Opinion
No. 349664
01-28-2020
In re BENAVIDES/BUKOWSKI, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Delta Circuit Court Family Division
LC Nos. 18-000348-NA 18-000349-NA 18-000350-NA 18-000351-NA Before: MARKEY, P.J., and GLEICHER and M. J. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals by right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her four minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist) and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm to children if returned to parent). We affirm.
Respondent has a history of substance abuse and of associating with persons involved in substance abuse and crime. Before this proceeding began, Children's Protective Services had received 23 complaints and conducted 17 investigations involving respondent. Petitioner sought jurisdiction over the children following an auto accident in January 2018. Respondent had fallen asleep while driving and crashed into a tree. Her two youngest children were in the vehicle and sustained minor injuries. At the time, respondent did not have a valid driver's license or insurance, and the vehicle was unregistered. This accident occurred shortly after respondent's boyfriend had fallen asleep at the wheel and crashed the same vehicle into a ditch. After the car was towed out of the ditch and the boyfriend was ticketed, respondent began driving the vehicle despite telling the police that she would call her grandmother to bring someone to drive the car. The children were placed in foster care.
The trial court directed respondent to comply with a parent-agency treatment plan to address her substance abuse, poor mental health, and inadequate parenting skills. Over the next several months, respondent failed to complete two substance abuse treatment programs, continued to abuse substances, discontinued counseling, failed to comply with drug screens, and failed to stay in contact with the caseworker. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition to terminate respondent's parental rights. Following a hearing in June 2019, the trial court granted the petition.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that petitioner established grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j) by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent additionally contends that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
If a trial court finds that a single statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence and that it has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is mandated to terminate a respondent's parental rights to that child. MCL 712A.19b(3) and (5); MCR 3.977(H)(3); In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 10-11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013); In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). "This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the children's best interests." In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011); see also MCR 3.977(K). "A finding . . . is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed[.]" In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). In applying the clear error standard in parental termination cases "regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); see also MCR 2.613(C).
The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), which permit termination under the following circumstances:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:The evidence supported termination under both grounds.
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
The conditions that led to the children's adjudication primarily involved respondent's substance abuse. She admitted that she had a history of abusing alcohol and "harder stuff" and that her home was unfit for the children because she and her boyfriend exposed them to substance abuse in the home. Respondent also admitted that she endangered her two youngest children by her own and her boyfriend's unsafe driving. Respondent was provided with a treatment plan but failed to achieve sobriety. She quit two inpatient treatment programs against medical advice, one in October 2018 and another in December 2018. Respondent also failed to undergo required drug screens after December 2018. She also failed to avail herself of mental health treatment. Respondent behaved inappropriately and upset the children during parenting time, in telephone calls, and in social media contacts. She demonstrated immaturity by relating to her children more as a friend than a parent. Respondent intended to continue her relationship with her boyfriend despite his criminality, substance abuse and her children's great fear of him. Seventeen months after the driving accidents in January 2018, respondent remained unable to provide stable and consistent care for herself or her children. The evidence supported the trial court's findings that the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and, considering respondent's lack of progress over the course of more than a year, were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable period of time. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating respondent's parental rights under § 19b(3)(c)(i). Further, respondent's inability to establish a stable lifestyle and her persistence in abusing substances and maintaining a relationship with her boyfriend also placed the children at risk of harm if they were returned to her care, thereby also supporting termination under § 19b(3)(j).
Respondent attempts to fault her caseworker for not more diligently following up with respondent's progress. She complains that the caseworker failed to communicate with her, failed to verify her welfare benefits, and failed to investigate her home. This argument is disingenuous in view of the substantial evidence showing that respondent failed in her own obligation to maintain contact with the caseworker. The evidence indicated that the caseworker regularly tried to contact respondent by phone and by going to her home. The caseworker even went from bar to bar searching for respondent after respondent left a treatment program. Respondent made only three attempts to contact the caseworker. Respondent did not inform the caseworker of her lodging arrangements in Marquette. Respondent fails to identify anything that she did that the caseworker failed to acknowledge. We also reject respondent's comparison of this case to In re B & J, 279 Mich App 12, 19-20; 756 NW2d 234 (2008), in which this Court held that the state's efforts to have the respondents deported violated the respondents' right to due process because the state's actions virtually assured the creation of a ground for termination of parental rights. Here, respondent's parental rights were terminated principally because of her continued substance abuse. She was offered the opportunity to participate in treatment programs, but she left those programs against medical advice, discontinued therapy, failed to maintain contact with the caseworker, and she did not benefit from other services. The state did not create these circumstances. Respondent did. In sum, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j).
With respect to a child's best interests, we focus on the child rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. In assessing a child's best interests, a trial court may consider such factors as a "child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
The caseworker discussed each child's situation and feelings about termination. The oldest child was in danger of respondent's enabling the child's own substance abuse. That child was also looking forward to attending college but believed that respondent would spoil that opportunity. The next oldest child felt betrayed and was angered by respondent's parental failures, and he did not believe that she could end her substance abuse. The two youngest children were afraid that respondent would expose them to dangerous situations because of her association with her boyfriend and other unsuitable persons. All of the children were in stable placements and were in need of continued stability and permanence, none of which respondent could to provide. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in each child's best interests.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael J. Kelly