Moreover, such an argument is flawed from a legal point of view because reviewing courts have consistently referred to a ban on substances prior to the start of the race in which the horse is competing, not to the start of the racing program (see id. at 689; Matter of Casse v. New York State Racing Wagering Bd., 70 N.Y.2d 589, 594; Equine Practitioners Assn. v. New York State Racing Wagering Bd., 66 N.Y.2d 786, 787; Matter of Beckwith v. New York State Racing Wagerning Bd., 219 A.D.2d 516). Speculation will not rebut the presumption (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180-181). Neither will testimony that petitioner and his employees did not use lidocaine since the rule requires him to prevent any person, whether or not employed by or connected with him, from administering the drug (see Matter of Allen v. Bilinski, 237 A.D.2d 231). We next reject petitioner's challenge to the penalty imposed.