There is some case law that supports the application of both statutes to non-resident consumers. SeeBrown v. Market Development, Inc., 41 Ohio Misc. 57, 60, 322 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ct.Com.Pl.1974) (Ohio Act applies irrespective of the location of the consumer); In re Boardwalk Marketplace Secs. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.Conn.1988) (applying Connecticut state law to out-of-state claimants where defendant partnerships were formed under Connecticut law); Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam Brown Co., No. 84-0887-CV-W-9, 1986 WL 7815, at *5 (CUTPA applies to " course of conduct emanating out of Connecticut which constituted unfair methods of competition" ). More importantly, however, Defendants have not provided this Court with any case law that would prohibit the application of the Ohio or Connecticut consumer fraud statutes to non-resident consumers under these circumstances.
Because absent class members will be bound by the results obtained by the class representatives and their attorneys, due process requires the Court to scrutinize the adequacy of purported class representatives. See In re Boardwalk Marketplace Secs. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 4, 7-8 (D.Conn. 1988). "The adequate-representation requirement is satisfied by a commonality of interests between representatives and class members and vigorous prosecution by plaintiftis] and plaintiffs' counsel."
Plaintiffs cite a line of cases for the proposition that "individual questions of reliance are not appropriate in determining whether class action is proper, and thus are not sufficient to defeat class certification." Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition at 4 (citing In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 4, 7 (D.Conn. 1988); Kamerman v. Ockap Corp., 112 F.R.D. 195, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977, 89 S.Ct. 2131, 23 L.Ed.2d 766 (1969)). First, it is not at all clear that sophistication is never relevant for purposes of class certification, But even assuming this to be true, our holding today is not to the contrary.
In either case, these numbers are sufficient to satisfy the numerosity criterion of Rule 23 and make the joinder of all Class members impracticable. SeeKorn, 456 F.2d at 1209; In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 4, 6 (D.Conn.1988). B.
1990); Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F.Supp. 1105, 1113 (D.R.I.1990); Grace v. Perception Technology Corp., 128 F.R.D. 165, 171-72 (D.Mass.1989); In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Lit., 122 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.Conn.1988); and In re United Energy Corp., Etc. Sec. Lit., 122 F.R.D. 251 (C.D.Cal.1988) with, e.g.,Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir.1973); In re Bexar County Health Facility Dev. Corp. Sec. Lit., 125 F.R.D. 625, 636 (E.D.Pa.1989); Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 412 (N.D.Ill.
See, e.g.,Grace v. Perception Technology Corp., 128 F.R.D. 165, 171 (D.Mass.1989); Longden v. Sunderman, 123 F.R.D. 547, 555-56 (N.D.Tex.1988); In re Boardwalk Marketplace Securities Litig., 122 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.Conn.1988); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Financial Corp., 121 F.R.D. 642, 649-50 (M.D.Pa.1988); In re ORFA Securities Litig., 654 F.Supp. 1449, 1461 (D.N.J.1987).
There is another line of cases in which some federal courts have certified both federal securities claims and pendent common law fraud claims where plaintiffs' common law fraud and federal securities claims are based on the same course of conduct by defendants. See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., supra n. 5, 132 F.R.D. at 379 (citing Worlds of Wonder Sec. Lit., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ΒΆ 95,004 at 95,628-629, 1990 WL 61951 (N.D.Cal. 1990)); Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F.Supp. 1105, 1113 (D.R.I. 1990); Grace v. Perception Technology Corp., 128 F.R.D. 165, 171-72 (D.Mass. 1989); In re Boardwalk Marketplace Sec. Lit., 122 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.Conn. 1988); and In re United Energy Corp., Etc. Sec. Lit., 122 F.R.D. 251 (C.D.Cal. 1988). Such cases are readily distinguishable from the present case, however, since they are primarily based on federal securities law violations.