But it is the use to which the property is dedicated and devoted which constitutes the test as to whether it is exempt.'" [citing Beta Theta Pi Corp. v. Bd. of Com'rs, 1925 OK 176, 234 P. 354, 356] Id. at 978. County asserts that when deciding Cox the Court focused on use alone without giving adequate consideration to the exclusivity of use required under the applicable constitutional provisions.

However, at page 306 it is said that it has been suggested that the rule of strict construction should not be applied to exemptions of religious, charitable and educational institutions on the theory that they relieve the government of burdens which it would otherwise have to bear (citing cases from five jurisdictions). In several of our former decisions we have announced the correct rule in the syllabus to the effect that it is the use of the property itself which is the test to be applied in determining taxable status or exemption, to wit, Tulsa County v. Sisters of Sorrowful Mother, 141 Okla. 32, 283 P. 984; Beta Theta Pi v. Board of Com'rs, 108 Okla. 78, 234 P. 354; Phi Kappa Psi v. State, 175 Okla. 605, 53 P.2d 1130, and Southwestern Osteopathic Sanitarium v. Davis, 115 Okla. 296, 242 P. 1033. We are now convinced that we were in serious error when we departed from that rule or enlarged upon it to the extent of holding that the mere use of income from property could alone be applied as the test of the use of the property itself in determining tax exemption under the constitutional provision here considered.

See, also, Board of Commissioners of Tulsa County v. Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother. 141 Okla. 32. 283 P. 984: Beta Theta Pi Corporation v. Board of County Commissioners of Cleveland County, 108 Okla. 78. 234 P. 354; Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578. The evidence offered by defendant, that all of the proceeds of the business in question are used exclusively for the use, maintenance, and upkeep of the Home, is not disputed, and the conclusion of the trial court that the Home is not a charitable institution on account of a large per capita cost of operation is contrary to the undisputed facts.

Richardson v. Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention, 176 Ga. 705 ( 169 S.E. 18); Tharpe v. Central Georgia Council, 185 Ga. 810 ( 196 S.E. 762). It is the use to which the property is put, rather than the declaration of purpose found in its owner's charter, that determines the question of exemption from taxation. Theta Xi Building Asso. v. Board of Review, 217 Iowa, 1181 ( 251 N.W. 76); Beta Theta Pi Corporation v. Board of Commissioners, 108 Okla. 78 ( 234 P. 354). We are therefore to consider the entire evidence on that subject, in order to ascertain whether the claim of exemption is well founded.

Plaintiff has presented three cases wherein the property owned and occupied by Greek letter societies of institutions of learning have been held exempt. These cases are State v. Allen, 189 Ind. 369 ( 127 N.E. 145); Kappa Kappa Gamma House Assn. v. Pearcy, 92 Kan. 1070 ( 142 P. 294, 295, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 995); Beta Theta Pi v. Board of Commrs., 108 Okla. 78 ( 234 P. 354). An examination of all of these cases clearly discloses that they are construing a law expressly exempting Greek letter societies of the same kind as plaintiff.

Cnty. Assessor, Okla. Cnty. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 329, 1949 OK 240, ¶ 17, 202 Okla. 162, 211 P.2d 790, 794 (citing Beta Theta Pi Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Cleveland Cnty., 1925 OK 176, 108 Okla. 78, 234 P. 354 ). ¶ 24 Given all this, it is impossible to conceive that the people—the same people who placed in the Constitution these strong limitations on exemptions and gave the Legislature the power "to qualify, curtail or annul any exemption from taxation"—intended that measures revoking special exemptions would be subject to the strict requirements of Article V, Section 33—requirements whose sole purpose is to hamstring the Legislature's ability to act.

In a few cases, courts have granted these exemptions, reasoning that fraternities serve the general charitable purposes typically recited in their charters. See Beta Theta Pi Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 234 P. 354, 356 (Okla. 1925) (reasoning that fraternity served charitable purpose in part by "promot[ing] the educational, moral and social culture and benevolent welfare of [its] members");. State ex rel. Baggy v. Allen, 127 N.E. 145, 146 (Ind. 1920) ("[T]he allegations of the [fraternity's] pleading clearly show that the dominant purposes for which [its] building [was] used [were] literary and educational.").

We are convinced that the proper interpretation of the words "used exclusively" in our constitutional provision is the use to which the property is dedicated and devoted. In the second paragraph of the Syllabus in the case of Beta Theta Pi Corporation v. Board of Comr's of Cleveland County, 108 Okla. 78, 234 P. 354, we held: "Under section 6, art. 10, of the Constitution, the `use' to which property is in fact dedicated is the test as to whether such property is exempt from taxation and such `use' is a question of fact, to be determined from the evidence."

Section 6, art. 10, of the Constitution provides that all property used exclusively for, charitable purposes, and other certain designated purposes, shall be exempt from taxation. It is well settled that the test as to whether certain properties come within an exempt class is the use to which said properties are put. Beta Theta Pi Corporation v. Board of Com'rs of Cleveland County, 108 Okla. 78, 234 P. 354; Southwestern Osteopathic Sanitarium v. Davis, Co. Treas., 115 Okla. 296, 242 P. 1033; In re Parks College, 170 Okla. 132, 39 P.2d 105; Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 340. In Southwestern Osteopathic Sanitarium v. Davis, supra, said the court:

Except to the extent the constitutional provision granting exemptions is self-executing (Cox v. Dillingham, Co. Treas., 199 Okla. 161, 184 P.2d 976), the Legislature is vested with power (sec. 6, art. 10, Const.) to qualify, curtail or annul any exemption from taxation, but it is without power to grant exemptions other than those recognized by the Constitution or to enlarge the exemptions so recognized. Beta Theta Pi Corporation v. Board of Com'rs of Cleveland County, 108 Okla. 78, 234 P. 354. There is nothing in the 1941 law that alters the conditions previously required of either charitable or educational institutions to entitle them to exemption and it follows that the test in each instance is whether the property in question is used exclusively for the declared purpose of the institution.