Opinion
No. 10-17-00386-CR
12-13-2017
IN RE ROY LEE BOYKIN
Original Proceeding
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this original proceeding, relator Roy Lee Boykin seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to rule on his motion to vacate the judgment and sentence for his underlying criminal conviction for capital murder. Attached to his filing is what appears to be a brief wherein Boykin argues that his criminal conviction should be vacated because his guilty plea was involuntary due to violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, vindictive prosecution, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors purportedly committed by the trial court. We dismiss the petition.
The Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court have recognized that "the exclusive post-conviction remedy in final felony convictions in Texas courts is through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [article] 11.07." Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 525 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West 2015); Ex parte Mendenhall, 209 S.W.3d 260, 261 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.); see also Ex parte Beard, No. 10-15-00252-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8522, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 13, 2015, orig. proceeding). Moreover, only the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases. See Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Ex parte Beard, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8522, at **1-2.
Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive authority to grant post-conviction relief from a final felony conviction, we are without jurisdiction to consider Boykin's petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07; Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 525 n.8; Ex parte Mendenhall, 209 S.W.3d at 261; see also Ex parte Beard, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8522, at **1-2; In re Golden, No. 12-11-00300-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9281, at **1-2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 23, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to withdraw a guilty plea, vacate a conviction, and return the defendant to the same position he occupied prior to entering his guilty plea). Accordingly, we dismiss Boykin's petition for writ of mandamus.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting with a note)
Dismissed
Opinion delivered and filed December 13, 2017
Do not publish
[CRPM] (Chief Justice Gray dissents to the Court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction. A separate opinion will not issue. The Court's opening paragraph properly characterizes this as a petition for writ of mandamus in an effort to compel the trial court to rule on his pending 11.07 writ. What the Court refers to "as what appears to be a brief" attached to the petition for writ of mandamus is actually a copy of the 11.07 writ Boykin wants ruled upon. We have jurisdiction of a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to rule on a matter that has been pending for an excessive period of time. A petition for an 11.07 writ, however, has a provision which provides that the "failure of the court to act within the allowed 20 days shall constitute such a finding" that there are no controverted, previously unresolved facts material to the legality of the applicant's confinement. Thus, the delay in the disposition of Boykin's 11.07 writ could not be due to the trial court's failure or refusal to rule since an implied ruling is made if no affirmative action is taken by the trial court in 20 days. There may be other reasons that Boykin has not obtained a ruling on his 11.07 writ, such as the proper form was not used or the clerk failed to forward a copy of the writ to the Court of Criminal Appeals or failed to file the appropriate certification of the findings made, but from the record provided by Boykin, we are unable to ascertain what, if any, other cause there may be for having failed to receive a ruling on his 11.07 writ. Moreover, if the problem lies with a failure of the trial court clerk, that issue is not before us nor would we have any jurisdiction to compel the trial court clerk to comply with the article 11.07 requirements. Based on the foregoing, the only appropriate ruling of this court is a denial of the petition for writ of mandamus. Because the court dismisses the petition for writ of mandamus for want of jurisdiction, Chief Justice Gray respectfully notes his dissent.)