Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. SJ012155, Garry G. Haehnle, Judge.
BENKE, Acting P.J.
S. G. and Bernardo L., III, appeal jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning their child, Bernardo L. (the minor). Bernardo contends substantial evidence does not support the court's order of jurisdiction and the court erred by its order requiring him to drug test. S.G. asserts the court abused its discretion by ordering her to have a new psychological evaluation, participate in the Substance Abuse Recovery Management System (SARMS) and begin therapy with a TERM team therapist. Each parent joins in the arguments of the other. We affirm the orders.
TERM is an acronym for Treatment Evaluation Review Management. TERM team psychologists and counselors are approved for treatment by the court and the Agency.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 31, 2008, police responded to a domestic violence call at S.G. and Bernardo's home. Bernardo was arrested for felony domestic violence and child cruelty. When the officers entered the home, they smelled marijuana. They found four jars of marijuana on a low shelf in an unlocked garage, there was a small bong on the coffee table, a bong and plastic baggies in a closet in a bedroom and a small electronic scale in the kitchen. On January 6, 2009, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on behalf of the four-year-old minor under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging marijuana and drug paraphernalia were left in the family home within his reach. The petition also alleged he had been exposed to a violent confrontation between Bernardo's uncle and S.G., and that Bernardo told S.G. not to call police or she would be killed. The court ordered the minor detained. On January 28 the Agency filed an amended petition to add an additional count concerning the domestic violence between S.G. and Bernardo which had occurred on December 31, 2008.
S.G. said Bernardo uses marijuana several times each day, but not in the minor's presence. She said she last used methamphetamine one year earlier. Her 19-year-old daughter, Y.C., said S.G.'s methamphetamine addiction had prevented her from caring for Y.C. and her siblings. Bernardo denied participating in any domestic violence on December 31, 2008, but said S.G. had been using methamphetamine that day. He later said he had discovered S.G. smoking methamphetamine on December 27, and blamed her for the domestic violence. He said he had a medical prescription for marijuana for his depression, stress and insomnia, but he kept the marijuana away from the minor. He denied the marijuana in the garage belonged to him. S.G. said Bernardo's uncle had beaten her and choked her on several occasions. She reported Bernardo had had her served with a restraining order and she believed he was sleeping with Y.C. On January 20, 2009, S.G. was arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon for stabbing Y.C. with keys. Another adult sibling stated she believed S.G. was using methamphetamine.
The social worker reported S.G. has past arrests involving drug use and domestic violence. In 2000 and 2001 she was convicted of importing a controlled substance. She said she did not believe she needed domestic violence treatment because she had already completed a domestic violence program. She said she and Bernardo had started parenting classes. She did not want to participate in SARMS, but believed it would be more beneficial to her to continue group therapy at a clinic she was already attending. The social worker learned S.G. had gone to the clinic for one year for mental health medication management and had had individual therapy until November 2008, but then moved to group therapy for substance abuse and mental health issues. Bernardo said he was willing to start parenting and domestic violence prevention classes and was prepared not to renew his medical marijuana prescription.
In February 2009 the social worker reported S.G. had had a negative drug test and Bernardo's test was positive for marijuana. They had missed recent parenting and anger management classes.
At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court considered the documentary evidence and arguments by counsel. It found the allegations of the petitions to be true, declared the minor a dependent of the juvenile court, removed custody from Bernardo and S.G. and placed the minor in relative care. It ordered S.G. to attend an anger management program and to have domestic violence treatment if requested by her therapist. It also ordered her to begin the SARMS program and to have a psychological evaluation and individual therapy with a TERM therapist. It ordered Bernardo to submit to on-demand drug testing.
DISCUSSION
I
Bernardo contends substantial evidence does not support juvenile court jurisdiction. S.G. joins his argument.
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036-1037.) Determinations of credibility of witnesses and resolutions of conflicts in the evidence are for the trier of fact. (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '... view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' [Citation.]" (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
Substantial evidence supports the court's finding of jurisdiction. As Bernardo acknowledges, his arguments relate only to the allegations regarding the marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the home; he offers no argument on the finding the minor was exposed to domestic violence. When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for jurisdiction, the finding of jurisdiction is sustainable if substantial evidence supports only one of the grounds. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Thus, the jurisdictional finding may be sustained solely on the ground of the risk to the minor from exposure to domestic violence.
Moreover, the evidence showed the minor also was at substantial risk of harm from having access to marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Police found four jars of marijuana on a low shelf in the garage within the minor's reach. The police officers who responded to the domestic violence call noted in their reports that the marijuana and drug paraphernalia were accessible to the minor, and that S.G. told police the garage was unlocked. Bernardo's argument there was no evidence to show the substance in the garage was marijuana is without merit. He acknowledged it was marijuana when he told the social worker, "But the marijuana in the garage, that I know of, that's not mine." A pipe or bong commonly used to smoke marijuana was on the coffee table in the home, also within the minor's reach. The officer said he smelled marijuana inside the home, and S.G. said Bernardo smoked it in the living room several times each day. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings on the basis of substantial risk to the minor from domestic violence and the marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the home.
