In re Austin T

4 Citing cases

  1. In re Joseph R.

    2024 Me. 47 (Me. 2024)

    in which we held that the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a parent's petition to terminate the parental rights and responsibilities of the other parent under Title 22, subchapter IV based on the best interest factors in Title 19-A, even though no child protection petition had been filed. See 2006 ME 28, ¶¶ 10, 12, 898 A.2d 946; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(b) (2024) (providing that a court may order termination of a parent's parental rights if "[c]ustody has been removed from the parent under . . . Title 19-A, section 1502 or 1653"). Because this was widely viewed as "an aspect of family law . . . needing substantial statutory clarity," the Commission proposed, and the 2021 amendment subsequently enacted, see P.L. 2021, c. 340, § 2 (effective Oct. 18, 2021), a new statutory basis in section 1658(2)(C) for petitions for termination of parental rights and responsibilities filed by another parent of the child-again, "outside of the adoption context."

  2. In re Nicholas P.

    2019 Me. 152 (Me. 2019)   Cited 13 times

    The power of the District Court to adjudicate a child protection matter is indisputable. See 22 M.R.S. § 4031(1)(A) (2018) ("The District Court has jurisdiction over child protection proceedings . . . ."); In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, ¶ 7, 898 A.2d 946; see also Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶¶ 6-7, 930 A.2d 1088 (concluding that the Probate Court's subject matter jurisdiction was not affected by the asserted procedural issues). [¶12] Instead, what the father actually argues—although it is not entirely clear—is that the court lacked authority, as a matter of law, to consider jeopardy as to him in the absence of a prior parentage adjudication; or that the court's finding in the jeopardy order itself that he is the child's parent is not supported, as a matter of fact, by sufficient record evidence; or both.

  3. In re Child Nicholas P.

    218 A.3d 247 (Me. 2019)   Cited 13 times
    Stating that we consider legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent when the statutory language is ambiguous

    The power of the District Court to adjudicate a child protection matter is indisputable. See 22 M.R.S. § 4031(1)(A) (2018) ("The District Court has jurisdiction over child protection proceedings ...."); In re Austin T. , 2006 ME 28, ¶ 7, 898 A.2d 946 ; see alsoAdoption of M.A. , 2007 ME 123, ¶¶ 6-7, 930 A.2d 1088 (concluding that the Probate Court's subject matter jurisdiction was not affected by the asserted procedural issues).[¶12] Instead, what the father actually argues—although it is not entirely clear—is that the court lacked authority, as a matter of law , to consider jeopardy as to him in the absence of a prior parentage adjudication; or that the court's finding in the jeopardy order itself that he is the child's parent is not supported, as a matter of fact , by sufficient record evidence; or both.

  4. Turcotte v. Humane Soc'y Waterville Area

    103 A.3d 1023 (Me. 2014)

    Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710 (quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we view the complaint “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory,” id. (quotation marks omitted), and “we take the material allegations of [the] complaint as though they were admitted.”In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, ¶ 6, 898 A.2d 946. As part of her opposition to HSWA's motion to dismiss, Turcotte filed a number of extrinsic documents, which we consider here.