Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeals from orders of the Superior Court No. DP018215 of Orange County, Dennis Keough, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jimmy B.
Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S. T.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
OPINION
FYBEL, J.
INTRODUCTION
Jimmy B. (Father) and S. T. (Mother) appeal following an order terminating their parental rights to their son, now 17 month old Benjamin B. This matter is a continuation of the dependency proceedings that were the subject of our decision in Jimmy B. v. Superior Court (Sept. 2, 2009, G042156) [nonpub. opn.]. In that opinion, we denied Father’s petition for a writ of mandate which challenged the juvenile court’s order denying him reunification services and setting a permanency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. (All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.)
In this appeal, Father contends the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion by summarily denying his section 388 petition in which he sought custody of Benjamin and, alternatively, reunification services, and (2) erred by finding the parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) inapplicable. Mother “joins in the opening brief filed on [F]ather’s behalf, ” solely arguing that “in the event this Court reverses the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights as to [F]ather, then the order terminating her parental rights must also be reversed by operation of California Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a)(2) and (h).”
We affirm. Even assuming Father’s section 388 petition presented a prima facie case of a change of circumstances or new evidence, the section 388 petition failed to show Father’s proposed modification would be in Benjamin’s best interests. Although evidence at the permanency hearing showed Father regularly visited Benjamin during the two month period following his release from incarceration and before the permanency hearing and that his interactions with Benjamin were positive, he did not satisfy his burden to show that severing his relationship with Benjamin would deprive Benjamin of a “substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
BACKGROUND
I.
Three month old Benjamin Is Detained; the Juvenile Court Declares Benjamin a Dependent Child, Denies Father and Mother Reunification Services, and Sets a Permanency Hearing; We Deny Father’s Writ Petition.
The following summary of the facts underlying the juvenile court’s order declaring Benjamin a dependent child, denying Father and Mother reunification services, and setting a permanency hearing is taken from our earlier opinion (Jimmy B. v. Superior Court, supra, G042156):
“Benjamin was born in Clark County, Nevada in December 2008. At the time of his birth, Benjamin and Mother ‘presented with urine toxicology screens positive for methamphetamine.’ Mother and Father tested positive for methamphetamine after submitting to hair follicle drug tests four days after Benjamin’s birth. On January 9, 2009, a petition was filed in the juvenile court in Clark County, alleging that Benjamin was ‘in need of protection.’
“On January 27, 2009, Father and Mother were arrested in Orange County, California. Father was arrested for possession of controlled substance paraphernalia, first degree burglary, and second degree burglary, and on a warrant for using another person’s identification; Father was incarcerated. Mother was arrested for receiving stolen property, grand theft auto, and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia, and on a warrant for first degree burglary.
“On March 10, 2009, Benjamin was taken into protective custody by [the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA)]. On March 12, SSA filed a juvenile dependency petition in Orange County Juvenile Court (the petition), which alleged Benjamin came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling). [Fn. omitted.] The petition alleged that Benjamin and Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine at the time of Benjamin’s birth and that Mother and Father tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine four days later, thereby ‘demonstrating that the parents’ substance abuse is an unresolved issue which places the child’s safety at risk.’ The petition also alleged Father ‘has an unresolved history of illegal substance abuse, dating from before 1995, including but not limited to, the use of methamphetamine and marijuana with no successful completion of a drug treatment program, which impairs his ability to safely parent and protect the child.’ The petition stated Father ‘knew or reasonably should have known of [M]other’s unresolved substance abuse and failed to protect [Benjamin] from the same.’
“The detention report explained that even though Benjamin was born in Clark County, Nevada, ‘the two jurisdictions agreed that the child... would be transported to Orange County and a petition would be filed on behalf of the child with the Orange County Juvenile Court’ because Father and Mother lived in Orange County and had a pending dependency case in Orange County Juvenile Court involving another child. The petition filed in Clark County was dismissed.”
