Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1095-13T4
07-07-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF B.H., A Juvenile.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant B.H. (Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (G. Harrison Walters, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Ashrafi and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Cumberland County, FJ-06-525-13.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant B.H. (Lauren S. Michaels, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Jennifer Webb-McRae, Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (G. Harrison Walters, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Following a bench trial, B.H., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(2); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4d; and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d. The trial judge imposed concurrent sixty-day terms in a juvenile detention center, and one year of probation.
The State developed the following proofs at trial. Officer Curstin Lowe served as the "housing officer" at an apartment complex. At 10:30 p.m. on December 10, 2012, the officer was dispatched to investigate a "possible assault" of a juvenile who was "struck with a metal bat." When he arrived at the scene, Officer Lowe spoke to two individuals, who identified the victim as A.C., a fourteen-year-old boy. The officer went to A.C.'s apartment. A.C. told the officer that B.H., another fourteen-year-old, had struck him with a metal bat. A.C. had "some slight swelling . . . on his right temple area" and "some markings on his back." A.C. was taken to the hospital where he was treated for his injuries.
Officer Lowe and three other officers went to B.H.'s apartment and one of his sisters answered through the door that the children's mother, Y.S., was on her way home. When Y.S. arrived, Officer Lowe told her he needed to take B.H. into custody and she brought him outside so he could accompany the officers to the station. The police did not recover a baseball bat at the scene.
A.C. testified he was with his friend, J.R., when the assault occurred. J.R. had taken out some trash and the two boys were returning to J.R.'s apartment to pick up A.C.'s "basketball sneakers." A.C. stated that, while they were walking, B.H. and his father "popped" out "[f]rom the bushes, around the corner." B.H.'s father punched J.R. in the face and then punched A.C. J.R. ran to get his father. A.C. testified that B.H.'s father told B.H. to "hit [A.C.] with a bat." B.H. struck A.C. "[a]bout six times" in his ribs, back, and head. After the attack, A.C. got up and ran home.
B.H.'s mother, Y.S., and his two sisters, eighteen-year-old S.S. and sixteen-year-old T.S., testified on B.H.'s behalf. Y.S. stated she was working with B.H.'s father on the evening of December 10, 2012. Around 8:30 p.m., one of her daughters called her to say "there were young men banging and kicking at the door, asking [B.H.] to come out to fight." Y.S. and B.H.'s father "close[d] the building out[,]" left work, and went to the apartment. When she arrived, the boys were gone. Y.S. testified that, about 9:30 p.m., A.C. and his step-father knocked on the door and asked if she would "let [B.H.] come out to fight [A.C.]" Y.S. told A.C., "'No, you need to go get your mother,' because we've had ongoing issues." Y.S. said that B.H. never left the apartment during this time. Y.S. did not call the police to report the incident.
Y.S. stated she waited about twenty minutes, and when A.C. did not return, she and B.H.'s father left the apartment to take B.H.'s cousin home. Y.S. could not explain how the cousin had gotten to the apartment. After they left, Y.S. said she received another call from her daughter that the police were at the apartment to take B.H. into custody, and she returned to speak to them. She stated that no one in her household played baseball or owned a bat.
S.S. testified that four boys, including A.C. and J.R., began banging on the apartment door around 8:30 p.m. B.H. stayed inside and S.S. called her mother. S.S. stated that, after her mother arrived home, A.C. and his step-father came to the apartment and then left. She said that Y.S. and B.H.'s father stayed at the apartment and were both there when the police arrived shortly after 10:30 p.m. to take B.H. into custody.
T.S. stated six boys were banging on the door and that A.C. came back by himself after her mother arrived home. T.S. testified that her mother and B.H.'s father went back to work after A.C. left. T.S. said that B.H. remained in the apartment the entire time.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge made detailed credibility findings. He found that Officer Lowe's and A.C.'s accounts were credible. However, the judge found the defense witnesses to be only partially credible because of the inconsistencies in their testimony. He believed that a group of boys came to B.H.'s apartment around 8:30 p.m. to challenge him to a fight and that B.H.'s sisters called their mother to come home. However, the judge discredited their testimony that, after waiting a short period of time, Y.S. and B.H.'s father simply left the three children home alone to either go back to work or to take B.H.'s cousin home. That allegation, the judge found, "just doesn't make sense to me . . . I don't believe it occurred." The judge stated:
But, what I do believe, and what I do find happened here in regard to this case is this. As I said, 8:30 the six boys come up there, threatening the family. Mom comes home, mom comes home with dad. Whether or not [A.C] came up to knock on the door, but mom didn't call the police initially, when the children called her, mom didn't call the police. When the people came up and knocked on the door challenging her son to fight. And then, after six people knocked on the door, people came up to the door challenging her family to fight. She wants me to believe that she left her son and two children there alone, and that she and [B.H.'s father] either went to drop off a relative, or went back to work.This appeal followed.
It doesn't matter to me what they were doing; I don't believe that they did that. [Y.S.] left the home, I'm sure, and she left the home with [B.H.] home, and [B.H.'s father] home, too.
