Opinion
No. 73-348
Decided December 5, 1973.
Habeas corpus — Original jurisdiction of Courts of Appeals — Legislature may not alter — Section 3, Article IV, Constitution — Juvenile Court — Jurisdiction — Custody of minor — R.C. 2725.02 and 2151.23.
1. The grant of original jurisdiction, by R.C. 2151.23(A) (3), to Juvenile Courts in habeas corpus actions involving the custody of minors is exclusive only as between Juvenile Courts and those courts given general habeas corpus jurisdiction by R.C. 2725.02.
We recognize that the Probate Court is now a division of the Court of Common Pleas. Section 4(C), Article IV, Constitution. See Sup. R. 3. Moreover, R.C. 2151.07 provides that a particular Juvenile Court may be within the probate or domestic relations division of a Court of Common Pleas, or may constitute a separate division of that court. Any distinctions drawn in this opinion between Courts of Common Pleas, Probate Courts, and Juvenile Courts, are directed at their jurisdictional differences, and not at the administrative structure within which they are ordered.
2. The General Assembly is without power to limit or alter the original jurisdiction of Courts of Appeals in habeas corpus actions. ( State, ex rel. Pressley, v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, applied.)
3. A Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving the custody of a child.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fulton County.
Beverly A. Black is a resident of the state of Idaho, having moved there from Ohio with her two minor children, William Arthur and Lorie Ann, sometime prior to January 1972. On February 11, 1972, Mrs. Black filed an action in the District Court, Ada County, Idaho, for divorce from her husband Lloyd W. Black, Jr., a resident of Ohio. Mrs. Black was awarded temporary custody of her children by the Idaho court pending disposition of the divorce action. In March 1972, Mr. Black visited his family, and secretly spirited his two children back to his Ohio home, where they remained with their father and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd Black, Sr.
In a May 30, 1972, judgment, the Idaho court issued a final divorce decree, and entrusted permanent custody of the children to their mother. Mrs. Black, appellee herein, then petitioned the Court of Appeals for Fulton County, Ohio, for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking return of the two children to her custody in accordance with the Idaho judgment. Named as respondents were Lloyd W. Black, Jr., and Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd Black, Sr., appellants herein. The writ was granted on February 23, 1973, and the children were ordered returned to petitioner.
The cause is now before this court upon appeal as a matter of right.
Mr. Charles N. Hunt, for appellants.
Mr. Richard B. McQuade, Jr., for appellee.
The sole question raised by appellants is whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider appellee's application for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellants point to R.C. 2151.23(A) (3) as making the Juvenile Court the exclusive forum for actions such as the present one, and conclude that the Court of Appeals was thereby precluded from entertaining the petition.
R.C. 2151.23 provides, in pertinent part:
"(A) The Juvenile Court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code:
"* * *
"(3) To hear and determine any application for a writ of habeas corpus involving the custody of a child. * * *"
We are called upon to construe the words "exclusive original jurisdiction" in light of Section 3, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which mandates, in part:
"(B (1) The Courts of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction in the following:
"(a) Quo Warranto;
"(b) Mandamus;
"(c) Habeas Corpus;
"(d) Prohibition;
"(e) Procedendo * * *."
No lengthy citation of authority is necessary to support the general proposition that when a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, the latter must prevail. In State, ex rel. Pressley, v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 149, this court said:
"* * * This constitutionally granted original jurisdiction of this court and of the Court of Appeals in mandamus cannot be abridged or limited by statutory enactment or by a rule based upon a statutory enactment. * * * [Citations omitted.]"
That principle is equally applicable to habeas corpus actions.
However, examination of R.C. 2151.23(A) (3) fails to disclose any real conflict between that statute and the above-quoted language from the Ohio Constitution. By its terms, R.C. 2151.23(A) (3) is limited solely to jurisdictional grants under the Revised Code. No encroachment upon the constitutional grant of original habeas corpus jurisdiction to Courts of Appeals was intended. The "exclusive original jurisdiction" of Juvenile Courts in habeas corpus proceedings is based upon specific statutory language, whereas the jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals is derived from a broad constitutional grant of jurisdiction to hear all habeas corpus cases involving the question of deprivation of liberty.
The purpose of R.C. 2151.23(A) (3) is to carve a narrow exception to the statutorily based jurisdictional provision of R.C. 2725.02, which broadly authorizes any "* * * Court of Common Pleas, Probate Court, or * * * judge of any such court" to entertain habeas corpus proceedings.
Thus, as among a Court of Common Pleas, a Probate Court and a Juvenile Court, only the Juvenile Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings involving a minor. See State v. Sanchez (1970), 22 Ohio App.2d 145. As between a Juvenile Court and a Court of Appeals, there necessarily exists concurrent jurisdiction in such habeas corpus proceedings.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals did have jurisdiction to dispose of appellee's claim, and its judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.