Opinion
2015 CA 1680
06-03-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF BASS
A.M. "Tony" Clayton Port Allen, Louisiana Attorney for Appellants/Appellees, Kip Bass and Melissa Bass, individually, and on behalf of their minor child, Blaire Bass Jeff Landry Attorney General Richard R. Ray Assistant Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee/Appellant, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the 18th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Pointe Coupee State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 45,458, Div. D The Honorable William C. Dupont, Judge Presiding A.M. "Tony" Clayton
Port Allen, Louisiana Attorney for Appellants/Appellees,
Kip Bass and Melissa Bass,
individually, and on behalf of their
minor child, Blaire Bass Jeff Landry
Attorney General Richard R. Ray
Assistant Attorney General
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee/Appellant,
State of Louisiana, through the
Department of Transportation
and Development BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND DRAKE, JJ. DRAKE, J.
Jeff Landry became Louisiana Attorney General, replacing former Attorney General James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, while this appeal was pending.
In this personal injury case, both the plaintiffs, Kip Bass and Melissa Bass, individually and on behalf of their minor child, Blaire Bass, and defendant, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), appeal the judgment of the trial court following a jury trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 30, 2012, Blaire Bass was a guest passenger in a vehicle driven by Lauren David, a minor, traveling in Pointe Coupee Parish on Highway 78 known as Parlange Lane, when the vehicle ran off the road and struck a standing tree located in the DOTD right-of-way. Blaire Bass had to be extricated from the vehicle and experienced serious injuries that resulted in a lengthy hospital stay and several surgeries.
The plaintiffs originally filed suit against Lauren David's parents, the insurer of the David vehicle, and DOTD. Prior to trial, plaintiffs settled with the Davids and their insurer and dismissed those parties. The matter was tried before a jury in October of 2014 against the remaining defendant, DOTD. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding no liability on the part of DOTD and finding Lauren David to be 100% at fault. Shortly after the jury verdict, a proposed judgment was presented to plaintiffs' counsel for review pursuant to Local Rule 9.5. Plaintiffs' counsel consented to the proposed judgment. After presenting the proposed judgment to the trial court judge, DOTD received an invoice and correspondence from the Clerk of Court's office indicating that the judgment could not be presented to the judge for a signature until all court costs were paid. DOTD sent a letter to the trial court requesting that the judgment assessing costs to the plaintiffs be signed, and advised him of the Clerk's position and plaintiffs' counsel's assent to the judgment. The trial court set a "Hearing on Judgment" after receiving DOTD's correspondence. On the day of the hearing, the trial court held a status conference and explained that since DOTD requested the jury, it would have to pay those costs, while all other costs were assigned to the plaintiffs. The trial court signed a judgment on March 25, 2015, reflecting the discussions of the status conference.
DOTD filed a motion for new trial seeking a reversal of that portion of the judgment taxing DOTD with all costs associated with the jury. On June 10, 2015, the trial court denied DOTD's motion for new trial.
DOTD appealed from the judgment casting it with all costs associated with the jury. Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment assessing DOTD with no liability.
ERRORS
Plaintiffs claim that the jury erred in failing to find that DOTD had custody over anything that caused the accident and by ignoring the verdict sheet and trial court instructions to find Lauren David 100% at fault.
DOTD claims that the trial court erred when it ordered all costs associated with the jury to be paid by DOTD, the wholly prevailing party, solely because it asked for the jury.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs' Burden of Proof Against the State
A plaintiff may proceed against DOTD under either a theory of negligence, based on La. C.C. art. 2315, or a theory of strict liability, based on La. C.C. art. 2317 and La. R.S. 9:2800. In order for DOTD to be held liable, the burden of proof is the same under either theory. That is, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that:
(1) DOTD had custody of the thing that caused the plaintiffs injuries or damages;
(2) the thing was defective because it had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm;Netecke v. State ex rel. DOTD, 98-1182 (La. 10/19/99), 747 So. 2d 489, 494. To recover, plaintiff bears the burden of proving all these inquiries in the affirmative and failure on any one is fatal to the case.
