Opinion
No. 335274
03-23-2017
In re A. L. BEDELL, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Branch Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 15-005288-NA Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MURPHY and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). Because there are no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
The trial court assumed jurisdiction over the child in April 2015 after allegations that respondent's husband had sexually abused the child. The petition alleged that respondent was aware of previous allegations against her husband, did not report those allegations, and took no action to protect the child. The petition also alleged that, despite stating that she would follow the request of the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) to keep the child and her husband separated until a forensic interview could be conducted with the child, respondent failed to do so. Due to the conditions of respondent's home, the child was placed into a foster care.
After the child's removal, respondent engaged in therapy, completed a psychological evaluation, and completed the Connections to Family Safety Program, a program designed for non-offending parents in child sexual abuse cases. Respondent continued to test negative for drugs, exercised her parenting time regularly, and successfully maintained employment and housing. Because of respondent's overall success, the child was returned to her care in December 2015. However, in March 2016, the child was removed from respondent's home because of allegations that she allowed Damien McArthur, a person with a history of child sexual abuse, to reside in the home. Although respondent denied that McArthur was living in the home, she did not deny that she was aware of his background, and she did not deny that McArthur, on at least one occasion, spent the night at the home with her and the child. An updated psychological evaluation of respondent completed in May 2016 indicated that, given respondent's inability to implement her training, additional treatment was unlikely to be successful. The trial court held a termination hearing on September 20, 2016, and respondent's parental rights were subsequently terminated.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). Before terminating a parent's parental rights, "the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds of MCL 712A.19b has been met by clear and convincing evidence." In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Thereafter, if the court also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent's parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A finding is "clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
B. ANALYSIS
Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), the trial court may terminate a parent's rights when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a child or a child's sibling "has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse," (2) a parent who had the opportunity "to prevent the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do so," and (3) "there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home." Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's reliance on MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). In 2013, two years before the allegations that prompted the present proceedings, respondent was aware of allegations that her husband had sexually abused the child. Moreover, during her forensic interview the child stated that respondent told the child to wake her up the next time it happened, which demonstrated that respondent was not only aware of the possibility that her husband was sexually abusing the child, but knew it was actually occurring. Despite this knowledge, respondent did nothing to protect the child from her husband. Moreover, after the Department contacted respondent regarding new allegations against her husband in April 2015, respondent still allowed contact between the child and her husband before the child's forensic interview. Respondent did so despite a request from the Department to keep the child from having contact with respondent's husband and despite her knowledge that her husband had sexually abused the child.
Respondent does not contest the fact that her husband sexually assaulted the child or that she had the opportunity to prevent the abuse. She instead argues that her completion of recommended services designed to help her learn how to protect the child demonstrates that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury in the foreseeable future if returned to her care. However, respondent's continued contact with her husband and her acquiescence to contact between her husband and the child after the 2013 allegations and briefly after the 2015 allegations demonstrates that respondent repeatedly failed to appreciate the danger her husband posed to the child. This evidence suggests that a return to respondent's care posed a likelihood of future harm to the child.
Further, respondent's subsequent therapy does not dispel this conclusion because the child was again removed from her care in March 2016 because of respondent's failure to implement the previous 10 months of training and education. Contrary to respondent's argument that she immediately ceased contact with McArthur upon discovering his criminal background, the record demonstrates that respondent had been aware of McArthur's criminal history before allowing McArthur to have contact with the child. Respondent had visited McArthur in jail while he was a suspect in a murder investigation, and, during her updated psychological evaluation and therapy sessions, respondent also admitted to being aware that McArthur was accused of sexually abusing his step-niece and his ex-girlfriend's children. While respondent may not have been aware of McArthur's conviction for criminal sexual conduct, her knowledge of the sexual abuse allegations was certainly sufficient to warrant additional investigation. Respondent's inability to implement basic parenting skills despite 10 months of extensive education and training concerning child safety shows that it is unlikely that she could protect the child in the future. Additionally, the Department caseworker, respondent's therapist, the child's therapist, and the author of respondent's and the child's psychological reports all testified that they believed that returning the child to respondent would cause a potential risk of harm to the child for these reasons. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). Because the trial court did not clearly err in finding one statutory ground for termination, we need not to address the additional statutory grounds on which the trial court based its decision. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
II. BEST INTERESTS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred when it found that termination was in the child's best interests. We review a trial court's best interests' decision for clear error. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357.
B. ANALYSIS
"Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court must consider the record as a whole in determining whether termination is in the child's best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 354. The trial court must "state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to whether or not parental rights should be terminated." MCL 712A.19b(1). When deciding whether termination is in the child's best interests, the trial court may consider "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). It is also proper to consider evidence concerning the length of time the child has been in foster care and whether the child could be returned to the parent "within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Although the parent's interests may be considered, "[t]he primary beneficiary" of the best-interest determination "is intended to be the child." In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356.
In this case, while the record supported that respondent and the child shared a loving bond, it also established that the child did not feel safe in respondent's care and that the child felt responsible for respondent's well-being. The child also indicated that, although she desired to see respondent weekly, she also desired to remain with her foster family. Additionally, respondent, given her codependency issues and inability to benefit from services offered, was unlikely to be able to provide a safe, stable environment for the child within a reasonable time. Respondent was responsible for the child's care for a three-month period during the 18 months of proceedings, after which the child was again removed because respondent chose to place the child at risk of physical and emotional harm by inviting McArthur into her home. Because it was "unlikely that the child could be returned to [respondent's] home within the foreseeable future," termination of respondent's parental rights was proper to facilitate the placement of the children in a permanent, stable, loving home. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 249. Although respondent argues on appeal that she had come closer to being able to provide a safe environment for the child at the time of the termination hearing, the child cannot be expected to wait indefinitely for respondent's uncertain improvement and, in so doing, forgo a permanent, safe, and stable home. Accordingly, the evidence established that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause