Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. J224-925, Lawrence Kapiloff, Judge.
McINTYRE, J.
The juvenile court adjudged 16-year-old Blake S. a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on true findings that he committed misdemeanor battery upon his mother, Elena S. The court placed Blake on probation and included among his probation conditions a Fourth Amendment waiver. Blake appeals, contending: (1) substantial evidence does not support the court's true findings; and (2) the court erred by requiring a Fourth Amendment waiver probation condition. We find his arguments unavailing and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the night of January 1, 2010, Elena went to Blake's room to confront him about ignoring her that evening. Blake was in bed covered by a blanket. He did not respond when Elena called his name, or when she started scolding him. Elena grabbed a towel and hit Blake with it to get his attention; however, she did not know what part of his body she struck because it was dark. When that failed to get Blake's attention, she started to pull the blanket which led to a struggle over the blanket.
As Elena tried to pull Blake's boxer shorts down to spank him, he jolted out of bed and hit her twice in the face. Elena felt pain to her upper right lip and forehead. She was "pretty sure" that Blake had hit her, but was not positive because she did not see him do so. As Elena raised her hand to hit Blake, he grabbed it and twisted her arm. Blake let go of her when she asked him to. Elena informed Blake that she was calling the police because she did not want him in the house anymore.
San Diego Police Officer Daniel Brinkerhoff, who had dealt with Blake in the past, responded to the home. Elena was crying and visibly shaking. Elena told Officer Brinkerhoff that Blake had hit her twice in the face as she tried to pull a blanket off of him. She claimed that Blake grabbed her arm when she tried to leave the room. He then twisted it so hard that she believed it might break. Elena told the officer that she still felt pain in her face where Blake had hit her, and that she was afraid of Blake and what he might do to her. Officer Brinkerhoff observed slight redness as a visible sign of injury, but no bruising, scratches or bleeding.
A petition was filed alleging two counts of misdemeanor battery (counts 1 and 2), and one count of assault by means of force likely to commit great bodily injury (count 3). After the People rested their case, the defense moved to dismiss the petition based on lack of evidence. The court granted the motion as to counts 2 and 3, explaining that count 3 related to the alleged arm twisting. However, it declined to grant the motion as to count 1, the count corresponding to Elena's allegation that Blake had struck her twice in the face.
Blake testified in his own defense. He admitted that he did not want to listen to his mother before the incident because she was mad and wanted to argue. Elena came into his room, hit him with a towel several times, and then pulled the blanket off of him. He did not remember Elena trying to pull his boxer shorts down, and claimed that he did nothing as she hit him with her hand. Blake did not remember hitting Elena that evening, although he recalled her yelling that he had broken her teeth and tried to break her arm. Blake asserted that he did not hit his mother; rather, he tried to block her blows.
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the court commented that although Elena was the initial aggressor, she could still become a victim. The court found that the redness on Elena's face proved that she had been struck, and concluded that Blake had used excessive force against her. It found count 1 true beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the disposition hearing, defense counsel submitted to all the probation recommendations, except number four pertaining to home supervision, and asked that Blake be returned home but without 30 days of home supervision. The juvenile court placed Blake with Elena, but left him on home supervision. It also adopted the balance of the probation recommendations, including that Blake waive his Fourth Amendment rights, and that he not use or possess alcohol or controlled substances.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Blake contends the evidence did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of simple battery because there was no evidence that he intended to hit Elena when he jolted out of bed.
Sufficiency of the evidence claims are reviewed under the same standard in juvenile and adult criminal cases. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) The critical inquiry is "'whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (Ibid., quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319.) The standard of appellate review is the same in cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence and it is the trier of fact, not the appellate court, which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
We view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains reasonable, credible, and solid evidence to support the trier of fact's finding. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 509.) It is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a witness or the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends and conflicts in the evidence or testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 361.) If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give due deference to the trier of fact and not retry the case ourselves. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
A battery is defined as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." (Pen. Code, § 242.) "Willfully" "implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act." (Pen. Code, § 7, subd. (1).) The only legal justification for battery is self-defense. (People v. Mayes (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 195, 198.) Blake concedes the evidence shows he hit Elena, but claims the record lacks substantial evidence establishing that he intended to hit her, and that the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the record is that he struck her accidentally.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that Blake willfully hit Elena. First, although defense counsel argued that Blake had acted in self-defense, Blake never testified that he acted in self-defense or that the touching had been accidental. Rather, Blake testified that he did not hit his mother and could not remember hitting her. Moreover, Elena's testimony that Blake struck her twice on different parts of her face supported the juvenile court's conclusion that Blake acted intentionally, not accidentally. Her testimony that Blake then grabbed her arm as she tried to leave his room bolstered this inference. (People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 108 [an individual's subjective willfulness can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the situation].) Although circumstantial, the evidence here cannot be deemed insufficient as a matter of law.
II. Probation Search Condition
The probation condition required Blake to submit his person, property or vehicle to a search with or without a search warrant or probable cause, on the direction of any law enforcement officer, probation officer or school official. Blake contends the condition is unreasonable because it is not related to his crime or future criminality, and is constitutionally invalid because it is overbroad and not tailored to meet his individual needs. Although Blake concedes that defense counsel failed to object to the condition, he urges us to address the issue on its merits because it is one of constitutional importance and is likely to come back to this court on habeas corpus as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The failure to timely challenge a probation condition in the trial court generally forfeits the claim for purposes of appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) The doctrine of forfeiture on appeal applies if the objection involves a discretionary sentencing choice or unreasonable probation conditions "premised upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case." (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885, 889 (Sheena).) However, the forfeiture doctrine does not apply to a facial challenge to a probation condition on constitutional grounds of vagueness and overbreadth where the issue presents a pure question of law that can be corrected without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court. (Id. at p. 887.)
Here, Blake challenges the reasonableness of the warrantless search condition under the test set forth in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). He also claims the condition is unconstitutionally overbroad because it subjected him to a warrantless search by virtually any person, including school officials, for an offense that occurred at his home. Blake is not arguing that the search condition is facially unconstitutional; rather, he relies on the particular facts and circumstances of his case, claiming the condition is unrelated to the facts of this case and not adequately tailored to the purposes of probation. Because Blake's arguments do not raise a pure question of law, he forfeited them on appeal by not objecting at the disposition hearing. (Sheena, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885, 889.)
Blake also contends that if his claims have been forfeited by his failure to object below, then his trial counsel was ineffective. Although we decline to exercise our discretion to address the forfeited claim directly, we address the underlying merits to show that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.
To prove inadequate trial representation, the minor must establish that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and resulted in prejudice. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333.) To establish prejudice, the minor must show that counsel's acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense or that there is a reasonable probability the result would have been different in the absence of the alleged ineffectiveness. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) To determine whether the minor's counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the search condition, we review the rules governing challenges to the reasonableness of a probation condition.
The juvenile court may impose any reasonable conditions it determines will promote the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) "[J]uvenile conditions may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders. This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed." (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) "'A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality."'" (In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246. (R.V.), quoting Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) A probation condition is not invalid unless all three factors are present. (R.V., supra, at p. 246.) In setting probation conditions, the juvenile court must consider not only the circumstances of the crime but also the minor's entire social history. (Ibid.) We will not disturb the juvenile court's broad discretion absent an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
During a psychological evaluation, Blake admitted experimenting with alcohol, and stated that he uses marijuana a few times each week. "'[A]lcohol and drug abuse'" are recognized "'precursors of serious criminality.'" (In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 710.) A warrantless search condition not only deters drug and alcohol abuse and related future criminality, it also serves the rehabilitative purpose of encouraging the minor to maintain sobriety. (See e.g., In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 132 [warrantless search condition imposed by juvenile court serves the important goal of deterring future misconduct]; People v. Beagle (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 415, 419; People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360, 366.) Accordingly, the search condition was reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation of a juvenile. Although Blake claims the search condition should have been more narrowly drawn, "the effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by the potential for random searches" anywhere and anytime. (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753.) Since imposition of the warrantless search condition was not unreasonable, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to it. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [counsel is not ineffective for failing to make unmeritorious objections].)
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., McDONALD, J.