(3) DOTD had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and failed to take corrective measures within a reasonable time; and
(4) the defect in the thing was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries.
The duty of DOTD is to maintain the public roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe and does not present an unreasonable risk of harm to the motoring public exercising ordinary care and reasonable prudence. La. R.S. 48:21; Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 494-95 (citing Campbell v. Department of Tramp. & Dev., 94-1052 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So. 2d 898, 901-02; Oster v. Department of Tramp. & Dev., 582 So. 2d 1285, 1288 (La. 1991)). DOTD must maintain the shoulders and the area off the shoulders, within its right-of-way, in such a condition that they do not present an unreasonable risk of harm to motorists using the adjacent roadway and to others, such as pedestrians, who are using the area in a reasonably prudent manner. Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 495 (citing Brown v. Louisiana Indem. Co., 97-1344 (La. 3/4/98), 707 So. 2d 1240, 1242; Oster, 582 So. 2d at 1289-91). DOTD's duty to maintain safe shoulders encompasses the foreseeable risk that for any number of reasons a motorist might find himself on, or partially on, the shoulder. Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 495 (citing Graves v. Page, 96-2201 (La. 11/7/97), 703 So. 2d 566, 572; Rue v. State, Dep't of Highways, 372 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (La. 1979)). This duty extends not only to prudent and attentive drivers, but also to motorists who are slightly exceeding the speed limit or momentarily inattentive. Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 495 (citing Ledbetter v. State, Through La. Dep't of Tramp. & Dev., 502 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (La. 1987)).
This duty, however, does not render DOTD the guarantor for the safety of all the motoring public. Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 495 (citing Graves, 703 So. 2d at 572; Briggs v. Hartford Ins. Co., 532 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (La. 1988)). Further, DOTD is not the insurer for all injuries or damages resulting from any risk posed by obstructions on or defects in the roadway or its appurtenances. Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 495. Moreover, not every imperfection or irregularity will give rise to liability, but only a condition that could reasonably be expected to cause injury to a prudent person using ordinary care under the circumstances. Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 495 (citing Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1149 (La. 1983)). The existence of an unreasonable risk of harm may not be inferred solely from the fact that an accident occurred. Whether DOTD breached its duty to the public, by knowingly maintaining a defective or unreasonably dangerous roadway, depends on all the facts and circumstances determined on a case by case basis. Netecke, 747 So. 2d at 495.
The plaintiffs claim that the jury was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in failing to find that DOTD had custody over anything that caused the accident, and specifically refer to DOTD's custody over the roadway and the tree. The verdict form presented to the jury was answered as follows:
1. Do you find Laruen R. David to be at fault in causing the accident?
Yes [X] No [ ]
(If the answer is Yes or No, go to No. 2.)
2. Do you find [DOTD] had custody over anything that caused the accident?
Yes [ ] No [X]
(If the answer is Yes, go to No. 3. If the answer is No., go to No. 6.)
3. Do you find that anything [DOTD] had custody over was defective and created an unreasonable risk of harm?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
(If the answer is Yes, go to No. 4. If the answer is No., go to No. 6.)
4. Do you find [DOTD] had actual or constructive knowledge of any defect?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
(If the answer is Yes, go to No. 5. If the answer is No., go to No. 6.)
5. Do you find [DOTD] failed to take corrective action within a reasonable time?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
(If the answer is Yes or no, go to No. 6.)
6. What percentages of fault, if any, do you find apply to each party whose negligence contributed to the accident on August 30, 2012? (The total must equal 100%)
| Lauren David | 100% |
|---|---|
| [DOTD] | 0% |
| Total | 100% |
The jury never determined if the roadway or tree was defective and created an unreasonable risk of harm, if DOTD had actual or constructive knowledge of any defect, or if DOTD failed to take any corrective action. Once the jury determined that DOTD did not have custody of anything that caused the accident, it was instructed to go to question 6, which the jury did. Although plaintiffs complain that the jury erred when it failed to find that DOTD had "custody over anything that caused the accident," we do not agree. From the phrasing of the verdict form, "anything that caused the accident," the jury must have concluded that nothing in DOTD's custody, the roadway or the tree, was a cause-in-fact of the accident— that the actions of Lauren David were the sole cause of the accident.
