Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J0600966
Pollak, J.
The minor’s parents appeal from an order denying father’s petition for modification of an earlier order terminating his reunification services and terminating the parental rights of both parents. Father, who had been absent from the minor’s life for two years, contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his petition for modification, and both parents contend that the sibling and parental relationship exceptions preclude termination of parental rights. We shall affirm.
Background
In May 2006, the then four-year-old minor was detained and a petition was filed by the Contra Costa County Department of Social Services (the department) alleging that he came within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). An amended petition was filed on July 20, 2006, alleging, among other things, that mother and father had substance abuse problems that impaired their ability to provide adequate care and supervision for the minor. On August 11, 2006, mother appeared at the jurisdictional hearing and admitted this allegation. Although father had appeared at a prior hearing in June, he failed to appear at the jurisdictional hearing. The court reserved ruling on the allegation with regard to father’s substance abuse until a later date.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
The minor was adjudged a dependent of the court and both parents were given reunification plans that required them to participate in a drug treatment program, demonstrate an ability to live free from drug dependency, provide a clean, safe drug/alcohol free home for the minor, and “maintain [a] relationship with [the minor] by following the conditions of the visitation plan.”
At the six-month review hearing, the social worker reported that the minor had been placed with his older sister in the home of their godmother. Father’s whereabouts were unknown and he had had no contact with the minor in the previous six months. Mother was visiting regularly with the minor but had not completed any other requirement of her case plan. The social worker opined that “[c]onsidering that the parents have not participated in drug testing, it is highly probable that they are still using substances.” Reunification services were continued for an additional six months.
In advance of the twelve-month review hearing, the department recommended that reunification services be terminated and a plan of long-term foster care be adopted for the minor. The social worker reported that father’s whereabouts were still unknown and an absent parent search had been initiated. Mother was not in compliance with her case plan and had not been maintaining contact with the department. The social worker opined that “the parents in this case have been unwilling and/or unable to partake in the services offered to them in order to address their issues and create a safe and stable home for their children. Although it is clear that [mother] loves her children, it is quite apparent that she is not ready to make the changes necessary to raise and care for them.” At the time of the report, the minor was still living with his godmother, but his sister had moved to Los Angeles to live with her aunt. The social worker explained that the minor’s placement was “unstable, as [the godmother] has never wanted to be a long-term caregiver for either child. She had agreed to help the family while the mother got back on her feet. It has been over a year now and [she] no longer wants to care for [the minor].” The court terminated reunification services, ordered supervised visitation and adopted a plan of long-term foster care.
At the next review hearing on January 9, 2008, the social worker reported that the minor had been moved to a licensed foster home. His sister was still residing at her aunt’s home in Los Angeles. Father’s location was still unknown. Mother had become homeless and intended to move to Georgia. She had not contacted the department in two months and was no longer visiting the minor.
The department was making efforts to find a suitable long-term home for the minor. The aunt caring for the minor’s sister had indicated some interest in caring for the minor, but was unsure whether she wanted to pursue a permanent plan of caring for the minor. Other relative placements, including the minor’s adult half-sister, also were being considered as long term placements for the minor.
An addendum report filed February 6, 2008, advised the court that the mother was in police custody following her arrest and that the minor’s current foster parent was being evaluated for a permanent placement.
The status review report prepared in advance of the June 2008 review hearing recommended setting a section 366.26 hearing. The minor’s foster parent had requested to adopt him and the social worker approved, noting that his “current placement offers him the structure and stability that he needs.” The social worker reported that mother had regular visitation with the minor while in custody, but had only visited him once since her release. She had been living in Richmond following her release but had refused to give the department her address. As of the date of the report, mother was living in Georgia. The social worker also reported that father had recently reappeared, claiming that he had completed all the requirements of his case plan and would like to reunify with the minor. Father initially made contact with the minor when he “appeared up at the foster family’s church and introduced himself to [the minor] and his foster mother. The foster mother expressed concern that [father] had showed up unannounced and he told [the minor] that he could not tell his mother that he saw him.” The foster mother advised father to speak with the social worker. When the father called the social worker, he was “upfront about his intentions to become active in [the minor’s] life again” and was “candid in reporting that [the minor] does not know who he is.” The court set a section 366.26 hearing for October 16, 2008.
On September 25, 2008, father filed a petition for modification under section 388 requesting that he be afforded six months reunification services. He reported that he had completed a residential treatment program; has a drug-free home; attends NA/AA meetings; has enrolled in a parenting class and is visiting with his son as often as the department will allow. He asserted that the modification would be in the minor’s best interests because he “can provide a safe, substance free, loving home for [the minor] now. After a transition period of increased visitation, [the minor] can leave foster care, live with his father, and be raised by a loving parent. Father and son have positive visits and [the minor] should have the right to be raised by a parent, now that his father is clean and sober.”