II
Bernardo asserts the court erred by requiring him to drug test. He argues the parties had agreed he would submit to drug testing, but, because he has a medical prescription for marijuana, he would not be ordered into SARMS unless he tested positive for a controlled substance other than marijuana. He complains instead that the court ordered him to drug test and that he would be required to go to SARMS if he tested positive for any controlled substance including marijuana.
The focus of the dependency statutes is to prevent harm to the child. (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 536.) The reunification plan " 'must be appropriate to each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.' [Citation.]" (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006-1007.) Services must be designed to remedy the problems that led to the loss of custody. (Id. at p. 1007.) "The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion." (In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104.) The reviewing court will not reverse the court's order in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1104.)
During discussion on disposition, county counsel and Bernardo's attorney informed the court that because Bernardo's prescription for medical marijuana would make it difficult for him to participate in SARMS, the parties had agreed he would drug test; if he tested positive for anything except marijuana, he would be required to enter SARMS. The court commented, "The law is there is no such thing as legal use of marijuana." It also stated "The issue is he can't smoke marijuana legally," and, addressing Bernardo, said, "... again, sir, remember you're at risk for using marijuana under any circumstances." The court further advised Bernardo:
"I'm just telling you the law. I know the District Attorney's office in this county is very consistent with the City Council and the County of San Diego and how they would prosecute or decide not to prosecute those cases, but I'm just telling you just be careful out there."
The court said to Bernardo, "Okay. So it is on-demand drug testing by the Agency, all right?" Bernardo answered, "Okay." The court ordered Bernardo to participate in drug testing. The minute order states he is to have on-demand random drug testing. The amended services plan states:
"[Bernardo] will participate in on demand drug testing and if he tests positive for any substance including alcohol, he will be ordered into SARMS. [Bernardo] must provide medical proof of marijuana license, or he will be ordered into SARMS."
A reasonable interpretation of the court's order is that Bernardo is to submit to on-demand drug testing in accordance with the agreement. The court did not expressly reject the counsels' explanation that it had been agreed if Bernardo shows he has a valid prescription for marijuana, he will be ordered into SARMS if he tests positive for any drug other than marijuana, but not if he tests positive for marijuana.
To the extent the order for on-demand drug tests is unclear as to whether Bernardo will face sanctions if he tests positive for marijuana, that issue will not be ripe for review unless he in fact does have a positive marijuana test. "The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions." (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.) " 'A controversy is "ripe" when it has reached... the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 171.) Because there is no evidence in this record that Bernardo has tested positive for marijuana, this issue is not ripe for review.
III
S.G. contends the court abused its discretion because it did not tailor the reunification plan to meet the needs of the family. She complains it refused to allow her to continue to participate in services at a clinic which has been her trusted provider. She also argues the clinic already administered a psychological evaluation and the court wasted valuable resources by ordering her to have a new psychological evaluation and to begin new programs, including SARMS and participation with a TERM therapist.
The court did not abuse its discretion by ordering S.G. to attend therapy with a TERM therapist or by ordering her to have a new psychological evaluation. By the time the dependency case began, she had already received the amount of individual therapy the clinic had allocated for her and she had moved to group therapy. The serious problems she showed with her mental health, drug use, domestic violence and parenting of the minor showed she needed the therapy a TERM therapist could provide. A TERM therapist would be knowledgeable about the dependency system and able to provide services to help S.G. deal with the issues she faced so she could work toward reunification with the minor. As to the order that she have a new psychological evaluation, although a mental health diagnosis was provided in the record, S.G. did not show the clinic had completed a full evaluation. As the court commented, psychological evaluations of parents in dependency cases are directed toward risk factors in parenting children. The court was well within its discretion in ordering she submit to a new evaluation.
The court also did not abuse its discretion by ordering S.G. to enroll in the SARMS program. Y.C. said that S.G.'s methamphetamine use had caused her not to be able to care for her older children. Y.C. and another adult sibling said they believed she was currently using drugs. Also, Bernardo said he saw her use drugs on December 27, 2008. He said on December 31 he smelled methamphetamine in the garage and he had found her drug pipe in the house. S.G. had attended a co-occurring disorders group at the clinic, which addressed mental health and substance abuse issues, but she had asked to discontinue that group and begin another, which was not focused on substance abuse. The court's orders do not preclude her continuing her participation at the clinic she believed was benefitting her at the same time she engages in court-ordered services. S.G. has not shown an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
I CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: HALLER, J.