for her mental illness was noncompliant with permanency plans and court was not compelled to defer termination to give mother a chance to demonstrate that her improvement from her recently begun medication regimen was permanent or sufficient); In re C.J.S., No. 2000-02836-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 256799 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 22, 2002) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (holding that the mother's mental condition prevented her from meeting her child's needs and was a persistent condition preventing the child's safe return home); In re T.S. and M.S., No. M1999-01286-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 964775 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 13, 2000) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (holding that the mother's limited intellectual functioning, consequent inability to provide care to her children, and inability to improve her parenting abilities, despite her obvious love for the children and attempts to improve her situation, constituted persistent conditions preventing the return of the children to the home); In re B.B., No. M1999-00643-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 794360 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 20, 2000) (appeal denied Dec. 18, 2000) (holding that proof of the mother's limited intellectual functioning combined with her psychological problems, preventing the mother from parenting appropriately, established the grounds that her mental condition was so impaired and likely to remain so that she would be unable to resume care of the child in the near future); In re T.J.H. and M.S.M., No. 01A01-9712-CH-00736, 1998 WL 313719 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 12, 1998) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (holding that parents' mental illness and inability to manage their psychological disorders were persistent conditions preventing the safe return of the children to the home); State Dep't. of Human Services v. Adams, No. 03A01-9403-CV-00114, 1994 WL 57991 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 24, 1994) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (holding that parents' inability to improve their parenting skills to a level where the children could be returned home, despite efforts by social services agencies, was grounds
1994) . Because the termination of a fundamental right is at issue, courts must find that the grounds for termination of parental rights cases are proven by clear and convincing evidence under the applicable statute. See, e.g., Tenn. Dep't ofChildren's Servs. v. Bates, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 26 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002); In re B.B., No. M1999-00643-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 399 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000); In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000). The applicable statute, T.C.A. § 36-1-113(c) (2001), provides that:
T.C.A. § 36-1-113 (c) requires that one or more of the asserted statutory grounds must be proved by clear and convincing evidence and the court must determine, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interests. See In re: B.B., No. M1999-00643-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 794360 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 20, 2000); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c) (2001). Mrs. Bates argues that the trial court erred in finding grounds supported by clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights.
I do see and understand your argument that she made some efforts but I just don't believe that those efforts come up to changing my mind that it is in the child's best interest that the parental rights be terminated and that custody be placed with the Department of Children's Services for placement for adoption. In the recent case of In the Matter of B.B., No. M1999-00643-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 794360 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 20, 2000) involving a mother whose parental rights were terminated upon a finding that she was unwilling and unable to care for the child at present due to "ongoing mental health issues[,]" the middle section to this Court found that the grounds for termination were established and that the termination was in the best interest of the child. Although the facts in that case differ somewhat from the instant case, there are marked similarities between the factors to consider in the instant case, and the factors that the Court in In re B.B. considered in determining that termination of rights was in the best interest of the child.
The Appellant also cites as error the finding of the trial court that Mr. Sheffield was and is under a sentence of ten or more years as a basis for termination of his parental rights as an incorrect application of section 36-1-113(g)(6) of the Tennessee Code. Due to our finding above, that the grounds for abandonment were proven by clear and convincing evidence, we decline to address this issue, as only one bases for termination must be proven. See In the Matter of B.B., No. M1999-00643-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 794360, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jun. 20, 2000); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2) (Supp. 1999).