“The petition also contained allegations regarding Benjamin’s sibling, A.B., who was declared a dependent of the Orange County Juvenile Court in February 2008. The petition alleged that a juvenile dependency petition had been filed on A.B.’s behalf (A.B.’s petition) under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling), and was sustained by the juvenile court. A.B.’s petition alleged that in December 2007, Mother gave birth to A.B. and that they both tested positive for amphetamine and/or methamphetamine. Father is A.B.’s father. A.B.’s petition also alleged Father reasonably should have known of Mother’s use of illegal drugs while she was pregnant with A.B. and he should have made efforts to protect A.B. A.B.’s petition further alleged that Father had a history of substance abuse since at least November 2002 and had no record of successfully completing a rehabilitation program, ‘thereby impairing his ability to effectively parent’ A.B. Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as to A.B. were terminated four days before Benjamin was born, due to their failure to comply with their case plans.
“The petition alleged Father and Mother (who are married to other people) have had children with their respective spouses and those children have been involved in various stages of the dependency system. Because the juvenile court’s basis for denying reunification services to Father was based on A.B.’s dependency case and Father’s failure to make reasonable efforts to resolve the substance abuse problem that led to A.B.’s removal, we do not refer to Father’s and Mother’s other children or their failures as to those children in this opinion.”
“The jurisdiction and disposition report in the instant case, dated April 13, 2009, stated that a records clearance with the California Department of Justice showed Father had been convicted of being under the influence of a controlled substance in February 2003, possession of a controlled substance in August 2003, and possession of a controlled substance again in January 2005. Father admitted to the social worker that he has had ‘a long history of drug use and never has completed a drug treatment program.’ He also claimed he has not used drugs since 2005 or 2006. The report further stated that the records in A.B.’s dependency case show ‘[b]oth parents failed to make substantial progress towards family reunification. [F]ather failed to comply with most of the items of the case plan. The only area he... complied with was the parenting education. [F]ather failed to test regularly, failed to attend the drug program and failed to attend the 12-Step meetings.’
“At the jurisdiction hearing, Father and Mother submitted to the allegations of the petition. The juvenile court found the allegations of the petition true by a preponderance of the evidence, and found Benjamin came under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).
“At the disposition hearing in June 2009, Father testified that he began a voluntary substance abuse program through the Phoenix House while he has been in custody. He expected to be released from custody on July 25, 2009, at which time he wished to change his life and continue treatment. Father testified he had not been drug tested while in custody. He also testified that he started attending Narcotics Anonymous/ Alcoholics Anonymous meetings on March 23 and has been reading books from the programs. During cross examination, Father inaccurately described the first step of the program. Although Father testified he was on step 5 or 6 of the program, he stated he could not remember what step 5 was about.
“On June 4, 2009, the juvenile court declared Benjamin a dependent child of the court under section 360, subdivision (d); found that Father and Mother need not be provided reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11), and (13); and set a permanency hearing under section 366.26.
“Father filed [a] petition for writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its order of June 4, 2009 and issue a new order providing family reunification services to Father. SSA filed an opposition to Father’s writ petition and Benjamin’s counsel filed a letter brief joining in SSA’s opposition and requesting that Father’s writ petition be denied.”
In our prior opinion, we denied Father’s writ petition, holding: “Substantial evidence shows that since A.B.’s removal, Father tested positive for methamphetamine in December 2008, was arrested for, inter alia, possession of a controlled substance in January 2009, and has failed to complete any substance abuse program. The juvenile court, therefore, did not err by finding that Father failed to make reasonable efforts to treat the substance abuse problem that led to A.B.’s removal within the meaning of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), and by denying Father reunification services accordingly. Furthermore, the record is devoid of evidence showing that reunification is in Benjamin’s best interest.”
II.
SSA’s Permanency Hearing Report and Addendum Reports
SSA’s permanency hearing report dated September 30, 2009 stated that since March 10, 2009, Benjamin has lived with the prospective adoptive parents and his brother A.B. whom the prospective adoptive parents have already adopted. The prospective adoptive parents are committed to adopting Benjamin should parental rights be terminated, and are “mature, responsible, and fully capable of providing [Benjamin] with a permanent loving home.” Having cared for Benjamin since he was three months old, they have been diligent in meeting his developmental, medical, and emotional needs and are warm and affectionate toward him. They have provided him with a stable and loving home. SSA reported Benjamin appears comfortable and secure in their home and has thrived in their care; he looks to them for comfort and support.
