visitation to which S.J. had agreed. The CASA volunteer also reported B.R.’s siblings wanted more contact, if not placement, with their biological family. Despite the wishes expressed by her siblings, B.R. continued to choose adoption.
Bonding Studies
The department also filed the court-ordered bonding studies assessing the parent/child relationship as well as the sibling relationship. Carrie Freeman, a licensed marriage and family therapist, conducted the assessments and reported first that the children did not have a strong parent/child relationship with their birth parents. The children appeared to respond and interact with the parents as though they were extended family members, not their parents. While the children were happy to see their parents and appeared to have a playful and fun visit, there appeared to be some distance in the relationship. In addition, the children did not have a substantial and positive emotional relationship with the parents such that they would be greatly harmed if rights were terminated.
As for the issue of a sibling bond, Freeman determined the siblings’ relationship was strained. B.R. appeared to have distanced herself from the others and was not as attached as the others appeared to be to one another. The older siblings were clearly fearful of not being able to see B.R. once she was adopted. Notably, however, each child’s care provider reported that the children did not often speak of their siblings, telephone one another or ask for additional visits.
In addition, Freeman did not believe the siblings’ relationship was such that they would not be greatly harmed if their relationship were terminated. During the evaluation process, Freeman observed that although the siblings communicated and interacted together, there was little reciprocated affection. When the brother began to cry, apparently about the prospect of B.R. being adopted, B.R. had to be told to give her brother comfort. B.R. stated toward the end of the observation and in front of her siblings that she wished to be adopted.
Further, in Freeman’s opinion, continuing the sibling relationship would not outweigh the well being B.R. would gain through adoption. The evaluator did believe, however, that continuing the sibling relationship in some manner would be beneficial given the other children’s “significant and great fear” of not being able to have contact with B.R. if she were adopted.
Response to Department’s Showing
In an apparent response to the department’s report and recommendation and the older siblings’ opposition, the children’s counsel declared a conflict of interest. The court in turn appointed separate counsel to represent B.R. The parents meanwhile filed contested issue statements with the court. Each parent claimed the court should find termination would be detrimental to B.R. based on the parent/child relationship and the sibling relationship (§ 366.26, sub d. (c)(1)(A) & (E).)
Attached to appellant’s statement of contested issues was a letter from the monitor of the family’s monthly visits. The letter, which the court later considered, reported that starting in the spring of 2006 the social worker purportedly authorized B.R. to decide which visits she wanted to attend. Thereafter, B.R. attended only the last portion of the May and June 2006 visits and did not attend the July and September visits. Her last visit the monitor supervised was in December 2006.
Also, attached to appellant’s contested issue statement was a copy of a March 2007 letter from B.R.’s therapist, another letter which the court also took into consideration. The therapist sought to update the child’s circumstances as well as answer questions posed by the mother’s attorney.
Since the therapist’s last report from September 2006, B.R. attended 14 individual therapy sessions and continued to thrive in S.J.’s home. She appeared less emotionally over reactive for long periods of time regarding “the adoption issues.” The goal of therapy at this point was to stabilize B.R.’s RAD symptoms so that she did not regress from her current level of functioning during the adoption process.
Appellant’s counsel had asked, “Does [B.R.] understand what adoption is?” and “Is adoption what [B.R.] wants?” The therapist posed the questions to B.R. alone during a March 2007 individual therapy session. As to B.R.’s understanding of adoption, the therapist offered the following:
“[B.R.] stated, ‘“[T]he way I think it is, is that you are changing parents, but the other parents are still your biological parents’. When asked what would be different from how she’s living now, [B.R.] stated, ‘no more social workers…we wouldn’t have to follow so many rules [from the court]…and [I] would be more like a normal person’. [B.R.] said she wants to be able to live by the same rules ‘like kids in my class…I’m the other foster kid in my class’. Being adopted means, ‘you become a member of a different family…fully a member’.”
