Involuntary mental health services, including the involuntary administration of psychotropic medications, involve a "`massive curtailment of liberty.'" In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482, 496, 702 N.E.2d 555, 561 (1998) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 63 L.Ed.2d 552, 564, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263 (1980)). Thus, the courts of this state have repeatedly recognized the importance of "the procedures enacted by our legislature to ensure that Illinois citizens are not subjected to such services improperly."
Generally, courts of review do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). Reviewing courts, however, recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine, such as the public interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, and an exception for cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we note that the issues raised are moot. Nevertheless, we will address the questions raised in the appeal because the issues are "`capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill.2d 247, 258 (1989). The first issue we address is whether the trial court's order must be reversed because respondent was denied the right to be represented by an attorney of her choice.
In this case, as in In re Barbara H., respondent "could be held involuntarily and forced to take psychotropic medication against [his] will only if a new set of petitions were filed and new hearings were conducted." In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1998). The parties agree on this point.
The issue has been considered by our court before. We addressed the requirements of section 3-807 of the Code in In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482 (1998). In that case, the State's sole expert had not conducted a psychiatric examination of the respondent.
In re Michelle J., 336 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1028, 785 N.E.2d 133, 135 (2003), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 209 Ill. 2d 428, 808 N.E.2d 987 (2004). In In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 702 N.E.2d 555 (1998), the supreme court held that because the expert had not personally examined the respondent in connection with that case and the respondent's situation at that time, the requirements of section 3-807 had not been satisfied. The supreme court likened the facts surrounding Barbara H. to the facts surrounding Sam in In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d at 435-36, 808 N.E.2d at 990-91.
Essentially, respondents claim that an examination of a respondent by an expert, as contemplated by section 3-807 of the Code, means a one-on-one interview with the respondent. Respondents cite to In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482 (1998), to support their claim. Section 3-807 states as follows:
The new petition — as well as all proceedings thereunder — must comply with all the statutory requirements applicable to an initial petition. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent continues to be subject to involuntary admission, it may enter an order that will be valid for 180 days. 405 ILCS 5/3-813(b) (West 2006). Receiving mental health services involuntarily involves a "`massive curtailment of liberty' " In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 496, 702 N.E.2d 555, 561 (1998), quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552, 564, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 (1980). Thus, courts have long recognized that mentally ill patients have a constitutional liberty interest in refusing treatment.
ANALYSIS At the outset, it must be noted that the trial court's order had a duration of 90 days and the hospital discharged Alaka seven days after her commitment. It would therefore appear that the instant appeal is moot. Nonetheless we will address the appeal on its merits pursuant to our supreme court's holding in In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559-60 (1998) ("To apply the mootness doctrine under these circumstances would mean that recipients of involuntary mental health services would be left without any legal recourse for challenging the circuit court's orders"). A. Compliance With Sections 3-807 and 2-107.1 of the Mental Health Code
As a general rule, courts of review in Illinois do not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1998). A moot question is one that existed but because of the happening of certain events has ceased to exist and no longer presents an actual controversy over the interest or rights of the party.