DOTD admitted that it had custody of the right-of-way up to eighteen inches past the backslope of the ditch on Parlange Lane, which included the tree hit by the David vehicle. Moreover, it is also undisputed that DOTD has a legal duty to maintain the roadway. La. R.S. 48:21. Although both parties in their briefs discuss whether the standing water and tree were unreasonably dangerous, the jury never decided that issue. The only issue decided by the jury was that DOTD did not have "custody over anything that caused the accident." Therefore, we must determine if the jury was manifestly erroneous in finding that the plaintiffs did not carry their burden of proof as to the issue that DOTD had custody over a thing which was a cause-in-fact of the accident.
Manifest Error
A court of appeal may not overturn a judgment of a trial court unless there is an error of law or a factual finding that is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Morris v. Safeway Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 2003-1361 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So. 2d 616, 617, writ denied, 2004-2572 (La. 12/17/04), 888 So. 2d 872. The Louisiana Supreme Court has posited a two-part test for the appellate review of facts in order to affirm the factual findings of the trier of fact: (1) the appellate court must find from the record that there is a reasonable factual basis for the finding of the trier of fact; and (2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La. 1987). Thus, if there is no reasonable factual basis in the record for the trier of fact's finding, no additional inquiry is necessary to conclude there was manifest error. However, if a reasonable factual basis exists, an appellate court may set aside a factual finding only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, it determines the factual finding was clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, through Dep't of Transp. and Dev., 617 So. 2d 880, 882 (La. 1993); Moss v. State, 2007-1686 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/8/08), 993 So. 2d 687, 693, writ denied, 2008-2166 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So. 2d 1092. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, a fact finder's choice between them can never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Dubuisson v. Amclyde Engineered Products Co., Inc., 2012-0010 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/31/12), 112 So. 3d 891, 895.
When, however, an appellate court finds that a reversible error of law or manifest error of material fact was made in the trial, it is required, whenever possible, to redetermine the facts de novo from the entire record and render a judgment on the merits. Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So. 2d 742, 745. With regard to questions of law, appellate review is simply a review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. Hidalgo v. Wilson Certified Exp., Inc., 94-1322 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/14/96), 676 So. 2d 114, 116. On legal issues, the appellate court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court, but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and render judgment on the record. In re Mashburn Marital Trust, 2004-1678 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/05), 924 So. 2d 242, 246, writ denied, 2006-1034 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So. 2d 384.
Plaintiffs aver that the jury, based on the evidence, erred by holding that DOTD did not have custody over anything that caused the accident and finding Lauren David to be 100% at fault. Plaintiffs claim that this verdict was internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, and should be reversed.
While great deference should be accorded to the fact finder, appellate courts have a constitutional duty to review facts, and to perform its constitutional duty properly. Thus, the appellate court must determine whether the lower court's conclusions were clearly wrong based on the evidence or are clearly without evidentiary support. Stewart v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 2008-0772 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/20/09), 9 So. 3d 957, 963, writ denied, 2009-1228 (La. 9/18/09), 17 So. 3d 968.
Cause-in-fact
In order for DOTD to be liable to the plaintiffs, there must be a causal relationship between its wrongful conduct and the plaintiffs' injuries. A plaintiff must show that the defendant's actions were a "cause-in-fact" of his injury. Where a single accident may have several causes-in-fact, the "substantial factor" test is used. "The defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact- of the harm if it was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the harm." Graves, 703 So. 2d at 570 (citing Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, § 4-3 at 86-88 (1996)).
When there are multiple causes of an accident, "negligent conduct is a cause-in-fact to another if it was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about that harm. The negligent conduct is undoubtedly a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the collision if the collision would not have occurred without it." Graves, 703 So. 2d at 570 (quoting Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298, 302 (1962)).
