"A trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes restrictions that exceed those required to protect the child's best interest." In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)(citing Inre H.D.C., 474 S.W.3d758,764 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.))

In other words, although "[t]rial courts have broad discretion to determine the frequency and duration of visitation rights, "[a] complete denial of parental access should be reserved for situations rising nearly to the level that would call for a termination of parental rights." In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); see In re P.M., No. 02-14-00205-CV, 2014 WL 8097064, at *30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Denial of access is "reserved only for 'the most extreme of circumstances.'"

An abuse of discretion occurs when "[a] trial court . . . imposes restrictions that exceed those required to protect the child's best interest." In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.D.C., 474 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)).

An abuse of discretion occurs when "[a] trial court ... imposes restrictions that exceed those required to protect the child's best interest." In re B.O. , No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.D.C. , 474 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ). II. Factual and Procedural Background

Trial courts have broad discretion to determine what is in the child's best interest. In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *22 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

When a parent's rights have not been terminated, the usual civil legal and factual sufficiency standards, rather than the clear-and-convincing standards applicable to a termination decision, apply. See In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *23 & n.26 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). The evidence here does not address all the Holley factors, but it does encompass some of them.

See In re R.R., No. 02-13-00464-CV, 2014 WL 3953930, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (relying in part on a mother's "mental disorders" in upholding a denial of managing conservatorship).See In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *25 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that considerations for conservatorship "include parental irresponsibility"). Taking this evidence together and surveying it under our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that naming Father as Zeke's managing conservator was not in the child's best interest.

The Holley best-interest factors may be considered with regard to possession and access decisions. In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *24 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). These factors used to determine the child's best interest are nonexclusive and may include the child's desires, the child's current and future emotional and physical needs, the child's current and future emotional and physical dangers, the parental abilities of those seeking custody and their plans for the child, and the acts or omissions of a parent that may indicate that the parent-child relationship is not a proper one, along with any excuse for such acts or omissions.

See Y.V., 2013 WL 2631431, at *1-2 (citing In re H.M.M., 230 S.W.3d 204, 204-05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding former mother did not have standing to appeal post-termination custody decision when she did not appeal the termination of her parental rights)); see also In re A.N.A., No. 05-18-00169-CV, 2018 WL 2228624, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing same). The cases Mother cites in her brief do not control our disposition of this issue because the parents in those cases also asked for relief regarding the termination of their parental rights, see In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615 (Tex. 2007); Corrales v. Dep't of Fam. and Protective Servs., 155 S.W.3d 478, 481, 484-87 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.); or the jury did not terminate their parental rights, In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.). We dismiss Mother's appeal.

Here, we have already extensively detailed the facts of the instant case, and for the same reasons discussed above in regard to conservatorship, we hold that the trial court did not err in limiting mother's possession of, and access to, T.L.C., and ordering that her visits be supervised. See Moreno v. Perez, 363 S.W.3d 725, 737-38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 31, 2011, no pet.) (noting best interest of child always primary consideration in resolving issues of possession and access and courts employ Holley factors to determine best interest); see also In re B.O., No. 02-16-00485-CV, 2017 WL 2590571, at *23-24 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (court considers Holley factors in conservatorship, possession, and access decisions); In re S.A.H., 420 S.W.3d 911, 926 n.28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ("[C]ourts in numerous contexts involving a 'best interest' analysis have looked to the factors set forth in Holley . . . ."). We overrule mother's second issue.