Generally, a defendant may introduce evidence of his or her good character or personality through "general reputation" evidence but not expert personal opinion testimony. In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201, 735 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (2000). Additionally, attempts to use purported expert testimony to bolster or attack the credibility of witnesses should be rejected.

However, since Dawson, the overwhelming weight of recent authority in other state jurisdictions considering the question of whether the accused may present expert testimony that he is psychologically unlikely to commit the charged offense has been to exclude expert evidence offered by the defendant in cases of child sexual abuse to establish that he does not fit the profile of a sexual predator or pedophile, or that his responses to standardized psychological tests failed to disclose any underlying sexual pathology or sexual deviancy that might explain sexual abuse of children. See, e.g.,R.D. v. State, 706 So.2d 770, 775 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997); State v. Person, 20 Conn. App. 115, 564 A.2d 626, 631-32 (1989); State v. Floray, 715 A.2d 855, 857-61 (Del.Super. 1997); State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647, 652-53 (1996); In Re B.J., 316 Ill. App.3d 193, 249 Ill. Dec. 233, 735 N.E.2d 1058 (2000); State v. Price, 43 P.3d 870, 877-78 (Kan.App. 2002); Tungate v. Commonwealth, 901 S.W.2d 41 42-43 (Ky. 1995);Earnest v. State, 805 So.2d 598, 606 (Miss.App. 2002). The decisions reflect a variety of rationales for excluding the evidence, among them the lack of a recognized scientific basis for drawing a nexus between test results or profile scores and actual conduct, Floray, 715 A.2d at 860-61;Parkinson, 909 P.2d at 651-52; Tungate, 901 S.W.2d at 43;Earnest, 805 So.2d at 606, the risk that the evidence might usurp the jury's province to determine the credibility of witnesses and guilt or innocence of the defendant, Floray, 715 A.2d at 855; Price, 43 P.2d at 878-79, and the tendency of the evidence to place before jurors opinion as to the accused's character in violation of state evidentiary rules. R.D. v. State, 706 So.2d at 775; Floray, 715 A.2d at 859-60;In Re B.J., 735 N.E.2d at 1065-66.

"[W]here a trial court finds that the minors' environment is injurious, it need not wait until each child becomes a victim or is emotionally damaged in order to remove the child from the household."In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 199-200, 735 N.E.2d 1058, 1064 (2000). The parents' failure to provide a safe and nurturing environment for their children constitutes neglect.

Nevertheless, parents have a duty to keep their children free from harm; thus, their failure to provide a safe and nurturing shelter is statutory neglect. In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 735 N.E.2d 1058 (2000). It is the State's burden to prove an allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence.

Other courts have also acknowledged that an expert witness cannot make credibility determinations in a child abuse and neglect proceeding.19 See, e.g., In re B.J., 735 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (Ill.App.Ct. 2000) ("[T]rial courts should reject the attempt to use purported expert testimony to bolster or attack a witness' credibility."); In re Tayler F., 958 A.2d 170, 190 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008), aff'd, 995 A.2d 611 (Conn. 2010) ("The respondent claims that the court abused its discretion by permitting [the expert witnesses] to testify about the ultimate issue in the case, the children's credibility. We agree with the respondent . . . that the court abused its discretion when it permitted [the expert witnesses] to testify about the children's credibility[.]").

Finally, we note that the trial court is in a far better position to assess Denk's credibility regarding her testimony of respondent's history of visitation with A.T. and will not disrupt that on appeal when, as here, the opposite view is not clearly apparent. See In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 199 (2000). ¶ 19 Furthermore, the trial court did not solely rest its finding that respondent did not maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility on respondent's missed visitation. The court also determined that although respondent had a history of substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental health issues, she failed to cooperate with DCFS to address those issues.

¶ 16 A trial court's dispositional order will not be disturbed unless its findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or the chosen disposition was an abuse of discretion. In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 200 (2000). While it is unclear exactly upon what evidence the trial court relied when it denied respondent's request, we can garner enough information from the record before us to determine that the court's decision to deny the request was not in error.

Nevertheless, parents have a duty to keep their children free from harm; thus, their failure to provide a safe and nurturing shelter is statutory neglect. In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 735 N.E.2d 1058 (2000). It is the State's burden to prove an allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence.

Nevertheless, parents have a duty to keep their children free from harm; thus, their failure to provide a safe and nurturing shelter is statutory neglect. In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 735 N.E.2d 1058 (2000). It is the State's burden to prove an allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence.

When one child in a household has been abused, a presumption arises that the environment in the household is injurious to the other minors therein. See In re B.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 193, 199-200, 735 N.E.2d 1058, 1064-65 (2000). Generally, neglect is the failure to exercise the care justly demanded by the circumstances, and it encompasses both wilful and unintentional disregard of parental duty.