in which we held that the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a parent's petition to terminate the parental rights and responsibilities of the other parent under Title 22, subchapter IV based on the best interest factors in Title 19-A, even though no child protection petition had been filed. See 2006 ME 28, ¶¶ 10, 12, 898 A.2d 946; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(b) (2024) (providing that a court may order termination of a parent's parental rights if "[c]ustody has been removed from the parent under . . . Title 19-A, section 1502 or 1653"). Because this was widely viewed as "an aspect of family law . . . needing substantial statutory clarity," the Commission proposed, and the 2021 amendment subsequently enacted, see P.L. 2021, c. 340, § 2 (effective Oct. 18, 2021), a new statutory basis in section 1658(2)(C) for petitions for termination of parental rights and responsibilities filed by another parent of the child-again, "outside of the adoption context."
The power of the District Court to adjudicate a child protection matter is indisputable. See 22 M.R.S. § 4031(1)(A) (2018) ("The District Court has jurisdiction over child protection proceedings . . . ."); In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, ¶ 7, 898 A.2d 946; see also Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶¶ 6-7, 930 A.2d 1088 (concluding that the Probate Court's subject matter jurisdiction was not affected by the asserted procedural issues). [¶12] Instead, what the father actually argues—although it is not entirely clear—is that the court lacked authority, as a matter of law, to consider jeopardy as to him in the absence of a prior parentage adjudication; or that the court's finding in the jeopardy order itself that he is the child's parent is not supported, as a matter of fact, by sufficient record evidence; or both.
The power of the District Court to adjudicate a child protection matter is indisputable. See 22 M.R.S. § 4031(1)(A) (2018) ("The District Court has jurisdiction over child protection proceedings ...."); In re Austin T. , 2006 ME 28, ¶ 7, 898 A.2d 946 ; see alsoAdoption of M.A. , 2007 ME 123, ¶¶ 6-7, 930 A.2d 1088 (concluding that the Probate Court's subject matter jurisdiction was not affected by the asserted procedural issues).[¶12] Instead, what the father actually argues—although it is not entirely clear—is that the court lacked authority, as a matter of law , to consider jeopardy as to him in the absence of a prior parentage adjudication; or that the court's finding in the jeopardy order itself that he is the child's parent is not supported, as a matter of fact , by sufficient record evidence; or both.
Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710 (quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we view the complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory,” id. (quotation marks omitted), and “we take the material allegations of [the] complaint as though they were admitted.”In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, ¶ 6, 898 A.2d 946. As part of her opposition to HSWA's motion to dismiss, Turcotte filed a number of extrinsic documents, which we consider here.