In response to whether adoption was what B.R. wanted, the therapist responded:
“When asked, [B.R.] said, ’ya’. I asked [B.R.] why, and she said, ‘it’s about the stuff I just said”. When asked, ‘Do you want to be adopted by [S.J.]?’ [B.R.] stated, ‘Yes’. When asked why, [B.R.] said, ‘because she can do a lot of things…I’ve been at her house the longest, at least that is what it seems like, and I get mad a lot, and sometimes the foster parents before couldn’t take it anymore and they would send me to a different home, but when I get mad at [S.J.’s] house, she doesn’t send me away’.
“I asked [B.R.] how her life is different now than it was before, [B.R.] talked about liking living with [S.J.] and at her house because ‘it used to be my [biological] sisters and brothers bossed me around and would tell me what to do’. [B.R.] said it would make her feel, ‘well, sad’. [B.R.] says she feels ‘better’ at her home at [S.J.’s] ‘because I don’t get bossed around as much’. When asked if [B.R.] loves [S.J.] or just likes her ‘a whole bunch’, [B.R.] said, ‘both, I like her a lot and I love her’.
“The complicating issue for [B.R.] came out when she started crying for about 10 minutes in session without talking after asked if she understood that once she was adopted that would mean ‘never ever’ going home to her biological parents and that visitation with her biological family would be ultimately up to the courts as part of the adoption decisions. When encouraged to tell this therapist what her tears were about, [B.R.] couldn’t at first, but then after 5 more minutes of covering her eyes with her hands, she stated that she doesn’t want anyone to get their feelings hurt, that she feels ‘two ways’. The first way she feels is that she loves her biological parents and would desire to go home to them if she could, and she doesn’t want this to hurt [S.J.]. The second way she feels is that if she can’t go home permanently with her biological parents, than she wants to be adopted, and she doesn’t want this to hurt her biological parents and siblings’ feelings. As you can image, this puts [B.R.] in a very unfair position of feeling like she is the source of pain to someone she loves no matter what happens.”
Contested Section 366.26 Hearing
As previously mentioned, the court eventually conducted a contested section 366.26 hearing for B.R. in May and June 2007. The department submitted the matter on its report and attachments. The parents’ attorneys called a number of witnesses, including Freeman who conducted the bonding studies, appellant, B.R.’s two older sisters, B.R.’s current social worker, and the family’s former visitation monitor.
In their examination of Freeman, parents’ counsel largely questioned her bonding study methodology. For example, she interviewed the biological parents, each set of foster parents, and 15-year-old K. in addition to conducting structured observations of the biological parents with the children and the children as a separate group. Freeman did not interview B.R. during the course of the bonding studies. However, she added, that children were not usually interviewed for bonding studies. The parents’ attorneys did not elicit any evidence to cause the court to conclude the bonding studies were legally insufficient.
Appellant testified about her relationship with B.R., her participation in the bonding study, and her opinion that termination would be detrimental to B.R. The mother described sharing a loving relationship with B.R. For the “last couple of months,” she and the father visited with B.R., separate from the other children under the supervision of B.R.’s social worker.
Appellant believed B.R. would be harmed if rights were terminated because she did not believe the foster mother, S.J., would continue to allow B.R. to see her biological family. The mother based her belief on B.R.’s absence from some of the scheduled visits. The mother also believed it would benefit B.R. to maintain her biological family ties because she would have her own family’s unconditional love as well as her family heritage.
In addition, appellant described B.R.’s relationship with her siblings. The mother estimated B.R. was closest to her brother and noted they spent a lot of time together during visits. Appellant testified K. and B.R. had a “more strained relationship” which the mother attributed to the age difference as well as the fact K. had “pretty much been the mom.” K. and B.R. lived together for the majority of their dependencies. The mother did not characterize the relationship between B.R. and her sister C.