The jury in the present case concluded that neither the roadway nor the tree was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the collision. The critical inquiry in this case is the propriety of the jury's causation determination. Causation is a fact-specific inquiry. The issue to be resolved is whether the factfinder's conclusion is a reasonable one. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 573.
This accident occurred on a two-lane highway. In 1982 or 1983, DOTD made changes to Parlange Lane, which made the travel lanes wider and eliminated the shoulder. Immediately outside the travel lane is a foreslope to a ditch, the ditch bottom, and the backslope of the ditch, all of which were in DOTD's right-of-way and maintained by DOTD. DOTD's right-of-way also included eighteen inches past the backslope of the ditch, which included the tree that Lauren David hit.
DOTD admitted at trial that the tree that Lauren David hit was in its right-of-way, which DOTD maintained, and therefore, it had custody of the tree. Since custody of the roadway and the tree were admitted by DOTD, the jury must have determined that the neither condition of the roadway nor the tree, both in DOTD's custody, was a cause-in-fact of the accident.
Lauren David testified that that as she was traveling down Parlange Lane, she gradually slowed down for a curve, hit a puddle of standing water, went through a ditch, and hit a tree. Brady Olinde was driving another vehicle with Kyle Hawkins, Lauren David's boyfriend, as a guest passenger and preceded the David vehicle through the curve. Lauren David testified that at the time of the accident she was not using her cellphone, texting, playing with the radio, speeding or racing the vehicle driven by Brady Olinde.
Kyle Hawkins also testified that Lauren David was not speeding, using her cellphone, or texting at the time of the accident. He was adamant that the vehicle in which he was riding (the Olinde vehicle) was not speeding. Kyle Hawkins also stated at trial that he saw Lauren David's car hydroplane once it hit the water on the road. At trial, he claimed that he saw Lauren's car go through standing water, and DOTD attempted to impeach him with previous deposition testimony in which he stated that he did not know if Lauren's vehicle hit standing water.
Brady Olinde also testified at trial with regard to the accident. He stated that both vehicles left from Lauren David's house to go to another friend's house. On the way, the two vehicles began to race, slowed down for the curve, and Lauren David's vehicle went sideways and then into the ditch. Brady Olinde testified that while going down Parlange Lane, he traveled 65 to 70 miles per hour, but the speed limit was 55 miles per hour. He also stated that even at the rate of speed he was travelling, Lauren David was keeping up with him. He did remember the roadway being wet, but did not see any standing water. On cross examination, Brady Olinde admitted that he had slowed down for the curve, so he was travelling between 55 and 60 miles per hour in the curve, but admitted he was not exactly sure as to his speed or Lauren David's at the time of the accident. He agreed that Lauren David was not passing him and that she was not speeding when the accident occurred.
Blaire Bass was unable to remember the details of the accident. She was able to testify that just prior to the accident, Lauren David was not using her cellphone or texting. Although on direct examination, Blaire Bass testified that Lauren David was driving normally at the time of the accident, she admitted, upon cross examination, that she had previously testified under oath that as she and Lauren David traveled from New Roads to Livonia, Lauren David passed a car and was driving faster than the speed limit.
The investigating state trooper, James Cannon, testified that he did not note any standing water or deep ruts on the roadway. However, on cross-examination, he testified that he was referring to the accident scene and not necessarily further up the road where Lauren David's vehicle left the roadway.
Joseph C. Berthelot, a Parish Maintenance Superintendent for DOTD, testified that a few times after major hurricanes, he had received complaints of standing water on Parlange Lane, but not in the location of this accident. This accident occurred on August 30, 2012, one day after Hurricane Isaac hit the area.
There is conflicting evidence in the record as to whether Lauren David and Brady Olinde were racing and whether Lauren David was speeding prior to the accident. The jury also heard testimony that one million vehicles a year travel down Parlange Lane, and although other accidents occurred on that roadway, none involved the tree hit by Lauren David.