And [B.H.'s father] and [B.H.] then left the home, they went outside, and they made sure that those six boys and, perhaps, the boy and the step-father that came to the home, were told in no uncertain way that they really shouldn't mess with them anymore. Because, I find that at that time, and I do give credibility to the testimony of [A.C.], that [B.H.'s father] did walk up to him and punch him in the face. . . . And that [B.H.], then did, in fact, strike him with a bat.
On appeal, B.H. raises the following contentions:
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE STATE'S WITNESSES CONCERNING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST OTHERS, INCLUDING THE COMPLAINANT, VIOLATED THE JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AND PRESENT A DEFENSE, AND HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A FAIR TRIAL.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE JUDGE'S DECISION WAS IMPROPERLY COLORED BY HIS ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE [APARTMENT COMPLEX WHERE B.H. LIVED], AND HIS DESIRE TO SEND A MESSAGE TO ITS RESIDENTS, B.H.'S ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY MUST BE REVERSED. (Not Raised Below).
POINT III
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ERRORS DENIED THE JUVENILE A FAIR TRIAL.
B.H. first argues the judge improperly prevented him from cross-examining Officer Lowe about whether complaints had been filed against A.C. or any of the other juveniles who were banging on B.H.'s door. The State objected to this line of questioning, and the judge sustained the objection, stating:
Well, whether or not charges were signed against other people . . . is of no import to the Court as to whether or not [B.H.] is guilty. I'm going to sustain the objection and not require that [the question] be answered under the circumstances at this time. Not because I find that it's outside of the scope of direct; I find it's just not something that I should consider in regard to this matter. And, therefore, I'm not going to require the witness [to] answer the question.
Later, defense counsel attempted to ask A.C. whether he had been charged as a result of the incident and the judge again sustained the State's objection to this line of questioning. B.H. argues these rulings violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. We disagree.
The right to cross-examine is not unlimited. State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 188 ( 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S. Ct. 811, 145 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2000). While N.J.R.E. 611(b) broadly authorizes questioning on "matters affecting the credibility of the witness," the cross-examination of a witness may nonetheless be limited by N.J.R.E. 403 considerations of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and waste of time. State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37, 59-62 (App. Div. 1997). The scope of cross-examination is a matter left to the court's discretion, and its rulings in this regard will not be disturbed in the absence of clear error. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 263 (1993); State v. Murray, 240 N.J. Super. 378, 394 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 334 (1990). Because B.H. objected to the judge's ruling at trial, the harmless error standard applies. That standard "requires that there be some degree of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result. The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [it] led the [the trier of fact] to a verdict it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012) (first and second alternations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Applying these principles here, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's ruling that information concerning complaints that might have been filed against other juveniles was not relevant to the question of whether B.H. assaulted A.C. with a baseball bat. N.J.R.E. 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action." The inquiry should focus on "'the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue.'" Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 15 (2004) (quoting State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1990)). Here, the status of any complaints filed against A.C. and the other juveniles was not relevant to proving or disproving an element of any of the charges against B.H.
Moreover, B.H. has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice from the exclusion of this testimony. The judge specifically found that the other juveniles, including A.C. and J.R., came to B.H.'s apartment earlier in the evening looking for a fight. Thus, the judge was fully aware of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the potential bias of the victim.
B.H. next asserts that the judge did not base his adjudication of delinquency on the evidence presented at trial, but rather rendered his verdict "to send a message" to the residents of the apartment complex. B.H. points to the judge's comments in his oral decision that the apartment complex was a "rough place" that needed a full-time police officer assigned, and that it "perhaps" had "unwritten laws" that encouraged residents to take "justice" into their own hands rather than calling the police for assistance. This argument lacks merit.
Our review of a judge's verdict in a non-jury case is limited. The standard is not whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, but rather "whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the judge's determination." State ex rel. R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 121 (App. Div. 1995). Moreover, we are obliged to "give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by [the] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).
"[T]he factual findings of the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." State ex rel. W.M., 364 N.J. Super. 155, 165 (App. Div. 2003). "[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]" Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963)).
Applying these standards, we discern no basis for interfering with the judge's well-developed findings, conclusions, and disposition on these charges. The judge credited A.C.'s testimony that B.H. struck him multiple times with a metal baseball bat after B.H.'s father punched him. The judge made detailed credibility findings explaining his reasons for disbelieving the accounts provided by Y.S. and B.H.'s two sisters. We defer to these credibility determinations. Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 471. Thus, there was ample credible evidence supporting the judge's conclusion that B.H. committed each of the charges at issue in this case.
The judge's comments about the apartment complex, and his admonitions that citizens should call the police when situations like this arise and not take the law into their own hands, were not an independent evidentiary basis for his adjudication of delinquency. Rather, this was merely commentary about B.H.'s and his father's apparent motivation in assaulting A.C. instead of involving the authorities. Thus, we perceive no error in the judge's comments.
Finally, B.H. argues that the cumulative prejudice of the errors he raises deprived him of a fair trial. Having rejected B.H.'s argument that any reversible error occurred during his trial, we also reject his cumulative error argument.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION