Opinion
No. 343440
10-25-2018
In re E. E. BOHANNON-BUNDRAGE, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 06-451318-NA Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and SERVITTO and GADOLA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, EB. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2006, respondent's parental rights to a child were terminated due in part to respondent's substance abuse and failure to maintain appropriate housing. In September 2015, EB was born and Child Protective Services received a referral after respondent would not provide the hospital with an address and was evasive regarding her living arrangements. Respondent moved multiple times in the months following EB's birth. She briefly lived with EB's father, but his home was not suitable because it lacked heat and running water. Respondent moved into the maternal grandmother's home, despite knowing that her mother used crack cocaine. A social worker sent by CPS to provide respondent with services visited that home to complete an assessment. Although respondent was initially receptive, she became agitated with the worker after approximately 20 minutes and asked him to leave. The worker attempted to reschedule the assessment but respondent never responded. The child's father reported to CPS that when he visited the maternal grandmother's home he saw multiple people using drugs, including respondent using cocaine, while EB sat in a car seat in the bedroom. The father then took the child to the paternal grandmother's home, where respondent was allowed to stay for a few days. Around that time, respondent missed two scheduled family team meetings. A termination petition was filed shortly thereafter.
The father was a respondent to the proceedings but his parental rights to EB were not terminated.
At the January 2018 bench trial, the hearing referee found that there was sufficient evidence to exercise jurisdiction over the child and to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), and (j). The referee ordered that respondent complete a Clinic for Child Study evaluation before the best-interests hearing. Respondent reported a history of cocaine use and three unsuccessful attempts at substance abuse treatment. The evaluator opined that it was in the child's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights because of respondent's unresolved substance abuse issues. At the February 2018 best-interests hearing, respondent testified that she had appropriate housing and was participating in a drug and mental health rehabilitation program. Respondent testified that she had visited EB three times since the child's removal in November 2017; the foster-care worker was aware only of the visit that took place at the Clinic for Child Study evaluation. The referee found by a preponderance of the evidence that the termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests. The trial court then entered the order terminating respondent's parental rights.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for clear error the trial court's findings that there were statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the child's best interests. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). A finding is "clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court's special opportunity to observe the witnesses." In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights without affording her an opportunity to participate in a case service plan with respect to EB. We disagree.
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), which at the time provided as follows:
MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) have since been substantively amended. 2018 PA 58, effective June 12, 2018. MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) now provides that termination is appropriate when "[p]arental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights."
(3) The court may terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful."In general, petitioner must make reasonable efforts to rectify conditions, to reunify families, and to avoid termination of parental rights." In re LE, 278 Mich App 1, 18; 747 NW2d 883 (2008). "As part of these reasonable efforts, [petitioner] must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification." In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). However, there is a statutory exception to the "reasonable efforts" requirement when the parent previously had his or her parental rights involuntarily terminated. MCL 712A.19a(2)(c), as amended by 2016 PA 497.
MCL 712A.19a(2)(c) now provides that reunification efforts are not necessary when "[t]he parent has had rights to the child's siblings involuntarily terminated and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to that termination of parental rights." 2018 PA 58, effective June 12, 2018 (emphasis added). --------
It is undisputed that respondent's parental rights to another child were terminated in December 2006 under multiple statutory grounds. Respondent was offered a case service plan in those proceedings. Her parental rights were ultimately terminated because she failed to complete a substance abuse assessment, complete substance abuse treatment, regularly attend parenting time, maintain suitable housing and employment, and communicate with the foster-care agency. Respondent also admitted that EB's sibling tested positive for cocaine at birth and that she used crack cocaine every three days while she was pregnant with that child. Moreover, respondent reported at the Clinic for Child Study evaluation that three prior attempts at substance abuse rehabilitation, the most recent occurring in July 2017, were unsuccessful. We also note that CPS offered respondent services to address her substance abuse and housing issues before filing the termination petition in this case. Thus, it is clear that respondent's rights were previously terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or abuse, and that her prior attempts at rehabilitation proved unsuccessful.
Further, at the time of the bench trial, respondent had not rectified the conditions that led to the prior termination of her parental rights. Respondent continued to have problems with maintaining suitable housing and failed to regularly communicate with CPS. Additionally, EB's father reported to CPS that he removed EB from respondent's care because respondent was using cocaine in the child's presence. Respondent denied that she was using cocaine but admitted that she was smoking marijuana. Respondent has a history of cocaine use yet she moved into her mother's home with EB despite knowing that her mother used crack cocaine. Respondent testified that after the termination petition was filed she obtained appropriate housing and began participating in substance abuse treatment. However, considering that respondent was still grappling with those issues 11 years after the previous termination of her parental rights, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding sufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). Because only one statutory ground is needed to terminate parental rights, we decline to address whether there was sufficient evidence to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent next argues that the trial court failed to find by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in EB's best interests if respondent's parental rights were terminated. We disagree.
"If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). The petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). In determining the child's best interests, "the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re White, 303 Mich App at 713 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Other relevant factors include "a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." Id. at 714.
In determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in EB's best interests, the hearing referee focused on respondent exposing EB to a risk of harm. Respondent's child born in 2006 tested positive for cocaine at birth. Respondent refused standard newborn testing when EB was born; a jaundice test was nevertheless conducted and revealed high levels of bilirubin, meaning that the child would have been at risk had the test not been conducted. Respondent then moved in with her mother, a known crack cocaine user. Given respondent's substance abuse history, it was extremely dangerous to bring a newborn child into an environment where both respondent and EB would be exposed to drugs and drug paraphernalia. Indeed, the child's father observed respondent and others using drugs in that residence while EB was present. Further, given respondent's history of substance abuse and failed attempts at rehabilitation, the referee did not clearly err in finding it unlikely that respondent would be able to rectify her substance abuse in a reasonable amount of time.
The referee also considered the fact that respondent only visited EB three times between November 2017 and February 2018, even though she was offered weekly visits. When respondent canceled her parenting time visits, she made no effort to reschedule. At the time of the bench trial, respondent was participating, but had not yet completed any of her substance abuse and mental health treatment. Unfortunately, it is apparent that respondent's behavior between EB's birth and the termination proceedings largely mirrors the behaviors that ultimately led to the prior termination of her parental rights. While respondent and EB may have a bond, that factor does not outweigh EB's need for a safe and stable home that is free from drug abuse and individuals with unresolved issues with substance abuse and mental health. Given EB's young age, it is critical that she be placed with someone who can provide adequate care and supervision. Accordingly, we are not convinced that the trial court clearly erred by finding that it was in EB's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Michael F. Gadola