Opinion
No. C9-96-576.
Filed June 25, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. P09560162.
James S. Dahlquist, (for Appellant Bauer)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Peter Fransway, Assistant County Attorney, (for Respondent Hennepin County)
Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Schultz, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)
Unpublished Opinion
Appellant Frances Bauer challenges the trial court order that her commitment as a chemically dependent person be continued for one year. We affirm.
Decision
The commitment must be "justified by findings based upon evidence at the hearing." Minn. R. Civ. Commitment 11.01; In re Fusa, 355 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Minn.App. 1984). Evidence to support the continued commitment must be clear and convincing. Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4 (1994). Findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991). The commitment will be reversed if the trial court findings are insufficient to support the conclusion that the requirements for commitment are met. In re McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 1995). In deciding whether a person continues to be chemically dependent and in need of commitment, the court need not find
that there has been a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others, or a recent failure to provide necessary personal food, clothing, shelter, or medical care. Instead, the court must find that the patient is likely to attempt to physically harm self or others, or to fail to provide necessary personal food, clothing, shelter, or medical care unless involuntary commitment is continued.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4 (1994); see In re Smith, 392 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Minn.App. 1986) (continued commitment as chemically dependent).
Bauer contends the trial court based its conclusion on speculation by the social services director of her facility that she would drink again if not committed. She argues that there were no recent acts or threats that could be interpreted as meeting the statutory requirement, and she notes that she has not consumed alcohol for four months. See McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d at 623-24 (reversing commitment as mentally ill because improperly based on speculation as to future harm rather than substantial likelihood). Thus, Bauer argues the trial court did not have clear and convincing evidence she was chemically dependent and in need of continued commitment. We disagree.
In an initial commitment, the court must examine the person's recent conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 2(b) (1994) (defining initial commitment as chemically dependent to require evidence of recent harmful conduct). For a continued commitment, however, the court does not need such evidence of recent conduct; instead, the court must determine whether the person is likely to attempt to physically harm self or others or fail to provide necessities unless involuntary commitment is continued. Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4.
Bauer's May 1995 commitment as chemically dependent was stayed; when she continued to consume alcohol, the stay was revoked. She has abstained at her present facility because the facility successfully controls her access to alcohol. She continues to deny she is chemically dependent, and she refuses to participate in the geriatric alcoholism treatment program. Because of Bauer's 20-year history of drinking, the treatment team and her son believed she would not be able to abstain from using alcohol unless committed to a facility that controls access to alcohol. We conclude the trial court had clear and convincing evidence that Bauer continues to be chemically dependent and is likely to fail to provide herself with necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.
Affirmed.