The permanency hearing report further stated that Father was released from incarceration on July 25, 2009. Mother remained in custody and faced immigration proceedings. During his incarceration, Father participated in Phoenix House outpatient programs and participated in Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous. Father expressed his commitment to participating in a six-month outpatient treatment program.
Beginning August 7, 2009, Father and Benjamin had monitored visits twice a week for two hours each. Father “demonstrate[d] appropriate parenting” with Benjamin. Father held and fed Benjamin and showed him affection. Father brought his own diaper bag with diapers, formula and toys to visits. He frequently checked Benjamin’s diaper and changed it when needed. Father read Benjamin books and repeatedly told Benjamin he loved him. Benjamin appeared clean, “very happy, ” and active during visits with Father; he did not cry during visits.
Based on Benjamin’s pediatrician’s recommendation, Benjamin was unable to go to the jail facility where Father was incarcerated for visits.
In the permanency hearing report, the social worker stated that although both Father and Mother had been participating in services and programs to work toward their sobriety during incarceration, their respective progress in achieving sobriety was still in its “infancy.” She stated, “[n]either... has been able to demonstrate their sobriety for a significant period of time nor [has been] able to successfully complete a drug treatment program” which she opined indicated an unstable and uncertain lifestyle. The report further stated, “[d]ue to their extensive substance abuse, criminal and Social Services history, it is the opinion of the undersigned that both parents would need to demonstrate their sobriety and stability for a significant period of time before it could ever be seriously considered that they could parent the child. Unfortunately, neither of them has been able to do this.” The social worker further stated she did not believe Father or Mother was “in any position to care for or be responsible for the child’s daily or future needs.” The report included SSA’s recommendation that Father and Mother’s parental rights be terminated.
SSA filed two addendum reports prior to the permanency hearing which documented that Father continued to visit Benjamin and that the visits all went well.
III.
Father Files the Section 388 Petition Which Is Summarily Denied by the Juvenile Court.
Father filed a petition under section 388 requesting the juvenile court to return Benjamin to his care or, in the alternative, provide him reunification services. The petition alleged a change of circumstances had occurred as Father had voluntarily enrolled in a Phoenix House outpatient program through which he attended classes and submitted to tests twice a week. He also participated each week in individual counseling and Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous. He participated in twice-weekly monitored visits with Benjamin. The petition also alleged Father lived in a stable home with other family members whom he supports. The petition alleged Father’s requested relief would be in Benjamin’s best interests because “Benjamin will be raised with love, support and nurturing from his family, as well as being able to stay connected with his Vietnamese roots and learning his new American culture.”
The permanency report stated the prospective adoptive mother was born in Vietnam and immigrated to the Untied States when she was four years old.
The section 388 petition was supported by Father’s declaration which provided further details about the furnished two bedroom apartment he shares with his mother and his four other children. He also described the various in-custody and post-custody programs in which he has participated and continues to participate and his visits with Benjamin. He stated he made the decision not to use drugs again and that he was ready to assume responsibility for himself and his children. In the declaration, Father explained the relief sought in the section 388 petition, “is in my son’s best interest because he deserves a father who is living a drug free healthy life style and able to provide a stable and secure home for my son and his siblings. I believe that I can do that given an opportunity. My child is very important to me and I believe that I am important to him. In addition, it would benefit my son to be with me and his family in order to stay connected to his Vietnamese roots while at the same time understanding and learning about the American culture. I believe it will serve his best interest to reunify with me.”