An individual driver owes a duty to operate his vehicle in a prudent manner, which includes the duty to maintain control of it and to remain within his lane of travel. Williams v. City of Monroe, 27,065, 27,066 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/3/95), 658 So. 2d 820, writ denied, 95-1998 (La. 12/15/95), 664 So. 2d 451; Delphen v. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 94-1261 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/24/95), 657 So. 2d 328. To be the cause-in-fact of an injury, a defect must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. U.S.F. & G. v. Hi-Tower Concrete Pumping, 574 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 578 So.2d 136, 137 (La. 1991).
In Graves, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a finding of liability on the part of DOTD when a motorist was struck by a drunk driver who crossed the center line of the highway while going around a curve and being chased by the police. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 574. The plaintiff asserted that DOTD was liable due to the vegetation growing on the side of the curve, which blocked his view of the oncoming driver. The Court noted that the vegetation was not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, but that the cause of the accident was a drunk driver traveling at a high rate of speed. Graves, 703 So. 2d at 574.
In the instant case, the testimony that the jury could have reasonably believed was the following: (1) the testimony of Brady Olinde and Blaire Bass, upon cross-examination, that Brady Olinde and Lauren David were passing each other before this accident occurred; (2) the testimony of Brady Olinde and Blaire Bass, upon cross-examination, that both Brady Olinde and Lauren David were speeding; (3) the testimony of Brady Olinde and Trooper Cannon that there was no standing water on the roadway; and (4) the testimony of Mr. Berthelot that DOTD had received no complaints of standing water at location of the accident.
On the record before us, we are unable to say that the choice by the jury to believe that Lauren David was racing or was speeding was manifestly erroneous. See Detraz, 950 So. 2d at 561. Given the testimony in the record, the jury could have reasonably believed that nothing in the custody of DOTD was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. The jury could have reasonably believed that the accident was caused by the actions of Lauren David, either by her actions of racing the Olinde vehicle or of speeding. This belief is evident from the jury's filling out the verdict form stating that Lauren David was 100% at fault and DOTD was 0% at fault. Therefore, the jury was not manifestly erroneous in failing to find that DOTD had custody over anything that caused the accident. The plaintiffs' failure to prove the causal relationship between the injuries and the thing which caused the injuries is fatal to liability against DOTD. See Neteke, 747 So. 2d at 494. Therefore, this court need not address whether the plaintiffs carried their burden as to the remaining elements of DOTD's liability, such as whether the defective condition created an unreasonable risk of harm or whether DOTD had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and failed to take corrective measures within a reasonable time.
Assessment of Costs
DOTD filed its own appeal regarding the trial court's decision to tax it with all costs associated with the jury. DOTD claims that because it was found to have absolutely no liability, it could not be taxed with costs at all, even though DOTD requested the jury.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 gives the court discretion to assess costs but limits this discretion. The general rule is that the party cast in judgment should pay all costs of the trial. A trial judge can abuse his discretion under La. C.C.P. art. 1920 by assessing costs to defendants who have been found to be not negligent and who have not prolonged the trial. Gholar v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 366 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (La. App. 1 Cir 1978). While a trial court has wide discretion in assessing costs, in the absence of some equitable reason, costs should not be assessed against a wholly prevailing party. Emoakemeh v. Southern Univ., 94-1194 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/7/95), 654 So. 2d 474, 479. Jury costs cannot be assessed against a party not found liable on the sole ground that the party requested a jury trial. Mack v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 32, 35 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984), writ denied, 449 So. 2d 1346 (La. 1984); Gholar, 366 So. 2d at 1016 (La. App. 1 Cir 1978).
Plaintiffs rely on Bourg v. Cajun Cutters, Inc., 2014-0210 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/7/15), 174 So. 3d 56, 73-74, and aver that while the general rule is that the party cast in judgment should be assessed with court costs, the trial court may assess costs in any equitable manner and against any party in any proportion it deems equitable, even against the party prevailing on the merits.