The department’s section 366.26 report recommends that the court terminate parental rights and find that adoption would be in the best interests of the child. The minor had then been living with his foster mother for over one year. His foster mother, who had previously adopted one dependent child, wanted to adopt him and was “committed to providing [the minor] with long term stability, care and love.” The social worker reported that while the minor does have a relationship with his mother and enjoys seeing her, the minor has not resided in her care for 26 months and her visitation has been irregular at best. The social worker also acknowledged a relationship between the minor and his sister. She did not believe, however, that the quality of either of these relationships outweighed the benefits of adoption. The social worked concluded that the minor had no relationship with his father. “They have had one formal visit and two brief encounters with each other in the past 28 months, possibly longer. [The minor] does not know who [father] is and clearly [father] has not provided a father-figure role for [the minor].”
Mother asserts for the first time on appeal that the social worker’s report did not “fully comport” with the requirements of an adoption assessment under section 361.5, subdivision (g)(1). Any objections to the sufficiency of the report, however, should have been made in the trial court. The failure to timely object waives the objection on appeal. (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411-412.)
At the combined hearing on father’s petition for modification and for the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, father testified that he was currently receiving disability payments and living with his fiancée. He claimed that he lost contact with the department at the beginning of the case because he was “really messed up.” Although he completed his drug treatment program in November 2007, he was not ready at that time to request visitation. He made contact with his son only recently after learning that he was in foster care. Prior to that time, he believed his son was being cared for by other family members. The court denied the petition, finding that while the father was in the process of changing his circumstances, he had not yet completed his case plan. The modification was not in the minor’s best interest because while father wished to develop a relationship with his son, no relationship currently existed.
At the permanency planning portion of the hearing, the social worker reiterated her opinion that the relationship between the minor and his parents and sister did not outweigh the benefits of adoption.
The sister testified that she did not want her brother to be adopted because she did not want him to forget his family. She explained that she was hurt when he forgot her name while she was living in Los Angeles.
The court terminated parental rights, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was likely to be adopted. Parents filed timely notices of appeal.
Discussion
1. Petition for Modification
Father contends that the court erred in denying his section 388 petition for modification requesting reunification services. “The juvenile court may modify an order if a parent shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, changed circumstance or new evidence and that modification would promote the child’s best interests. [Citations.] This is determined by the seriousness of the problem leading to the dependency and the reason for its continuation; the strength of the parent-child and child-caretaker bonds and the time the child has been in the system; and the nature of the change of circumstance, the ease by which it could be achieved, and the reason it did not occur sooner. [Citation.] After termination of services, the focus shifts from the parent’s custodial interest to the child’s need for permanency and stability. [Citation.] ‘Whether a previously made order should be modified rests within the dependency court’s discretion, and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.’ ” (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.)
Section 388 provides in relevant part: “(a) Any parent... may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court... for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.... [¶]... [¶] (d) If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order..., the court shall order that a hearing be held....”
Here, the court acknowledged father’s participation in drug treatment but concluded that it would not be in the minor’s best interests “to delay the selection of a permanent home to see if his parent... who [has] failed to reunify with him after this amount of time, would be able to come to some reunification in the future. It really does not promote stability for the child. And when you look at the current strength and nature of the relationship between the parent and the child, the testimony is that [father] wants to build a relationship with the child. And I think, even he agrees, that it would take some time to do that.” As the trial court observed, it is unfortunate that father waited until this late stage to participate in the proceedings. The trial court’s denial of the modification petition does not reflect an abuse of discretion. Father completed his drug treatment program in November 2007 and had been sober for 14 months before a chance encounter led him to make contact with his son. The trial court justifiably concluded that his extended failure to act should not deprive the minor of a stable, permanent home.
2. The Sibling Relationship Exception
Parents contend that the court should not have terminated parental rights because the termination will interfere with the minor’s relationship with his older sister. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v) provides that parental rights may not be terminated if the court finds that termination would be detrimental to the child because “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” In In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61, the court explained that “[T]he ‘sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a “compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be “detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’ ”
The siblings had been living apart for 19 months. The sister chose to leave her placement with the minor and move to Los Angeles. While they had regular contact by telephone, the minor had forgotten her name in her absence. The social worker testified that at the sibling visit she supervised following the sister’s return from Los Angeles, there was no interaction between the siblings. Instead, the older sister spent the time on her cell phone. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the minor’s relationship with his sister was not sufficiently strong to warrant interfering with his chance for a stable, permanent home.
3. The Parental Relationship Exception
Mother contends that the beneficial parental relationship exception precludes termination of her parental rights. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides that parental rights may not be terminated if the court finds that termination would be detrimental to the child because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” The exception requires proof of “a parental relationship,” not merely a relationship that is “beneficial to some degree but does not meet the child’s need for a parent.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) “To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent’s rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed.” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)
Mother’s visitation throughout the proceedings has been sporadic at best and has not progressed past supervised visitation. Although there is some relationship between mother and the minor, the minor had not resided with his mother in over two years and mother had failed to progress in her case plan. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that any benefit to the minor in maintaining that relationship did not outweigh the benefits of adoption.
Disposition
The order denying father’s section 388 petition and terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Jenkins, J.