Father attached the following documents as exhibits to his declaration: (1) a certificate recognizing Father as “Family Member of the Week” dated June 23, 2009; (2) a certificate dated June 12 recognizing Father’s completion of “Phoenix House at Theo Lacy ‘Orientation’”; (3) a certificate recognizing Father’s completion “with dedication and perfect attendance” of an eight week curriculum (from May 2009 through June 2009) addressing issues including “Introduction and Strength, ” separation and loss, grief and responses to separation, knowing your child, caregiver relationships, family living plans, hopes, dreams, reality, and planning for the future; (4) a certificate dated July 25, showing Father completed in custody substance abuse treatment; (5) a certificate dated July 23, 2009 recognizing Father’s participation in “Emotional Cartography”; (6) copies of Father’s meeting attendance cards at Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings; and (7) a progress report dated September 29, 2009 showing Father’s good standing in Phoenix House’s New Start Theo Lacy program, and his negative drug tests.
The progress report noted Father entered the program on July 28, 2009 by stating: “[A]fter completing 86 days of in-custody treatment through the Theo Lacy New Start Program. As part of his treatment [Father] is required to attend 1 social support group, 1 relapse prevention group, an individual counseling session and UA test per week. [Father] has remained compliant to all of his PHOP treatment requirements and is also attending 2 outside 12-step meetings per week in preparation for continued recovery.”
The juvenile court summarily denied the section 388 petition stating, that “any argument in terms of extension of [family reunification services] needs to address the likelihood of return within time remaining and also... the issue of best interests is-is in this case vanishingly small, vanishingly slim, to, in terms of the particularized showing. [¶] I mean it’s true that every child deserves a drug-free parent and I don’t think anybody would quarrel with that. And there needs to be a further showing, and the court is going to deny the... petition.”
IV.
The Juvenile Court Terminates Father’s and Mother’s Parental Rights; Father and Mother Appeal.
At the permanency hearing, the juvenile court accepted SSA’s permanency hearing report and two addendum reports into evidence. Father briefly testified, stating he has changed, knows how to behave, no longer uses drugs, knows how to be a good father, and does not agree to losing Benjamin and wants more time to prove that he has changed. He requested that the court consider an alternative permanent plan such as a guardianship or long-term foster care placement for Benjamin.
The juvenile court found it likely Benjamin would be adopted, and ordered Father’s and Mother’s parental rights terminated; the court also found the provisions of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A)(B)(i) through (vi) did not apply. Father and Mother separately appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Summarily Denying Father’s Section 388 Petition.
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying his section 388 petition, which sought to change the court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency hearing.
In the opening brief, Father argues he has not forfeited his challenge to the juvenile court’s summary denial of the section 388 petition even though he failed to reference that order in his notice of appeal. We need not address whether this argument has been forfeited because, as explained in detail post, Father’s argument challenging the court’s summary denial of the petition is without merit.
To succeed on a section 388 petition, a parent must show changed circumstances establishing that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the child. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 526.) “The parent seeking modification [through a section 388 petition] must ‘make a prima facie showing to trigger the right to proceed by way of a full hearing. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] There are two parts to the prima facie showing: The parent must demonstrate (1) a genuine change of circumstances or new evidence, and that (2) revoking the previous order would be in the best interests of the children. [Citation.] If the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not show changed circumstances such that the child’s best interests will be promoted by the proposed change of order, the dependency court need not order a hearing.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)
We apply the abuse of discretion standard in our review of the juvenile court’s decision to deny the section 388 petition without a hearing. (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.) We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 319.) We affirm the order unless it “‘“exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (In re Brittany K., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) The juvenile court’s decision will not be disturbed “‘“unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.”’” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.)
Here, the juvenile court summarily denied the section 388 petition on “both grounds” that it failed to show a change of circumstances and that Benjamin’s best interests would be served by the requested relief. We agree the petition insufficiently addressed Benjamin’s best interests and conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying the petition.
The following factors should be considered in determining whether a section 388 petition addresses the best interests of the child: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) The strength of the relative bonds between the dependent child to both parent and caretakers becomes an even more important factor when a section 388 petition is filed after reunification services have been terminated. In In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 317, the California Supreme Court stated, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.”
Here, the seriousness of the problem leading to Benjamin’s dependency status is not in dispute. Like his older brother A.B., Benjamin tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine at the time of his birth; shortly thereafter, Mother and Father, too, tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Father’s declaration in support of his petition discussed his efforts to at least begin to address his substance abuse problem.