Next, the eldest child K. took the witness stand. She testified she had a good relationship with B.R. although she had not seen her younger sister in a couple of months. K. blamed S.J. for not getting to see B.R. Before then, they visited once a month and would play games and talk. K. also claimed there was a time when she spoke on the telephone with B.R. and overheard S.J. tell her to hang up the telephone. K. believed that if S.J. adopted B.R., K. would no longer be able to see B.R. It would “just be easier” and preferable to K. if B.R. stayed within their family. Asked if it was in B.R.’s best interests to be adopted, K. replied “Honestly, I don’t know.” K. also remembered asking her youngest sister during the sibling attachment study, if she wanted to be adopted. K.’s recollection was that B.R. did not answer.
B.R.’s other sister, C., also testified in opposition to the department’s recommendation that B.R. be freed for adoption. C. did not believe adoption would be in her younger sister’s best interests because she did not think it was “right[.]” She claimed her parents were “doing good” and the only reason B.R. wanted to be adopted was to prevent her from being moved, even possibly with their parents.
The parties agreed to accept the brother’s written statement in lieu of his in-court testimony. He too opposed the recommendation for adoption.
B.R.’s current case manager testified she observed three visits between B.R. and her parents as well as one visit B.R. had with her siblings. She confirmed that the family was affectionate with one another.
Last, a Comprehensive Youth Services employee testified about having supervised the family’s visits for approximately three years until earlier in 2007. She described B.R.’s relationship with the other children as “normal within the family.” The older siblings, as well as the parents, doted on her perhaps because she was the youngest. B.R.’s brother appeared to be the closest to her. The visitation monitor also believed there was a bond between B.R. and her siblings.
Closing arguments centered on the parents’ claims that termination would be detrimental to B.R. on account of her parent/child relationship as well as sibling relationship. The department countered that the parents failed to sustain their burden of proof as to either detriment claim, especially in light of the bonding assessments. It also emphasized how well B.R. was doing in her current foster home and how far she had come. B.R.’s attorney agreed with the department. He added that on numerous occasions B.R. indicated she still wanted to be adopted although she had feelings for her parents and always would. Her attorney asked the court to grant her wish and free her for adoption.
After the parties submitted the matter, the court found B.R. adoptable and rejected the parents’ detriment arguments.
DISCUSSION
I. Introduction
Because B.R. was likely to be adopted, the law required the court to terminate parental rights, unless one of the specifically designated circumstances, set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), provided a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Appellant and the father bore the evidentiary burden of showing termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal. App.4th 799, 809.)
On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s rejection of appellant’s detriment claims for abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal. App.4th 1339, 1351.) Having completed that review, as summarized above, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting either argument.
II. Parent Child Relationship
As previously mentioned, appellant urged the court to find she maintained regular visitation and contact with B.R. and the child would benefit from continuing their relationship such that termination would be detrimental to her. (§ 366.26, sub d. (c)(1)(A).) For this exception to apply, appellant had to show the parent/child relationship promoted B.R.’s well-being to such a degree that it outweighed the well-being she would gain in a permanent, adoptive home. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal. App.4th 567, 575.)
This exception once applied in B.R.’s case, as evidenced by the court’s finding in 2003. However, even assuming appellant continued to maintain regular visits with B.R. throughout the balance of her dependency, appellant could no longer make a case for detriment.
Sometime in 2005 their visits were reduced to once-a-month for two hours. The visits also never moved beyond supervised visits. In addition, by 2007, B.R. had spent two-thirds of her life outside of appellant’s custody and care. Although B.R. still loved appellant, they no longer shared, as Freeman reported and testified, a strong parent/child relationship. B.R. as well as her siblings appeared to respond and interact with their biological parents as though they were extended family members. There was some distance in their relationship.
In large part, appellant criticizes Freeman’s bonding study as “less than satisfying.” In appellant’s view, it seemed “inconceivable” that Freeman could assess B.R.’s relationship with her (appellant) without speaking to her. However, Freeman explained children were not usually interviewed for bonding studies. Also, the court expressly found the parents’ attorneys did not elicit any evidence to cause the court to conclude the bonding studies were legally insufficient. Thus, the issue boiled down to what weight the court chose to give Freeman’s opinions. Weight, however, is not a matter for this court’s review. (In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal. App.4th 1373, 1378-1379.)
