Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. JW107290-04. Jon E. Stuebbe, Judge.
Patricia A. Andreoni, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Harris, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Kane, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 13, 2006, the Kern County District Attorney filed a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) in juvenile court charging appellant minor as follows: count I— willful vandalism of property with a value in excess of $400 (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)) and count II— violation of probation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777, subd. (a)(2)).
We note appellant was the subject of previous juvenile wardship petitions filed May 20, 2005 and May 3, 2006, and supplemental petitions filed on or about November 17, 2005 and February 28, 2006.
On December 27, 2006, the court conducted an uncontested detention hearing and appellant denied the allegations of the petition.
On January 29, 2007, the court conducted a contested jurisdictional hearing. At the conclusion of the prosecution case, the court denied a defense motion to dismiss the petition for lack of evidence of identity (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.1). That same date the court found all of the allegations of the petition to be true, and declared the offense alleged in count I to be a felony.
On February 13, 2007, the probation officer filed a report and recommended continuation of probation for a period not to exceed five years and commitment of the minor to the Kern Crossroads Facility.
On the same date, the juvenile court conducted a disposition hearing, found count I to be a felony, continued the terms of appellant’s probation for a period not to exceed five years, and committed him to the Kern Crossroads Facility. The court also suspended appellant’s privilege to obtain a driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 13202.6), directed appellant to stay away from the victim, and ordered him to provide samples of prints and bodily fluids (Pen. Code, § 296).
On February 22, 2007, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the dispositional order and the findings of the contested jurisdictional hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At 2:45 a.m. on July 20, 2006, Michael Zavala heard a loud noise outside a window of his mother’s Bakersfield home. He looked out the window and saw someone swing a baseball bat and break the front window of his mother’s black Pontiac TransAm automobile. The automobile was about five feet away from the window. Zavala yelled and ran out the front door and chased after the individual. After hearing the yelling, Zavala’s mother, Rosa Salcedo, looked outside her bedroom window and saw someone run across the street to the back door of her neighbor’s home. The person was dressed in shorts but she did not remember the color of his shirt. She did not know the identity of the person but thought it was either appellant Bobby V. or his brother. Bobby’s brother and her children were friends and Rosa knew Bobby’s mother.
Michael Zavala ran to appellant’s house, started to bang on the front door, and heard people inside say “ shh, be quiet” and “ they’ re all outside.” Rosa’s other son and her boyfriend ran out of their front door to see what happened. Rosa saw glass everywhere around her vehicle but did not step in it because she was walking barefooted. Instead, she went to Bobby’s front door and asked his mother, Ida, to come out and speak with her. However, no one came to the door. Rosa heard Ida say that she was calling the police. Rosa said the police had already been called and they were on the way.
Bakersfield Police Officer John Blunt responded to Salcedo’s telephone call. She flagged down his police car and they spoke outside her home. While talking with Officer Blunt, Salcedo noticed that appellant had come to the front door of his house. He began changing his clothes by putting a white shirt over his tank top. When Rosa was at Bobby’s house earlier that day, he was wearing a tank top. The suspect who ran across the street was wearing a T-shirt but she believed he had a tank top underneath that shirt. Rosa based her identification on Bobby’s dress earlier in the day, i.e., shorts, white shirt, and Nike Cortez shoes. She did not know the color of the shoes. Rosa’s son, Michael, saw the suspect in a white shirt and gray Nike shoes. When Officer Blunt arrived, Michael said appellant was wearing the same clothes as the suspect. Bobby’s brother had been wearing jeans that day and Rosa believed that the brother was a little smaller than Bobby.
After talking to Rosa Salcedo, Officer Blunt went to appellant’s residence. When Blunt arrived at the residence, appellant was wearing a gray tank top, gray shorts, and no shoes. Officer Blunt asked appellant to get his shoes and to come outside. Appellant put on a pair of black Nike Cortez running shoes and went to Blunt’s patrol car. At the patrol car, Blunt had appellant remove the shoes and Blunt examined them. According to his report, Officer Blunt saw glass on the soles of the shoes. When the shoes were offered at trial, defense counsel claimed no glass was located on the bottom of the shoes and no glass was in the storage bag for the shoes. Officer Blunt examined the shoes at trial and again stated that he saw glass on the bottom of one shoe. However, he did not see a big piece of glass between the treads that he saw on the night of the incident. After viewing the shoes at the hearing, the juvenile court judge stated there was no glass in the storage bag but that he did see glass on the bottom of one shoe.
Officer Blunt seized appellant’s Nike Cortez running shoes and booked them into evidence. Although Blunt photographed Rosa’s Pontiac TransAm, these photographs were not produced in court. Blunt said he did not find any baseball bat and did not conduct a search of appellant’s house.