In the section 388 petition, however, Father failed to in any way address the strength of the relative bonds of Benjamin to Father and to the prospective adoptive parents. Although Father has had monitored visits with Benjamin during the two and one half month period following his release from incarceration and before the court’s order denying the section 388 petition, Benjamin has never lived with Father. Shortly after he was detained in March 2009, Benjamin was placed in the same home with his brother, A.B., where he has since thrived. Benjamin looks to the foster parents for comfort and support. The foster parents are “mature, responsible, and fully capable of providing [Benjamin] with a permanent loving home through the course of adoption” and are interested in adoption.
“At this point in the proceedings, on the eve of the selection and implementation hearing, the children’s interest in stability was the court’s foremost concern, outweighing any interest [Father] may have in reunification.” (In re Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 251 252.)
Father argues In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497 supports reversal of the juvenile court’s summary denial of the section 388 petition. In re Hunter S. is factually distinguishable and lends no support to Father’s contention. In that case, the appellate court held the juvenile court erred by granting a 16 year old boy “virtually complete discretion to veto visitation, and indeed all contact, with his mother, a discretion he exercised without any oversight or direction by the court.” (In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) The court held the juvenile court’s refusal to grant the mother’s section 388 petition “was an abuse of discretion because it was the court’s last opportunity to rectify three years of errors in failing to enforce the visitation orders, errors which led inexorably to erosion of the intimate bond she once shared with her son.” (In re Hunter S., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506.)
For the reasons discussed ante, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying the section 388 petition.
II.
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Finding the “Beneficial Relationship” Exception Under Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) Inapplicable.
Father contends the juvenile court erred by failing to find the parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights applicable. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) allows the juvenile court to decline to terminate parental rights over an adoptable child if it finds “a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Father had the burden of proving both prongs of the parent-child relationship exception were satisfied. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 949.) We consider whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination the parent-child relationship exception did not apply. (In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424 425.)
In In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351, the appellate court acknowledged that courts have “routinely applied the substantial evidence test” to the juvenile court’s finding under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The appellate court in In re Jasmine D. stated that the abuse of discretion standard is a more appropriate standard even though “[t]he practical differences between the two standards of review are not significant.” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) Under either standard, Father’s argument fails for the same reasons.
The record shows that during the time period following Father’s release from incarceration up until the November 2 permanency hearing, Father had “regular visitation and contact” with Benjamin within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) that went well. Father, however, did not satisfy the second prong of the exception, by showing Benjamin would benefit from continuing his relationship with Father.
In In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pages 575 576, the court stated: “In the context of the dependency scheme prescribed by the Legislature, we interpret the ‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the relationship promotes the well being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated. [¶] Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. [Citation.] The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. [Citation.] The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [¶] At the time the court makes its determination, the parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12 months or longer, during which time the nature and extent of the particular relationship should be apparent. Social workers, interim caretakers and health professionals will have observed the parent and child interact and provided information to the court. The exception must be examined on a case by case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.”
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding the parent child relationship exception did not apply. Benjamin was less than three months old when he was detained in March 2009 and has spent his entire life in the care and custody of the prospective adoptive parents.
The record shows Father consistently visited Benjamin in the three-month period before the permanency hearing, and during those visits took care of Benjamin by holding him, feeding him and changing his diapers. SSA’s reports show Father was loving and appropriate during visits.
The record also shows Benjamin is attached to the prospective adoptive parents with whom he has lived since March 2009. The prospective adoptive parents have worked to diligently provide for Benjamin’s needs. They have adopted Benjamin’s older brother, A.B. They have demonstrated their commitment to providing both Benjamin and A.B. a stable, nurturing, and permanent home. Benjamin appears comfortable and secure in the home.
In short, the record shows the prospective adoptive parents have occupied a parental role in Benjamin’s life since March 2009 and the termination of Father’s parental rights would not deprive Benjamin of a “substantial, positive emotional attachment such that [he] would be greatly harmed.” (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding the parent-child relationship exception was inapplicable.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P.J., MOORE, J.