Opinion
No. 334674 No. 334684
04-25-2017
In re BAIN/QUINTANILLA, Minors. In re QUINTANILLA, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED Oakland Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2007-730785-NA Before: MURPHY, P.J., and MURRAY and M. J. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-mother, D. Bain, and respondent-father, J. Quintanilla, appeal as of right the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to the minor children, AB, CQ, and DQ. The court terminated respondents' parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(iii), (g), and (j). Because we conclude that there are no errors warranting relief in either appeal, we affirm.
Respondents first argue that the trial court erred when it found that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 83 (2003). This Court reviews the trial court's findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Respondents' parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(iii), (g), and (j), which permit termination of parental rights when the following conditions are satisfied:
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found that these statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence.
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(iii) A nonparent adult's act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or abuse by the nonparent adult in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home.
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
The evidence overwhelmingly established that respondents exposed their children to a very real risk of harm by living in the same home with a convicted pedophile. It is undisputed that respondent-mother's brother Dallas had sexually assaulted AT on two occasions and that he had exposed himself to two adolescent boys. A conviction related to this later event resulted in Dallas being placed on the Sex Offender Registry. Respondent-mother was clearly aware that Dallas was a convicted pedophile listed on the registry when she made the conscious decision that she and her children would reside in the same home as her brother. Respondent-father asserts that he was unaware of Dallas's criminal history. However, his own testimony belies this assertion. Respondent-father specifically testified that when Dallas was released in July 2015, he was concerned about Dallas moving back into the home because of his criminal history. Both respondents were clearly aware of the risk Dallas posed to their children.
Notwithstanding this significant risk of harm to the children, respondents did little to nothing to protect the children. Dallas frequently slept in the same area with the children, and he was consistently permitted to be around them unsupervised. The maternal great-aunt testified that when she came to the home, almost without exception, she found Dallas alone with the children while respondents were secluded in their bedroom with the door shut. On one occasion, when she arrived at the home, there were no other adults present at all. That Dallas spent a great deal of time with the children is further supported by the children's maternal grandfather, who testified that Dallas had established a friendship with the children and that they played games together. Despite respondents' assertions to the contrary, it is clear that respondents did nothing to protect the children, as Dallas was frequently left alone with the children, unsupervised.
Finally, there was clear and convincing evidence that the children would be harmed if returned to respondents' care. Their past conduct demonstrated that they consistently failed to appreciate potential risks of harm to the children. Further, respondents had been provided with a multitude of services during earlier child protective proceedings, yet they still permitted the children to live in the same home as a convicted pedophile. These actions clearly demonstrated that respondents had not benefited from the services offered. Further, respondents were not truly committed to benefiting from any services. Respondent-mother fled the state when she thought Child Protective Services would again be involved with her family. She has not committed to any sort of true counseling and, despite her protestations that she was no longer involved with respondent-father, they continued to "carpool" to court together. Respondent-father also was not in any therapy and believed that working out at a gym was an adequate and appropriate substitute for substance abuse treatment. The clinical psychologist who evaluated respondents concluded that there was no indication of significant psychopathology that would prevent them from appropriately caring for their children. He therefore concluded that they were capable of properly parenting, but simply chose not to make the effort. Considering the foregoing, it is readily apparent that the children would be at continued risk of harm if returned to respondents' care.
Because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that respondents placed their children in a situation where there was a substantial risk of harm to their well-being, that they did nothing to protect them from this risk, and that they would be incapable of protecting them in the future, the trial court did not clearly err when it terminated their parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(iii), (g) and (j).
Next, respondents challenge the trial court's finding that termination of their parental rights was in the children's best interests. We find no merit to this challenge. "If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5). Whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The court may consider several factors when deciding if termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, including "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). The court may also consider psychological evaluations, the child's age, continued involvement in domestic violence, and a parent's history. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's finding that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests. Id.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondents' parental rights was in the children's best interests. The evidence established that respondents placed their children in an environment that created a real risk of harm to them, that they were incapable of protecting the children, and that they were unwilling to put their children's needs ahead of their own. The evidence further revealed that the children had known nothing but instability and lack of permanence in their young lives. The filing of several petitions resulted in the children being removed from their home for extended periods on multiple occasions. Even when in respondents' care, they had no stability in their housing. It was clear that the lack of permanence and stability, combined with poor parenting, had taken their toll on the children, as evidenced by their behavioral issues. However, the children had shown real improvement after being placed in the secure and stable environment provided by the maternal great-aunt.
Respondents both argue that they are currently in a position to provide a stable home environment for their children. Each claims to have adequate employment and appropriate housing. However, the lower court was skeptical regarding respondent-mother's claim that she had an appropriate home for the children. When asked about her current living arrangement, respondent-mother denied having any knowledge that her roommate's brother, who frequently came to the home, was a convicted felon. In any event, we agree with the trial court's finding that it is unlikely that respondents, considering their history, will be able to maintain any stability. Respondents had participated in years of services, yet still failed to improve in any meaningful way.
At the time of the termination hearing, the children were placed in the home of the maternal great-aunt. Even though placement with a relative weighs against termination, and the fact that a child is living with relatives must be considered, a "trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child's best interests[.]" In re Olive/Metis, 297 Mich App at 43. Here, the court acknowledged that the children's relative placement weighted against termination of parental rights, but it nonetheless determined that it was in the children's best interests to terminate respondents' parental rights. We find no clear error in this determination. In light of all the instability in their lives, the children clearly required security and permanence. Their needs could only be satisfied if respondents' parental rights were terminated, which would then begin to pave the way toward adoption. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of respondents' parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Michael J. Kelly