This burden must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990). "[E]xemptions are scrutinized in light of their impact upon a debtor's estate.
S.D. Ohio 2001) citing In re Hollar, 79 B.R. 294, 296 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr.N.D. Ohio. 1990); In re Ciotta, 222 B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1998).
, In re Patterson, 128 B.R. at 739-40 ["If we compare Section 522 with other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, it becomes evident that Congress did not intend for debtors to pay a portion of the attorney's fees out of their exempt property. . . .If the estate authorizes the employment of the attorney and the attorney recovers property for the estate, the attorney's fees should be paid out of the estate regardless of whether portions of the property recovered are exempt."]; In re Turner, 190 B.R. 836, 841 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996); In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) [refusing to surcharge the debtor's exemption with a proportionate share of the attorney's fees owed to special counsel]; 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 46.14 (2003). The entire recovery arising from a smaller cause of action could conceivably be protected by exemptions.
Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643-646 (1992); In re Moore, 175 B.R. 13, 15-16 (Bankr.S.D.Oh. 1994); In re Zimmer, 154 B.R. 705, 706-710 (Bankr. S.D. Oh. 1993). Upon the filing of a timely objection, debtors remain entitled to the presumption that their claims are prima facie valid, and it is incumbent upon the objecting parties to rebut this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Hollar, 79 B.R. 294, 296 (Bankr.S.D.Oh. 1987); In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr.N.D.Oh. 1990); In re Ciotta, 222 B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr.C.D.Ca. 1998). As noted by the Court in the case of In re Ciotta, ". . . A debtor is not required to make an affirmative showing that a claimed exemption is appropriate. . . . The debtor only needs to characterize, either expressly or impliedly, that the claimed exemption falls within an exempt category . . . ."
It is well established law that it is the objecting party's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Debtor is not entitled to the exemptions claimed. In re Miller, 188 B.R. 302, 307 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1995) (citing In re Ehnle, 124 B.R. 361 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1991); and In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1990)). Once the objecting party has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the Debtor to prove his entitlement to the exemptions.
Under normal circumstances, a trustee is prohibited from surcharging a debtor's exemptions with administrative expenses. See id.; Scott v. United States Trustee (In re Allen), 203 B.R. 925, 929-30 (W.D.Va. 1997); In re Turner, 190 B.R. 836, 841 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1996) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522 (k)); In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1990); In re Duby, 98 B.R. 126, 127 (Bankr.D.R.I. 1989). The right to exemptions is not absolute, however.
The Trustee bears the burden of proof on his objection to the Debtors' claimed exemptions by the preponderance of the evidence. In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1990) (citing Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(c)); see also Lester v. Storey (In re Storey), 141 B.R. 157, 161-62 (S.D.Ohio 1991). WHETHER THE DEBTOR IS ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPTION FOR TOOLS OF THE TRADE
The Trustee also bears the burden of proof on his objection to the Debtors' claimed exemptions by the preponderance of the evidence. In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 15 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1990) (citing Fed.R.Bankr.P. 4003(c)); see also Lester v. Storey (In re Lester), 141 B.R. 157 (S.D.Ohio 1991). WHETHER DANIEL'S POSTPETITION, PRECONVERSION CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
It should be indicated that at least two courts have concluded that they have no jurisdiction to conduct a valuation hearing absent an "expressed and valid purpose". In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13, 13 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Tx. 1990); In re Richardson, 97 B.R. 161 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 11 U.S.C. § 506 provides rather vague but nevertheless supportable argument for the position that the court should take a flexible approach to the valuation of collateral in bankruptcy matters.
It is well established law that it is the objecting party's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Debtor is not entitled to the exemption claimed. In re Ehnle, 124 B.R. 361 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1991); In re Barlock, 121 B.R. 13 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1990). Once the objecting party has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the Debtor to prove his entitlement to the exemption.