About a week later, the family court judge entered an amended termination order, adding a provision stating that respondent's child support obligation previously ordered in a judgment of divorce entered in Arenac County was also terminated. More than a year later, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a motion to set aside the amended termination order, arguing that the order had been entered without notice to the county prosecutor and DHHS; that the termination of respondent's child support obligation was contrary to law under our Supreme Court's ruling in In re Beck, 488 Mich 6; 793 NW2d 562 (2010); and that the family court judge lacked the authority in the neglect proceedings to terminate child support. The trial court granted the motion without mention of any procedural rule, holding that the amended termination order was void ab initio and, thus, reinstated the original termination order and respondent's child support obligation.

See, generally, id. at 313–314, 805 N.W.2d 226. Plaintiffs argue that because their son continued to pay child support and thus met his parental responsibilities, they are entitled to grandparenting time, i.e., visitation, an express parental right. However, in In re Beck, 488 Mich. 6, 8, 793 N.W.2d 562 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court observed that, under Michigan's statutory scheme, parental rights are distinct from parental obligations. The Beck Court held that while an order terminating parental rights terminates a parent's “liberty interest in ‘the care, custody, and control of their children[,]’ ” see id. at 11, 793 N.W.2d 562, quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), a termination order does not eliminate the parental obligation to support a child, Beck, 488 Mich. at 15, 793 N.W.2d 562.

Id. at 123. Lastly, the petitioner's reliance on In re Beck, 488 Mich 6; 793 NW2d 562 (2010), for the proposition that RD has an inherent right of support regardless of the effect of a support order, is misplaced. In Beck, the Supreme Court held that the termination of a legal father's parental rights did not serve to terminate his child support obligation arising under a divorce judgment " ' unless a court of competent jurisdiction modifies or terminates the obligation . . . .' " 488 Mich at 15, quoting MCL 722.3(1).

The parent of a child has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the child. See Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982); In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010). There is " 'a presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children' " under the United States Constitution.

Those parental rights are lost when the parent's parental rights are terminated. In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 15; 793 NW2d 562 (2010). "In other words, the terminated parent loses any entitlement to the custody, control, services and earnings of the minor."

In October 2015, a family court judge entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights to his minor daughter, and almost immediately thereafter an amended termination order was issued by the judge, which added language indicating "that the child support obligations of [respondent] for the minor are hereby terminated . . . ." Well over a year later, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a motion to set aside the amended termination order, arguing that the order had been entered absent any notice to the county prosecutor and DHHS, that the termination of respondent's child support obligation was contrary to law under our Supreme Court's ruling in In re Beck, 488 Mich 6; 793 NW2d 562 (2010), and that the family court judge otherwise lacked the authority in the neglect proceedings to suspend support. DHHS failed to cite any court rule or statutory provision pertaining to relief from an order, such as MCR 2.612 (relief from judgment or order generally) or MCR 3.992 (encompassing postjudgment relief from a termination order).

Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the "care, custody, and control of their children." In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010) (citation omitted). If termination of parental rights is pursued, the petitioner bears the burden of showing that the allegations establish a statutory basis for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children. In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010). If termination of parental rights is pursued, the petitioner bears the burden of showing that the allegations establish a statutory basis for termination by clear and convincing evidence.

Furthermore, "[b]iological parents have an inherent obligation to support their children[,]" Macomb Co Dep't of Social Servs v Westerman, 250 Mich App 372, 377; 645 NW2d 710 (2002), citing Evink v Evink, 214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995), as well as having a statutory support obligation, MCL 722.3(1); In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 12; 793 NW2d 562 (2010) ("The . . . parental obligation identified in MCL 722.3 is the duty to provide a child with support."); Diez v Davey, 307 Mich App 366, 376; 861 NW2d 323 (2014). Respondent's continuing obligation to pay child support was not a "consequence[] of the plea" taken by the trial court under MCR 3.971.

Parental rights, as a constitutional matter, encompass parents "fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children." In re Beck, 488 Mich. 6, 11; 793 N.W.2d 562 (2010) (cleaned up). However, a parent's right to control the care and custody of their children is not absolute; "the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and in some circumstances neglectful parents may be separated from their children."