We agree that the trial court has wide discretion in assessing costs and can assess costs against a party found to be free from fault. Louisiana Civil Code of Procedure Article 1920 provides, in pertinent part, that "the court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider equitable." In its reasons for assessing jury costs to DOTD, the trial court does mention the fact that DOTD requested the jury, but, contrary to DOTD's assertions, also mentions "equitable reasons." Specifically, the trial court actually says, "State did get a benefit by asking for the jury." The trial court notes that it also allocated other costs to the non-prevailing plaintiffs and then explains its reason for assessing the jury costs to DOTD. Thus, DOTD was not assessed costs solely because it requested a jury trial. The allocation was within the discretion of the trial court, which also assessed some costs to plaintiffs as well.
See Bourg, 174 So. 2d at 73-74 (the trial court allocated court costs disproportionate to the original allocation of fault by the jury, and the appellate court did not find the cost allocation to be so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion); Brown v. Mathew, 2013-1974 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/14), 2014 WL 7455038, at *13 (although defendant was found free from fault, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allocate defendant's expert witness fee to the plaintiff); Townes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 2009-2110 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/7/10), 41 So. 3d 520, 531 (although the plaintiff got a zero verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering each party to bear their own costs); Starr v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation and Development, 46,226 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/17/11), 70 So.3d 128, 144, writs denied, 2011-1835 (La. 10/21/11), 73 So. 3d 386, 387, 388 (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating 100% of costs to a defendant found only 24% at fault); Davis v. State, DOTD, 94-308 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So. 2d 552, 556, writ denied, 95-0034 (La. 1/27/95), 649 So. 2d 382 (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating 100% of costs to defendant 44% at fault). --------
The cases involving jury costs from this circuit state that jury costs cannot be assessed against a party not found liable on the sole ground that the party requested a jury trial. Mack, 447 So. 2d at 35; Gholar, 366 So. 2d at 1016. However, we have found in this case that DOTD was not assessed jury costs solely because it requested a jury trial. Furthermore, cases from other circuits conflict with this court's earlier pronouncement in Mack. See Roderfeld v. Willmoth, 473 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1985) (The party who requests a jury trial may be assessed the costs associated with the jury even if he prevails on the merits if that action serves the "best interests of justice." In fact, a prevailing party may be cast with all costs when the best interests of justice are served by that result.); Courtney v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 447 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1984) (Best interest of justice required prevailing defendant grocery store to pay all costs of jury trial in a suit brought by an indigent plaintiff, where grocery store requested jury trial); Deville v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 587 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1991) (The clerk may obtain the payment for jury costs from a defendant's bond even if the judgment exonerated the defendant and cast the plaintiff for costs, when the plaintiff sues in forma pauperis).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it assessed only the jury costs to DOTD and all remaining costs to the plaintiffs, as the trial court found such an assessment of costs to be equitable under the circumstances. See Bourg, 174 So. 3d at 73-74. Costs are defined as "costs of the clerk, sheriff, witness' fees, costs of taking depositions and copies of the acts used on the trial, and all other costs allowed by the court." La. R.S. 13:4533 (emphasis added). This court has previously interpreted La. R.S. 13:4533 to allow for the assessment of the expenses of jury meals as court costs, Meyers v. Basso, 381 So. 2d 843, 846 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ refused, 384 So. 2d 794 (La. 1980), and in Mack, this court further noted that if meals can be taxed as costs, then other relevant jury costs are also taxable as costs. Mack, 447 So. 2d at 35 n.l. See also La. C.C.P. art. 1734.1(D) ("The funds dispersed from the cash deposit for payment of jury costs shall be assessed as costs of court.") We affirm that portion of the judgment assessing DOTD with the jury costs.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment of March 25, 2015, in favor of defendant, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development, and against plaintiffs, Kip Bass and Melissa Bass, individually and on behalf of their minor child, Blaire Bass, is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally against plaintiffs, Kip Bass and Melissa Bass, individually and on behalf of their minor child, Blaire Bass, and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development in the amount of $6,293.75 (one-half of the total costs of $12,587.50).
AFFIRMED.