Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SJ12251A-B, Garry G. Haehnle, Judge.
HALLER, J.
Maria G. (mother) appeals, contending a juvenile court order limiting her unsupervised visitation with her children, J.G. and B.G. (together, children) was an abuse of the court's discretion. Mother also argues there was not sufficient evidence to support the court's finding reasonable reunification services were provided to her by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency). We dismiss the appeal as moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2010 the Agency filed amended petitions in juvenile court on behalf of four-month-old J.G. and three-year-old B.G., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The petitions alleged J.G. had sustained injuries which ordinarily would not have occurred without the unreasonable or neglectful acts of his mother or father, I.G. (father) (together, parents), and the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious harm. When J.G. was evaluated at Children's Hospital, the examining physician concluded his injuries were consistent with nonaccidental trauma. Because the parents could not explain how J.G. sustained his injuries, the children were declared dependents of the court, placed in foster care, and reunification services were ordered for the parents.
Father is not a party to this appeal.
By the six-month review hearing, the parents had completed parenting classes, undergone psychological evaluations, and were attending individual therapy. Due to the severity and unexplained nature of J.G.'s injuries, the social worker recommended the Agency supervise the case for another six months, and the parents continue to receive reunification services and supervised visits.
The court continued the hearing to allow the Agency additional time to assess the possibility of unsupervised visits between the parents and children. Although mother was doing well in therapy and interacted appropriately and positively with the children, the Agency recommended short unsupervised visits because the cause of the alleged abuse was unknown, and mother had not acknowledged the possibility that father had caused J.G.'s injuries. The Agency recommended mother have one hour per week of unsupervised visits with the children at the Agency's offices. The court found reasonable services had been provided and the parents had made substantive progress with their case plans, but decided returning the children to their parents' custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them, and adopted the Agency's visitation recommendations.
Mother appeals, contending the court abused its discretion in failing to order visitation sufficient to achieve the goal of reunification, despite mother's substantive compliance with her case plan. Mother also argues that if her compliance with her case plan was insufficient to justify expanded unsupervised visitation, then substantial evidence did not support the court's finding reunification services provided by the Agency were reasonable.
DISCUSSION
A
After mother filed this appeal the juvenile court issued a minute order on April 27, 2011, placing the children with mother. In issuing its order, the juvenile court considered the Agency's April 2011 status report recommending the children's return to mother, along with the safety and integration plan submitted by the parents, and found the parents had made substantive progress on their case plan.
In a May 24, 2011 letter, this court informed the parties it had taken judicial notice of the juvenile court's April 27, 2011 order, and invited the parties to file supplemental briefing on whether the issues raised in this appeal are moot in light of the juvenile court's subsequent order. Those issues are: (1) whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in accepting the Agency's recommendations for limited unsupervised visitation; and (2) whether the reunification services provided to mother were reasonable. In their supplemental briefs, the mother, the Agency and minors' counsel agree the issues are moot, because the relief mother seeks in this appeal has been granted.
B
"An appellate court will not review questions which are moot and only of academic importance, nor will it determine abstract questions of law at the request of a party who shows no substantial rights can be affected by the decision either way." (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054.) The duty of an appellate court is to decide actual controversies and not to give opinions on moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles of law that cannot affect issues presently before the court. (In re Audrey D. (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 34, 39, fn. 4.)
"An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief." (In re Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054.) "[A] reviewing court may exercise its inherent discretion to resolve an issue rendered moot by subsequent events if the question to be decided is of continuing public importance and is a question capable of repetition, yet evading review. (Citations.) We decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether our decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404; In re Esperanza C., at p. 1055.)
C
The court's order returning the children to mother superseded its previous order limiting mother's unsupervised visitation with the children to one hour per week. Whether the court's earlier order should have granted mother more liberal unsupervised visitation, or whether the reunifications services provided were adequate to allow mother to achieve reunification, are no longer " 'live' " controversies. (In re Hirenia C. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 504, 518; In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 406.) The matter is moot because there remain no material questions for our determination and the superseded visitation order will not affect the outcome of subsequent proceedings. (In re Esperanza C., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1054; Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) Further, whether the court should have granted the mother more liberal unsupervised visitation, or whether there was sufficient evidence to support the court's finding that services provided to mother were reasonable, are not questions of continuing public importance, because they are based on the particular facts of this case. (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38; see also In re Raymond G. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 964 [despite child's return to parents, court addressed standard required for detention]; In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548 [jurisdictional issues not moot where father collaterally estopped from relitigating findings in later family court proceeding].)
The juvenile court's April 27, 2011 order placed the children with mother, and mother is entitled to no relief beyond that which she already has been granted. Furthermore, there are no exceptions to the mootness doctrine for which we may exercise our discretion to consider her appeal. Accordingly, we conclude the appeal is moot.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J.BENKE, J.