At the hearing, both Salcedo and Zavala described the perpetrator as resembling appellant. Salcedo said the perpetrator was either appellant or his younger brother. Zavala said he was able to see the backside of the perpetrator from five feet away and knew it was appellant. Zavala based his identification on appellant’s body shape. Zavala acknowledged he had not seen appellant’s brother in awhile, but said he could tell them apart because appellant is larger than his brother and he “ knew the resemblance” of the two.
Rosa Salcedo said she saw an individual running across the street. The individual was wearing shorts and a short-sleeved shirt with a tank top under the shirt. However, she could not remember the color of the outer shirt. Salcedo testified that appellant was wearing “ exactly what [the perpetrator] was wearing” when he came out of his residence. Zavala said the perpetrator was wearing a white shirt, white shorts, and dark gray Nike shoes. Zavala also testified that once appellant came outside, he was wearing the same white shirt, white shorts, and dark gray Nike shoes that the perpetrator wore. Zavala believed the perpetrator used a silver bat but he was unsure because there were no lights in the area of the vehicle.
Rosa Salcedo said her ex-spouse, Richard “ Big Rich” Salcedo, was a leader of appellant’s gang and that her ex-husband likely ordered appellant to smash her car windows. In Rosa’s view, appellant considered Richard a “ big homey,” i.e., someone who gave orders to newer gang members. Richard Salcedo had been released from Folsom State Prison on July 16, four days before the vandalism occurred. The windshield, driver’s side window, and the rear window of Rosa’s automobile were broken in the incident. Rosa paid approximately $500 for window repairs.
Defense
Appellant’s mother, Ida, said everyone in her house went to bed between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on July 19, 2006. She said everyone in her home was asleep when Rosa Salcedo came to her door at approximately 2:30 a.m. According to Ida, appellant and his brother were asleep in the hallway under a cooler. This was where they usually slept. When Ida heard people knocking at the door, she observed appellant sleeping in the hallway as she approached the door. She did not hear the front door open or close at any time that evening. She never saw appellant with a baseball bat and claimed that her family did not own a bat.
Appellant minor testified in his own defense. He claimed he was asleep in the hallway of his home between 10:00 p.m. and the time when Salcedo and Zavala came to his front door. He denied hearing his brother get up during the night. Appellant said neither of them got up until people began coming to their home in the middle of the evening. Appellant further denied breaking the windows of Rosa Salcedo’s car and denied having any contact with Rosa’s ex-husband until after this incident. Appellant admitted wearing his Nike shoes in his cousin’s car before the incident. However, he denied being on Rosa Salcedo’s property. Appellant admitted he had been released from camp only a few weeks before this incident.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends there was no substantial evidence to support a true finding that he was in fact the perpetrator of the vandalism of Rosa Salcedo’s car.
The juvenile court found at the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing:
“ I’ve listened carefully to the evidence. Mr. Wakeman [deputy public defender] is correct, it is a circumstantial evidence case and heavily goes to the issue of the identity of who did the act and whether or not it was this minor.
“ I’ve listened carefully both to the testimony of Ms. Salcedo and Mr. Zavala and some coincidences are just that, they are just coincidences, and there are too many in this case for the Court to conclude anything other than that it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor did commit the act alleged in Count 1 and that that was a violation of his probation as alleged in Count 2.
“ Between the shoes, which frankly I did see some glass on the bottom of the one shoe. You’ re right, there was none in the bag, but I saw what appeared to be glass on the bottom of the one shoe.
“ The ID of the shoes – or of the other clothes, the shorts and the shirt, the direct testimony that at the time the officer was there he was actually changing clothes, which would be an indication of possible awareness of guilt in this matter, and the fact that both of them identified that that’s who this person was, not by face but by the back, it was either him or his brother, and Mr. Zavala was more certain that it was him because the brother was smaller and he didn’t think it was him.”
Appellant now specifically argues:
“ … Defense counsel argued that Rosa Salcedo identified Bobby solely from the clothes that he was wearing, and her son Michael only saw the suspect from behind. Neither witness was certain whether it was Bobby or his brother. Michael thought that the shoes were gray, but in fact they were black. Bobby’s shoes did not have any glass on them, and the alleged bat was never found.
“ Rosa’s identification of Bobby was somewhat confusing. She testified that she saw him putting on a white tee shirt after the incident.… [¶ ]… [¶ ] On cross-examination, Rosa admitted that she identified Bobby based upon the clothing of the suspect ....
“ This directly contradicts her earlier testimony that Bobby had been wearing a tank top earlier in the day. Michael Zavala testified that Bobby was wearing a white shirt, shorts and dark Nikes when the police arrived. This also contradicts Officer Blunt who testified that Bobby was wearing a gray tank top and gray shorts.
“ Michael Zavala was able to see the last strike to the car with a baseball bat, but he could only see the back of the person whom he believed was Bobby. He based his opinion on what he perceived was Bobby’s shape. However, he admitted that Bobby and his younger brother resembled each other and that he had not seen them for a while.
“ Officer Blunt seized Bobby’s running shoes on the night of the incident. He testified that he had seen glass on the bottom of the shoes. However, on close examination, no glass was found, only some granual-size reflections which the officer believed was glass and to which the court concurred could have been glass. The bag in which the shoes had been booked did not contain glass either.
“ In closing, defense counsel reiterated ... that the identification was shaky by both witnesses and the shoes did not contain glass. The prosecutor admitted that he was a little worried about the identification. However, he countered that although it could have been Bobby or his brother according to Michael Zavala, Bobby testified that it was not his brother. Basically, by process of elimination, the prosecutor concluded that it was Bobby. It should be noted, however, that Bobby denied involvement as well. [¶ ] ... [¶ ]
“ Given the state of the evidence, e.g. lack of positive identification, lack of verifiable glass in the shoes, and no baseball bat found, there is no substantial evidence to show that Bobby was the perpetrator of the vandalism of Rosa Salcedo’s vehicle[.] In the case at bar, there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding sustaining the petition, as a matter of law.”
Penal Code section 594, as charged in count I of the December 13, 2006, wardship petition, states in relevant part:
“ (a) Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism:
“ (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material.
“ (2) Damages.
“ (3) Destroys. [¶ ] ... [¶ ]
“ (b)(1) If the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is four hundred dollars ($400) or more, vandalism is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) ... or by both that fine and imprisonment.”
The crime of vandalism is a public offense. (People v. Arroyas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1443-1445.) To commit vandalism within the meaning of Penal Code section 594, an individual must maliciously damage or destroy any real or personal property not his or her own. Under California law, there must be evidence that the charged offender was the person who damaged or destroyed the property. (In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 743.)
When an appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court judgment sustaining the criminal allegations of a wardship petition, the reviewing court must apply the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal. Under this standard, the critical inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. An appellate court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.)
In reviewing the evidence adduced at the jurisdictional hearing, our perspective must favor the judgment. This court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trial court’s findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding. The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.)
This court is bound by the findings of the trier of fact where it has rejected a hypothesis pointing to innocence and there is evidence to support its implied finding that guilt is the more reasonable of the two hypotheses. Moreover, it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. Even though the appellate court may itself believe that the circumstantial evidence might be reasonably reconciled with the defendant’s innocence, this alone does not warrant interference with the determination of the trier of fact. Whether the evidence presented is direct or circumstantial, the relevant inquiry on appeal remains whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.)
In an appeal from a juvenile criminal, as in any other criminal appeal, we are in no position to weigh any conflicts or disputes in the evidence. The juvenile trial court was the trier of fact and the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses. The appellate court is not. Even if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we cannot substitute our own inferences or deductions for those of the trial court. We must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s decision and resolving conflicts in support of the trial court’s decision. In short, in juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination of whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the decision of the trier of fact. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.)
At the jurisdictional hearing, Michael Zavala testified he played cosmic bowling during the early morning hours of July 20, 2006, and returned to his mother’s home at 2:00 a.m. At about 2:45 a.m. that morning, Zavala heard seven or eight clashing noises outside his window of Rosa’s home. Zavala looked outside and saw someone hit the front window of his mother’s Pontiac TransAm with a baseball bat. The TransAm was located five feet away from the window. Zavala said he observed “ the last hit of the car” and noted “ the bat was still in the window.” Zavala saw the person with the baseball bat from the back and believed it was appellant Bobby V. Zavala based this conclusion on “ [h]is shape. His Figure.” Zavala saw the person run to appellant’s house across the street.
After police arrived at the scene, appellant came out of his house and was dressed in the same clothes as the person who ran from Zavala’s mother’s car. Officer John Blunt said the front, rear, and driver’s side windows were broken out of the TransAm and there was broken glass on Rosa Salcedo’s driveway and some broken glass in her vehicle. When Blunt made contact with appellant, he found glass stuck in between the treads of one of appellant’s shoes. At the jurisdictional hearing, Blunt examined the bottoms of appellant’s shoes and noted “ little reflective pieces of stuff right in here.” Blunt believed the reflective items were little pieces of glass.
On appeal, appellant attempts to undermine the prosecution’s case by citing confusion and inconsistencies in Rosa Salcedo’s testimony, contradictions between the testimony of Officer Blunt and Michael Zavala, and the absence of glass in the treads of appellant’s shoes and the storage bag when those items were offered into evidence at the jurisdictional hearing. However, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination of whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that will support the decision of the trier of fact We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s decision. We must also resolve conflicts in support of the trial court’s decision. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.)
In view of the foregoing principles favoring the decision of the juvenile court, appellant’s citation of perceived factual conflicts and testimonial inconsistencies in the record on appeal is inadequate to attack the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the adjudication of appellant’s guilt. Reversal for alleged insufficiency of the evidence is not required.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.