460, 466-67 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (affirming trial court's refusal to dismiss based on expert report that applied same standard of care to multiple defendants); In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A., 223 S.W.3d 398, 405-08 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, orig. proceeding). And Dr. Groysman's expert reports sufficiently explain why both Drs. Keepers and Chan are to be held to the same standard of care and breached the standard of care in the same manner-because they were both involved in the lumbar facet block procedure performed on Michael.

However, if multiple defendants owe the same duty to the patient, then the plaintiff is not required to specifically state the same standard of care for each individual defendant. SeeRittger v. Danos, 332 S.W.3d 550, 556–57 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ; Romero v. Lieberman, 232 S.W.3d 385, 391–92 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) ; In re Boone, 223 S.W.3d 398, 405–06 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2006, orig. proceeding).Appellees assert that Dr. Patel, a hospital-based pharmacist, set out the standard of care for dispensing Lovenox with a "STAT" instruction (i.e. within one hour of receiving the order) and that "the pharmacy" breached that standard of care when it dispensed the prescription almost two hours after it received the "STAT" order.

Accordingly, we conclude that grouping Solis, Rizzo, and Cardiologists of Lubbock, P.A. together under the relevant standard of care does not render Shadoff's report inadequate simply because the same standard of care is applied to each. See In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A., 223 S.W.3d 398, 405-06 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (holding single standard of care applied to defendant doctors and physician's assistant sufficient because all were involved in administering treatment). The cases relied upon by Solis, Rizzo, and Cardiologists of Lubbock, P.A. are inapposite.

(holding the report sufficiently explained the statutory elements were the same as to all relevant healthcare providers); San Jacinto Methodist Hosp. v. Bennett , 256 S.W.3d 806, 817 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding the report adequately assigned required elements to the staff of each of the two named hospital defendants); In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A. , 223 S.W.3d 398, 405-06 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, orig. proceeding) (finding report adequately informs each of the multiple defendants of the specific conduct called into question). An expert report concluding that different healthcare providers are collectively negligent, must explain why, under the particular circumstances, the providers owed the same standard of care to the plaintiff and breached that duty in the same manner.

Compare Barber v. Dean, ___ S.W.3d. ___, No. 02-07-353-CV, 2009 WL 3490952, at *10 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 29, 2009, no pet. h.) ("The report is not insufficient for `grouping' [a]ppellees together because Dr. Wagner specifically states that they all owed the same duty to ensure the proper positioning and padding of Malcolm's arm."), and In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A., 223 S.W.3d 398, 405-06 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (holding that single standard of care applicable to physicians and physician assistant was sufficient because all participated in administering treatment), with Polone v. Shearer, 287 S.W.3d 229, 235 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (holding report that set forth single standard of care applicable to physician and physician assistant insufficient to represent a good faith effort because "[a]lthough the standards of care might be the same for both [the physician and physician assistant], the report does not specifically state as much").Polone, 287 S.W.3d at 236; see also Bowie Mem'l Hosp., 79 S.W.3d at 52-53; Hutchinson v. Montemayor, 144 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).

See Taylor v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp., 169 S.W.3d 241, 243 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.); Rittmer v. Garza, 65 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Doades v. Syed, 94 S.W.3d 664, 671-72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); In re Boone, 223 S.W.3d 398, 405-06 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.). We find each of these cases distinguishable.

Admittedly, being a physician may qualify someone to offer an opinion on the standard of care applicable to nurses or other medical personnel merely because he is a physician. In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A., 223 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, orig. proceeding); Hall v. Huff, 957 S.W.2d 90, 100 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied). Yet, the converse is equally true; being titled a physician does not alone qualify a doctor to opine about the standards a nurse must follow.

Although Dr. Miller uses the same standard for both physicians, his report outlines each doctor's standard of care separately, identifying each doctor and his standard of care in the case. See Romero v. Lieberman, 232 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding same standard of care adequate for all listed medical doctors involved in treating septicemia condition); In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A., 223 S.W.3d 398, 405-06 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, orig. proc.) (holding expert report adequate on standard of care for multiple defendants where each defendant was in the same type of care and the standard was the same for each); Cf. Taylor v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp., 169 S.W.3d 241, 245 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (holding that report failed to address separate standards of care for varied duties of the defendants, including the hospital, doctors' association, emergency room physician, and cardiologist).

Thus, to the extent appellants contend the Guerras' expert reports must fail because they assign the same duties and obligations as to each of them, we reject this contention. See In re Stacy K. Boone, 223 S.W.3d 398, 405-06 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, orig. proceeding) (holding expert report was adequate on standard of care for multiple defendants when each defendant was involved in same type of care and expert explained that standard was the same for each). 2.

We therefore conclude Hoffman was qualified to render an expert opinion on the standard of care applicable to Sanjar and Krell with respect to their participation in the treatment of Green's edema, the administration of fentanyl, and the monitoring of her increasing lethargy and respiratory difficulties.See In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A., 223 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (holding cardiologist was qualified to render expert opinion as to general surgeon's care because opinion was on post-operative therapy and surgeon participated in management of that therapy); see also Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153-54 (Tex. 1996) (holding medical expert must have sufficient expertise with regard to actual subject because not every doctor is a qualified expert on every medical question). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to dismiss on grounds that Hoffman was not qualified to render an expert opinion as to Sanjar and Krell.