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In re Beaty

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Jan 19, 2017
No. 332113 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2017)

Opinion

No. 332113

01-19-2017

In re K. D. BEATY, Minor.


UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 09-488879-NA Before: TALBOT, C.J., and JANSEN and HOEKSTRA, JJ. PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights to her minor son, KDB, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent's act caused injury to child or sibling), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), (i) (parental rights to a sibling have been terminated due to abuse or neglect and prior rehabilitation efforts were unsuccessful), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned to parent). We affirm.

Respondent argues that termination of her parental rights was not warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), or (j), and that termination of her parental rights was not in KDB's best interests. We disagree.

When a respondent challenges termination of his or her parental rights, this Court reviews the trial court's decisions regarding statutory grounds for termination and the child's best interests for clear error. In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id.

Before terminating a respondent's parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground for termination exists. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Although the trial court found four statutory grounds for termination of respondent's parental rights in this case, respondent only challenges the trial court's conclusions relating to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j). As such, respondent's first claim of error is fatally flawed from the outset because "[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent's parental rights," In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011), and respondent concedes that statutory grounds for termination existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). Moreover, respondent's argument regarding the trial court's other findings lacks merit because there was clear and convincing evidence in support of the other statutory grounds for termination.

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), the court may terminate a respondent's parental rights to a child if the child has been physically injured or abused and "[t]he parent's act caused the physical injury or physical . . . abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home." KDB tested positive for cocaine and opiates when he was born, and there was testimony that KDB startled easily at noise, which his doctor believed was most likely caused by exposure to drugs. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by concluding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) was established by clear and convincing evidence.

As already noted above, respondent concedes that the trial court had clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), and her concession is well supported by the record. MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) provides statutory grounds for termination of parental rights if "[p]arental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful." A copy of the 2010 order terminating respondent's parental rights to KDB's biological brother was admitted at the termination hearing, and respondent admitted that her rights were terminated because she failed to protect KDB's brother from physical abuse by her former boyfriend. Respondent also acknowledged that she was offered a treatment plan before the prior termination, but failed to successfully complete it.

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), parental rights may be terminated if "[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age." Respondent was not employed at the time of the hearing. Although respondent visited with KDB on a regular basis, her mother told the foster-care worker that respondent often napped during the visits and was not as helpful as she could be with respect to taking care of KDB. Respondent testified that her substance abuse problems impaired her ability to parent, and she relapsed as recently as October 2015. Moreover, respondent failed to complete the substance abuse counseling that was offered in connection with the previous termination proceedings. Respondent asserted that she was in the process of enrolling in an outpatient treatment program at the time of the hearing. However, there is no indication that respondent would truly complete, or benefit from, such a program given her lack of participation in the past and her recent relapse after purportedly attending narcotics anonymous meetings for two years. Thus, there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of respondent's parental rights was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), the trial court may terminate a respondent's parental rights if "[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent." Although respondent testified that she had been drug free for the two years before October 2015, the very fact that she relapsed at 35 weeks gestation demonstrates that she had not adequately resolved her substance abuse problem. Furthermore, after overdosing on cocaine and heroin, respondent refused an obstetrics examination and left the hospital against medical advice because of her desire to sleep in her own bed, despite the hospital staff's warning that her unborn child could suffer serious harm or death. In light of respondent's refusal to prioritize her child's wellbeing above her own comfort, it is reasonably likely that KDB would be harmed if returned to respondent's care. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that statutory grounds for termination existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

Once a statutory ground for termination of a respondent's parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, "the trial court must find that termination is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court's best-interest determination must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In making this determination, a court should consider "a wide variety of factors that may include the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." Id. at 713 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If a child is in the care of relatives at the time the case proceeds to termination, the trial court must consider that fact in determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43.

At the time of the termination hearing, KDB was approximately three months old and had been living with his maternal grandmother for about two months. Thus, KDB had only a limited opportunity to bond with respondent before he was removed from her care, and there was no indication that KDB's bond with respondent increased in any meaningful sense thereafter. There was also evidence that respondent lacked appropriate parenting skills: her rights to KDB's brother were terminated in 2010; she had ongoing substance abuse problems for at least six years; and she refused an obstetrics examination after overdosing on cocaine and heroin shortly before KDB's birth, despite being warned that KDB might suffer serious harm or death. Indeed, it appears that respondent continued to disregard KDB's wellbeing even after her October 2015 relapse, and she testified that she took Vicodin before KDB's birth because she was in pain and did not know she was going into labor. Furthermore, respondent was unemployed at the time of the termination hearing. Thus, it does not appear that respondent would have been capable of providing KDB with permanency or stability.

By contrast, termination of respondent's parental rights allowed KDB the opportunity to be adopted by his maternal grandmother. KDB had been in his grandmother's care for the majority of his life and was reportedly doing well in that environment. Moreover, because the maternal grandmother also adopted respondent's older son after respondent's parental rights were terminated in 2010, KDB's permanent placement with his grandmother would allow KDB to develop a long-term relationship with his biological brother. The court acknowledged that KDB was placed in relative care, but still found that termination of respondent's parental rights was in KDB's best interests. In fact, the referee observed that KDB would likely be adopted by his grandmother and hoped that she would be counseled "on the importance of protecting these children from [respondent] whose drug use is greater than her ability to parent or put their needs first." Given the evidence before it, the trial court did not err when it determined that termination of respondent's parental rights was in KDB's best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Talbot

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra


Summaries of

In re Beaty

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Jan 19, 2017
No. 332113 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2017)
Case details for

In re Beaty

Case Details

Full title:In re K. D. BEATY, Minor.

Court:STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Date published: Jan 19, 2017

Citations

No. 332113 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2017)