Opinion
04-24-00692-CV
10-25-2024
IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF STEPHEN PATRICK BLACK
From the 274th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas Trial Court No. CV-15-1805 Honorable Gary L. Steel, Judge Presiding
ORDER
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Appellant, Stephen Patrick Black, filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's July 31, 2024 biennial review order in Black's sexually violent predator civil commitment case. In its order, the trial court found it could not determine by a preponderance of the evidence that Black's behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent that he is no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence and did not find that any of the requirements of Black's civil commitment should be modified at that time. See TEX. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 841.102. The court ordered Black remain committed pursuant to Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code and that all the requirements of the April 7, 2016 final judgment and order of commitment remain unchanged and in full force and effect.
Our review of Chapter 841 and the clerk's record raises a question about our jurisdiction over the appeal. The trial court's July 31, 2024 order does not appear to be either a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Black, 594 S.W.3d 590, 591 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2019, no pet.). As we explained in a different appeal by appellant on the same issue:
The Texas Constitution vests the courts of appeals with jurisdiction over appeals from district and county courts, "subject to any restrictions and regulations prescribed by law." Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Barlow, 48 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. 2001); see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a); Gray v. Rankin, 594 S.W.2d 409, 409 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam) (holding appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals "is not unlimited or absolute, but within constitutional limitations is subject to control by the Legislature"). The legislature has limited the constitution's general jurisdictional grant in civil cases to appeals from final judgments of the district or county courts in which the judgment or amount in controversy exceeds $250. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.220(a); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &REM. CODE § 51.012; see Tune v. Tex. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 23 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tex. 2000). We have appellate jurisdiction over other judgments and orders (ones that are
not final or in which the amount in controversy requirement is not satisfied) only when the legislature has enacted a specific statutory authorization. See Barlow, 48 S.W.3d at 176; Tune, 23 S.W.3d at 361; see, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE § 32.001(c) (authorizing appeal of final orders issued by a probate court); TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(b) (authorizing appeal of final orders in suit affecting parent child relationship); id. § 56.01(c) (specifying orders in juvenile proceedings that are appealable); id. § 81.009 (providing for appeal of some protective orders); TEX. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE §§ 574.070, 574.108 (authorizing appeal of orders for court-ordered mental health services, orders renewing or modifying such orders, and orders for administration of medication to patients under court order for mental health services); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &REM. CODE § 51.014 (authorizing appeal of certain interlocutory orders).
In Chapter 841, the legislature authorized an appeal of a factfinder's determination after a trial of whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a person is a sexually violent predator. TEX. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 841.062(a); see In re Commitment of Richards, 395 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 2013, pet. denied). The legislature did not specifically authorize an appeal from the trial court's initial probable cause determination in a biennial review. See Richards, 395 S.W.3d at 908. Accordingly, the trial court's order in Black's biennial review is appealable only if it is a final judgment in which the amount in controversy exceeds $250. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &REM. CODE § 51.012. We conclude it is not. The order does not bear the hallmarks of a final judgment. The biennial review was not initiated by a party's petition or motion; rather it is a statutorily required review. The order did not follow a trial or an evidentiary hearing, or even a structured "paper" proceeding such as a motion for summary judgment; rather it followed an informal documentary review. No claims or causes of action were adjudicated in the order; rather the court made a statutorily required factual determination, based on an informal review of documents....[T]he order simply recited that the 2016 judgment and commitment order would remain in effect unchanged. Generally, a postjudgment order that does not follow a new trial and does not impose any new obligations or "work a material change in the adjudicative portions of the original judgment" "does not qualify as another final judgment" and is not appealable. See McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2017). We conclude a trial court's order finding no probable cause after a biennial review is not a final judgment.
We hold the trial court's order finding no probable cause in the context of a Chapter 841 biennial review is not appealable.Black, 594 S.W.3d at 592-93.
We therefore order appellant to show cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by November 25, 2024. See Black, 594 S.W.3d at 592-93. If appellant fails to respond to this order by the date ordered, this appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3. If a supplemental clerk's record is necessary to show this court's jurisdiction, appellant has the burden to request the trial court clerk to prepare the record, identifying the additional pleadings and orders requested, and must file a copy of any such request with this court. All other appellate deadlines are suspended until further order of this court.