Opinion
No. 4-890 / 04-1843
Filed January 26, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, T.W. Mott, District Associate Judge.
Mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Kathryn Walker of Walker, Knopf Billingsley, Newton, for appellant mother.
Terry Rickers of Matthias, Campbell, Tyler, Nuzum Rickers, Newton, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Johnson, County Attorney, and James W. Cleverly, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Steven Holwerda of Selby, Updegraff, Smith Holwerda, Newton, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
William and Heidi are the parents of Peggy, born in July 1998, and Blade, born in April 2002. William has been incarcerated since Blade's birth.
The Department of Human Services intervened in July 2002 after Heidi was convicted of operating while intoxicated and child endangerment. Apparently Heidi left the children unattended in her car while she was drinking in a bar and subsequently drove away with the children in the car while she was intoxicated.
As a result, the children were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2003) (child is likely to suffer harm due to parent's failure to supervise) and (n) (parent's drug or alcohol abuse results in child not receiving adequate care). The juvenile court ordered that Heidi and the children should reside with the maternal grandmother. In November 2002 the parties stipulated to a dispositional order that placed the children in foster care. Heidi was ordered to have a substance abuse evaluation and follow all recommendations, participate in in-home services, and parent skill development sessions. Both parents were ordered to complete a social history.
In March 2003 Blade was returned to Heidi's care because she had entered a treatment center for women and their children. Peggy was not returned to her care due to recent behavioral problems which had caused a temporary hospitalization. Heidi left the treatment program in June 2003, and Blade was returned to foster care. Heidi did not regularly attend visitation with the children and she did not provide drug tests as requested. In October 2003 Heidi was placed in a residential correctional facility for violating her probation on the OWI and child endangerment charges.
In June 2004 the State filed a petition seeking termination of the parents' rights. The juvenile court terminated the parents' rights under sections 232.116(1)(d) (circumstances continue despite the receipt of services), (e) (parent has not maintained significant and meaningful contact), (f) (child cannot be safely returned home) (Peggy), and (h) (child cannot be safely returned home) (Blade). The court found:
For either parent to receive custody of a child, he or she would need to have a home, have a job, demonstrate sobriety, demonstrate a lifestyle free of criminal activity outside institutional supervision, and demonstrate a solid relationship with the children. At the present time, their relationships consist of a history of abuse, neglect, and prison visits.
The court concluded the children needed stability and that termination was in the children's best interests. William and Heidi appeal.
II. Standard of Review
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
William claims the State did not present sufficient evidence to support termination of his parental rights. He points out that he was released to a half-way house in August 2004. He asserts he could provide a stable home for the children in the near future.
A parent does not have an unlimited amount of time in which to correct his or her deficiencies. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). It is unnecessary to take from a child's future any more than is demanded by statute. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 1997). This is because patience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for the child. Id. Here, the statutory time had passed, and William was not in a position to care for the children. We determine William's parental rights were properly terminated under sections 232.116(1)(f) (Peggy) and (h) (Blade).
Because we have affirmed on these grounds, we need not address the other grounds discussed by the juvenile court. See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999) ("When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm.").
IV. Reasonable Efforts
William contends the State did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunite him with his children. Prior to termination of parental rights, the State has the obligation to offer reasonable services to preserve the family unit. H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d at 679. A parent, however, has the responsibility to challenge or object to the services provided prior to the termination hearing. In re M.B., 595 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). William did not request different or additional services prior to the termination hearing, and we determine he has failed to preserve this issue for our review.
V. Best Interests
William and Heidi claim termination of their parental rights is not in the children's best interests. Even if the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interests of the children. In re M.M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). In considering a child's best interests, we look to the child's long-range as well as immediate best interests. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). We determine termination of the parents' rights is in the children's best interests. The children need stability and should not be required to wait any longer for the parents to be able to care for them or meet their needs.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.