In any event, the juvenile court must balance the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal. App.4th at p. 575.) Given the evidence that B.R.’s emotional attachment to appellant as well as her siblings was less than positive and indeed caused her much grief, we do not question the court’s decision.
III. Sibling Relationship Exception to Adoption
For the so-called sibling relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) to apply, a court must find:
“There would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”
As the California Supreme Court explained in In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 61:
“the ‘sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a “compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be “detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’ (In re Daniel H. [(2002)] 99 Cal. App.4th [804,] 813, quoting § 366.26, sub d. (c)(1).)”
Here, the evidence simply did not compel a finding termination would substantially interfere with a sibling relationship. Appellant failed to satisfy her heavy burden of proof in this regard as well.
Again, she questions the value of Freeman’s opinions regarding the sibling relationship. Appellant also cites her other children’s testimony about a close relationship and their collective opposition to adoption as well as their fear that S.J. would not permit future sibling contact if she adopted B.R. On this basis, appellant argues the court should have found termination would substantially interfere with B.R.’s sibling relationship. In so arguing, appellant ignores both the balance of the record as well as the law.
First, there was arguably no evidence offered by the parents of the nature and extent of the sibling relationship, including, but not limited to, whether B.R. was raised with her siblings in the same home and whether B.R. shared significant common experiences. Indeed, we know from the record that she was repeatedly separated from her siblings throughout her young life.
There was also evidence of a strained sibling relationship, as Freeman opined in her bonding assessment. Along the same lines, as B.R.’s therapist reported in the fall of 2006, B.R. felt like a scapegoat with her siblings, feeling teased, left out, and verbally put down by some siblings during family visits. This was an “agonizing tight rope” B.R. walked from visit to visit. When asked about her feelings regarding adoption in 2007, B.R. described her siblings as telling her what to do and making her feel sad as a result. Indeed, B.R.’s therapist questioned the wisdom of B.R. maintaining regular family visits due to the adverse effect the visits had on B.R.’s RAD symptoms.
Additionally, appellant overlooks B.R.’s notion of continued contact. In B.R.’s view, visits once or twice a year would be okay even though she might miss her family. Furthermore, there was evidence from which the court could infer that the visits which B.R. did not attend in 2006 and 2007 were ones that she missed of her own volition.
Moreover, appellant dismisses the evidence that it was B.R.’s wish to be adopted, a wish which her therapist, her CASA volunteer and Freeman, as well as the department, supported. Indeed, B.R.’s wish for adoption as a way to achieve stability in her life also matched the court’s focus which was to satisfy the child’s need for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)
Were this not enough, appellant overlooks the lack of evidence that continued sibling contact was in B.R.’s best interest as required under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E). Clearly, her family believed B.R. should not be freed for adoption but none of them could articulate how continued sibling contact was in B.R.’s best interests. At most, appellant believed B.R. would be harmed if rights were terminated because she did not believe the foster mother, S.J., would continue to allow B.R. to see her biological family. The mother based her belief on B.R.’s absence from some of the scheduled visits. The mother also believed it would benefit B.R. to maintain her biological family ties because she would have her own family’s unconditional love as well as her family heritage. However, there was also evidence, namely from B.R.’s therapist and the CASA volunteer that continued visitation was not in B.R.’s best interest.
Finally, as the California Supreme Court explained in In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 61:
“even if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the court must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home through adoption.”
On this record, the juvenile court easily could find the benefit to B.R. of adoption greatly outweighed any benefit attached to a continued sibling relationship. For this court to overturn the trial court’s determination would amount to our reweighing the evidence which is not our role. (In re Brison C., supra, 81 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1378-1379.) By arguing otherwise, appellant also obfuscates the point that it was her burden to persuade the court that termination was not in B.R.’s best interests. Given the circumstances of this case, appellant’s evidence did not compel the court to make such a finding. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.