The trial panel concluded that, by having Mr. Caputo sign the documents in blank and filing those documents with the Bankruptcy Court, the accused engaged in misrepresentation under DR 1-102(A)(3). That rule requires, at the least, that a lawyer knowingly engage in a misrepresentation. See In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 652 n 7, 740 P.2d 785 (1987) (stating principle); In re Hiller, 298 Or. 526, 532, 694 P.2d 540 (1985) (same). Because the accused does not challenge the trial panel's conclusion that he violated DR 1-102(A)(3), we deem him to have acted with knowledge, that is, with "the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result," when he had his client sign blank documents that contained perjury clauses and when he filed those documents with the court.

This court found the accused guilty of violating DR 9-101(A) and other rules. Aggravating and mitigating factors also were present, but the accused did not have a prior disciplinary record. The case most similar to the one before us is In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 740 P.2d 785 (1987), in which this court imposed a six-month suspension on a lawyer who failed to account for property of a client (former DR 9-102(B)(3)), failed promptly to pay over client funds to which the client was entitled (former DR 9-102(B)(4)), engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation (DR 1-102(A)(4)), engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (DR 1-102(A)(5)), and mishandled funds belonging in part to the lawyer and in part to the client (DR 9-102(A)). 303 Or at 645.

This court has found that the rule encompasses conduct such as: The failure to appear at trial, In re Bridges, 302 Or. 250, 728 P.2d 863 (1986); the failure to appear at depositions, In re Dixson, supra, 305 Or at 89-90; harassing court personnel, In re Rochat, 295 Or. 533, 668 P.2d 376 (1983); filing an appeal without the consent of the clients, In re Paauwe, supra, 294 Or at 177; repeated appearances in court while intoxicated, In re Dan Dibble, 257 Or. 120, 478 P.2d 384 (1970); and permitting a non-lawyer to use a lawyer's name on pleadings, In re Jones, 308 Or. 306, 779 P.2d 1016 (1989). By recognizing that Bar disciplinary proceedings "strongly resemble judicial proceedings in that they primarily involve factual adjudications," this court, in In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 654, 740 P.2d 785 (1987), concluded that the Bar disciplinary proceedings fell within the scope of the administration of justice. Other proceedings that contain the trappings of a judicial proceeding, such as sworn testimony, perjury sanctions, subpoenas, and the like, similarly would qualify as being within the confines of the administration of justice.

Our precedent is consistent with other jurisdictions’ interpretation and application of professional conduct rules analogous to our Rule 8.4(d). See, e.g. , Disciplinary Counsel v. Chambers , 125 Ohio St.3d 414, 417, 928 N.E.2d 1061, 1064-65 (2010) ; Matter of Tartaglia , 20 A.D.3d 81, 84, 798 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460-61 (2005) ; Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Artimez , 208 W.Va. 288, 295-97, 540 S.E.2d 156, 164-65 (2000) ; Florida Bar v. Frederick , 756 So.2d 79, 86-87 (Fla. 2000) ; In re Conduct of Boothe , 303 Or. 643, 653-55, 740 P.2d 785, 790-91 (1987). For example, in Ramirez , the respondent attorney sent his dissatisfied clients (a husband and wife) a letter forgiving their outstanding legal bill and agreeing to withdraw from representing them.

The accused's repeated actions resulted in prejudice to the conduct of this proceeding and to the interests of the Bar and the public. See In re Boothe, 303 Or 643, 654, 740 P2d 785 (1987) (issues in bar disciplinary proceedings directly and significantly affect members of Bar and general public). His conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice.

In that case, the lawyer actually paid the disputed funds out of the trust account, and a conversion took place. Second, in In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 740 P.2d 785 (1987), this court suspended a lawyer for six months when, inter alia, the lawyer refused to comply with a client's request to turn over a will, forged his client's signature on a check, and withdrew disputed funds. In that case, however, the court noted the lawyer's generally good reputation, lack of previous disciplinary action, and his cooperation with the investigating committee.

See, e.g., In re Magar, 312 Or. 139, 141, 817 P.2d 289 (1991) (lawyer's unauthorized endorsement of client's name on draft made out to client constituted behavior involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation); see also In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 651-52, 740 P.2d 785 (1987) (lawyer's endorsement of client's name, without authorization, on a check on which lawyer and client were joint payees, constituted conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation); In re Sassor, 299 Or. 570, 576, 704 P.2d 506 (1985) (lawyer's endorsement, without authorization, of payee's signature on a state property tax refund check and deposit of those funds in lawyer's trust account constituted conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation). Applicant's testimony before the Board provided no convincing explanations for his misrepresentations in the course of the Varner litigation, and does nothing to resolve our significant doubts regarding applicant's moral character. Those doubts constitute sufficient grounds for denial of his application to practice law in Oregon.

"It is not necessary that the Accused must have acted with intent to injure or defraud because no such intent is required[,] so long as the accused lawyer knew that the alteration and filing as altered [were] not authorized. In re Booth, 303 Or [643,] 652[, 740 P.2d 785 (1987)]."

See, e.g., In re Sousa, 323 Or. 137, 915 P.2d 408 (1996); In re Hedges, 313 Or. 618, 624, 836 P.2d 119 (1992); In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 649, 740 P.2d 785 (1987). But those cases do not support the proposition that the rule cannot be violated unless a client has requested an accounting.

We also find, as the Bar argues, that this conduct prejudiced the administration of justice. As the court said in In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 654, 740 P.2d 785 (1987), where the issue was whether the "administration of justice" includes Bar disciplinary proceedings: "Finally (and, perhaps, most to the point), bar disciplinary proceedings determine whether an accused is fit to practice law in the courts of this state — a question as close to the heart of the `administration of justice' as any could be.