Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK71975 Marguerite Downing, Judge.
Joseph D. MacKenzie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Timothy M. O’Crowley, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUZUKAWA, J.
Appellant M.R. (Mother) has three children with B.P. (Father P.), M.P. (born December 1997), L.P. (born July 1999), and B.P. (born April 1996) (collectively the P. children). Mother has two children with M.R. (Father R.), R.R. (born August 2005) and M.R. (born October 2003) (collectively the R. children). Mother has a sixth child with R.H. (Father H.), R.T. (born June 2002), who is not a subject of this appeal. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it denied her a contested hearing, denied her further reunification services as to the P. children and the R. children, and terminated jurisdiction with respect to those children. We affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received several referrals beginning in January 2007 for general neglect, physical abuse, emotional abuse, and drug use by Mother. Mother agreed to voluntarily release her six children to the Department and to participate in substance abuse counseling, drug testing, parenting classes, and individual counseling. In December 2007, Mother was arrested when she allegedly stabbed her boyfriend (not a father of any of the children) with a fork. Although Mother then enrolled in mental health counseling, she did not attend regularly and missed appointments with a psychiatrist. Mother began anger management counseling and by February 2008 was reportedly attending classes and doing well. However, on February 28, 2008, Mother and her boyfriend were arrested for possessing cocaine base for sale. Drug paraphernalia and ammunition were found in her apartment.
A petition was filed on March 17, 2008, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (g). The children were placed in four separate foster homes. Mother said she and the children had recently moved from Nebraska because she and Father R. were arguing. The social worker contacted Father P. in Indiana, who said he wanted his three children placed with him. At this point Father R. had not yet been located.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In April 2008, Father P. appeared in court and was granted unmonitored visitation. In June 2008, the social worker reported that she had located Father R. in Nebraska, who said that he wanted custody of his two children. He had not been told by Mother where she and the children had been living after leaving Nebraska. Father R. was employed, living with a girlfriend and their son, and believed he could support all three children. Father H.’s whereabouts were unknown and R.T. was placed with her paternal aunt.
At a court-ordered mediation on June 10, 2008, the parties failed to reach agreement and the matter was set for adjudication. Father P. asked that his children be released to him and requested a written plan from the Department to work out the details regarding transportation to Indiana. Mother’s counsel informed the court that Mother was opposed to placing the children with Father P. The court set the matter for adjudication and gave the Department discretion to release the P. children to Father P., and the R. children to Father R. The court requested that a court-appointed special advocate (CASA) evaluate the homes of Father R. in Nebraska and Father P. in Indiana.
On August 12, 2008, the adjudication of the petition proceeded as to Father P. and Father R. As Mother was incarcerated and had a criminal court hearing, her matter was continued. The court reviewed social worker reports, home evaluations by the CASA workers, and letters provided by counsel for the fathers in determining whether their homes were suitable for placement of their children. The social workers’ reports indicated that the Department “fully intends” to release the P. children to their father once he obtained the medical training necessary for L.P., who had sickle cell anemia, and intended to release the R. children to their father upon the receipt of a favorable report regarding his home. Both fathers indicated that Mother had taken the children away from them and had failed to inform them of her whereabouts. The court found the fathers to be non offending under the petition. The court stated that the CASA reports for Father P. and Father R. indicated that their homes were safe and appropriate and expressed its intent to release their children to them for extended visits. Mother objected to the release, and the Department joined, based on the fact that a full investigation of Father R.’s home had not been conducted and that it had not been determined whether Father P. could appropriately care for L.P. The court noted it had no evidence that releasing L.P. to her father would pose a risk to her safety and was satisfied with the CASA reports and released the children to their respecting fathers.
At the August 28, 2008 hearing, after the juvenile court received documentary evidence from the Department, it asked counsel for the children whether she had any evidence to present. She said she did not, and that she would proceed by argument. The court then addressed Mother’s counsel, who responded, “No, Your Honor. I’m going to proceed by argument.” The court found all of the allegations in the petition to be true, and then proceeded to disposition. Mother’s counsel requested a contested hearing at this point, arguing for family reunification services. The Department argued that it was impossible for it to provide reunification services when the children lived out of state. It pointed out that Mother would be receiving services as to R.T. and that if Mother complied with her case plan, she would be in a position to file a section 388 petition as to the other children.
The court stated, inter alia, “[T]he court is inclined at this point to terminate services for the P[.] children. The court is not in a position to supervise them. They are with their Father. He is out of state. And so the court feels at this point with respect to him, that I have provided all the services that I can, especially given the fact that Mother’s been having services for a while now before this case was even filed, which is an indication to me that services may not be successful in this case. So the court is going to terminate jurisdiction for [the P. children and the R. children]. I will order family reunification services with respect to [R.T.] because she is here and in a position where the court can supervise her. And the court is going to deny your request to continue this matter for a contested disposition because it sounds like we’ve had one....” After it announced it was going to remove custody of the children from Mother, Mother asked to speak. She stated that neither Father R. nor Father P. had done anything for the children and that she had raised them since birth. She denied using drugs; however, she later admitted to using marijuana but claimed the children had never been in danger or physical harm. She told the court, “You caused me to have that behavior,” and said, “I can have as many [children] as I want.... I have been taking care of them. You guys haven’t.”
