¶ 55 On appeal in a juvenile proceeding, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's determination of abuse or neglect unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17, 367 Ill.Dec. 11, 981 N.E.2d 336 ; In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d 92, 102, 324 Ill.Dec. 530, 896 N.E.2d 316 (2008) ; In re J.C., 396 Ill.App.3d 1050, 1056, 336 Ill.Dec. 695, 920 N.E.2d 1285 (2009). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if it is clearly apparent from the record that the trial court should have reached the opposite conclusion.
Accordingly, the [F]ifth [A]mendment bars a juvenile court from compelling a parent to admit to a crime that could be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding by threatening the loss of parental rights. See In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d at 108, 324 Ill.Dec. 530, 896 N.E.2d 316; In re L.F., 306Ill.App.3d 748, 753, 239 Ill.Dec. 780, 714 N.E.2d 1077 (1999); see also Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250, 268, 647 A.2d 714, 724-25 (1994); In re M.C.P., 153 Vt. 275, 300, 571 A.2d 627, 641 (1989); In re Welfare of J.G.W., 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn.
In re P.M.C., 376 Ill. App. 3d 867 (2007). On November 26, 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order directing us to vacate our previous decision in this cause ( In re P.M.C., 376 Ill. App. 3d 867 (2007)) and to reconsider our judgment in light of its decision in In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92 (2008). In re P.M.C., 229 Ill. 2d 668 (2008).
Respondents also raise constitutional issues, which we review de novo. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 106 (2008). ¶ 147 The issue here is rather narrow.
¶ 112 Next, the State claims that, since defendant argued in a prior appeal that his initial postconviction petition was dismissed, collateral estoppel bars him from asserting a contrary argument on this appeal. "The doctrine of collateral estoppel 'bars relitigation of an issue already decided in a prior case.' " In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 99 (2008) (quoting People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002)). "There are three requirements for application of collateral estoppel: '(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.
¶ 112 Next, the State claims that, since defendant argued in a prior appeal that his initial postconviction petition was dismissed, collateral estoppel bars him from asserting a contrary argument on this appeal. "The doctrine of collateral estoppel 'bars relitigation of an issue already decided in a prior case.' " In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 99 (2008) (quoting People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002)). "There are three requirements for application of collateral estoppel: '(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.' "In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 99 (quoting Gumma v. White, 216 Ill. 2d 23, 38 (2005)). ¶ 113 On appeal of the dismissal of his fifth pro se postconviction petition, defendant argued, among other things, that his postconviction counsel had a per se conflict of interest in advancing defendant's fifth petition since defendant alleged that she provided unreasonable assistance of counsel.
Defendant further asserts that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case preclude the State from raising the probable cause issue in this court. "[C]ollateral estoppel `bars relitigation of an issue already decided in a prior case.'" In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 99 (2008), quoting People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002). The doctrine applies when a party participates in two separate and consecutive cases arising on different causes of action and some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated against that party in the former case by a court of competent jurisdiction.
¶ 34 When a parent appeals the trial court's findings that a parent is unfit and that terminating the parental rights is in the child's best interest, the appellate court must not retry the case but, instead, must review the trial court's findings to determine if the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Za. G., 2023 IL App (5th) 220793, ¶ 31 (citing In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d 92, 104 (2008)). The reviewing court
¶ 81 On appeal from a trial court's findings that a parent is unfit and that terminating the parental rights is in the child's best interest, the reviewing court must not retry the case but, instead, must review the trial court's findings to determine if the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d 92, 104 (2008). A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.
¶ 79 On appeal from a trial court's findings that a parent is unfit and that terminating the parental rights is in the child's best interest, the reviewing court must not retry the case but, instead, must review the trial court's findings to determine if the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.W., 231 Ill.2d 92, 104 (2008). A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to App (3d) 100545, ¶ 28 (citing In re Joseph M., 398 Ill.App.3d 1086, 1089 (2010)); In re S.R., 326 Ill.App.3d 356, 360-61 (2001).