The court then granted physical custody of the P. children and the R. children to their respective fathers. It terminated jurisdiction with respect to the P. children. The next day, it did the same with respect to the R. children. ~(CT 349-351)~
DISCUSSION
I. The Section 361.2 Hearing
Mother does not quarrel with the court’s jurisdictional findings. However, she contends she was entitled to a contested dispositional hearing before the court issued its order pursuant to section 361.2 and that the court should have granted her request for a continuance to prepare for the hearing. We disagree.
Section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides that when a child is removed from the custody of a parent, “the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time of the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
If the court places the child with that parent, it may (1) grant the parent legal and physical custody of the child, allow the noncustodial parent reasonable visitation and terminate jurisdiction over the child, or (2) grant the parent custody of the child subject to the jurisdiction of the court, with or without the provision of reunification services to the noncustodial parent. (§ 361.2, subds. (b)(1), (2), & (3).)
Mother concedes that section 361.2 does not specify the precise nature of the hearing that must be held, arguing instead that nothing in the statute precludes a contested hearing. She correctly notes that she was entitled to due process before the children were taken from her custody. We conclude she had an adequate opportunity to be heard. Nothing more is required under the statute.
At the time of the August 28 hearing, Mother was aware the court had determined that Father P. and Father R. were non offending and had ordered their respective children released to them. She also had notice that the fathers were seeking termination of the court’s jurisdiction. Although Mother’s counsel requested a contested hearing, he did not state what, if anything, would be gained. Mother asserts that she gave an offer of proof, but her suggestion is belied by the record. As the court was issuing its order, Mother asked if she could address the court. She simply repeated her claim that the fathers had done nothing for the children and that she had taken care of them all of their lives. The court had already rejected that claim, finding that Mother’s propensity to simply leave with the children prevented their fathers from providing support.
Mother argues that In re Michael W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 190 (Michael W.) and In re Kelley L. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1279 (Kelley L.) compel the conclusion she was entitled to an evidential hearing. We are not persuaded. In Michael W., the trial court’s order was reversed because it refused to hear current evidence from the mother’s doctor relevant to the issue of visitation despite the fact that the court’s information was almost a year old. As we have discussed, in our case, Mother made unfounded accusations but proffered no new evidence. Kelley L. provides no assistance, as the issue there concerned the lack of notice provided to the parent prior to a hearing regarding the content of exit orders. Here, there is no question Mother had notice and a full opportunity to be heard.
Nor did the court err when it denied Mother’s request for a continuance. Section 352 provides that “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance.” Mother failed to meet her burden. At the hearing, her counsel merely argued that the Department failed to establish Mother would not benefit from the grant of reunification services. There was no showing what evidence could be brought to bear on the issue had a continuance been obtained.
II. The Termination of Reunification Services
Mother claims that the court erred in terminating reunification services as to the P. and R. children because she was willing and available to participate in services, and the court wrongfully assumed that it could not order services out of state.
Section 361 does not require the court to offer reunification services to the parent from whom custody is removed. “If the previously noncustodial parent can provide a safe and stable permanent home for the child and the evidence establishes that the other parent cannot, reunification services may be offered only to the previously noncustodial parent since this serves the Legislature’s goals by placing the child in parental custody and providing for a safe and stable permanent home for the child. The statute expressly directs the court to consider these factors in deciding to whom reunification services should be provided.” (In re Erika W. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 470, 476-477, italics omitted.) A denial of reunification services is proper under section 361.2. (In re Patricia T. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 400, 406.) We review a denial of services for abuse of discretion. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.)
The court’s comments indicate that it did not base its decision solely on the out-of-state placement of the children. It found that the noncustodial parents (Father P. and Father R.) could provide safe and stable permanent homes for the children and that Mother could not. It also noted that Mother had been receiving reunification services for some time and her performance was an indication that she would not successfully reunify with her children. Substantial evidence supports that conclusion.
Reunification services had been offered since January 2007. Over the years she received in-home counseling services, and instruction on budgeting and home organization, substance counseling, mental health counseling, anger management counseling, and parenting classes. She missed several drug tests and tested positive for cocaine and marijuana in two separate tests in 2007. Mother was arrested for stabbing her boyfriend and, in a separate incident, on a narcotics charge when ammunition and drug paraphernalia were found in her apartment. The children’s welfare was clearly endangered and Mother’s situation appeared to be getting worse since the initial referral in January 2007. Reunification services did not appear to result in any improvement in Mother’s behavior and the court was entitled to consider this in deciding whether further services should be offered.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P.J. MANELLA, J.