Opinion
B162361.
10-7-2003
In re ASHLEY C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ASHLEY C., Defendant and Appellant.
Bruce G. Finebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Lance E. Winters, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Ashley C. appeals from an order of wardship after a finding she loitered with the intent to commit prostitution. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602; Pen. Code, § 653.22, subd. (a).) At disposition, the juvenile court ordered her into suitable placement and calculated the maximum theoretical period of confinement as six months. On appeal, Ashley C. requests this court review the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing to ascertain whether the juvenile court provided her with all discovery under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Adjudication Hearing
Prosecution Evidence
The evidence adduced at the adjudication hearing was that around midnight on July 26, 2002, Los Angeles Police Officers Collins and Vergara were in an unmarked police car in Hollywood. They were on prostitution enforcement detail. Officer Collins had conducted over 100 detentions and arrests for prostitution.
The officer observed 13-year-old Ashley C. (appellant) and her sister walking in the area. Appellant walked around slowly, paying close attention to passing cars. Businesses were closed at that time of night. Appellant appeared to be walking in a circle from one street corner to another. At one point, she approached a red Honda parked in a nearby gas station, briefly spoke with two men in the car, and then walked away. The car departed. Fifteen minutes later, appellant and her sister approached a Mercedes Benz at a nearby corner. They had a conversation with the male driver and then walked away. After five minutes, the same sequence of events occurred, this time with a man driving a black Honda.
Officer Collins formed the opinion that appellant was loitering for the purpose of committing prostitution and detained her. In a statement made to the officer after appellant had been arrested and questioned about her ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct (In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855) she said she knew it was wrong to loiter in the area for purposes of committing prostitution. Appellant was advised of and declined to waive her constitutional rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436).
Officer Collins was the subject of an internal affairs investigation.
Appellants mother testified that her daughter was a chronic runaway and admitted having been involved in prostitution and in fear of a pimp some six months earlier.
Defense Evidence
Appellant did not testify.
Officer Vergara testified that she believed the license plate numbers she recorded from 60 feet away were accurate. Two of the car owners with license plates matching the recorded numbers testified. One man testified he was out of town on July 26, 2002, had left his car at his home and no one else had access to it. Another owner testified he was in the area using a pay telephone. He denied ever seeing appellant before or being solicited by her for prostitution.
Andre Lee Bennett testified that on August 9, 2002, Officer Collins and her partner stopped his car and asked him for identification. He was released but the same officers pulled him over again about two blocks later and arrested him for auto tampering. Bennett denied the charge and subsequently filed a complaint against Officer Collins and identified her in court. He admitted that he was currently serving jail time for possession of drug paraphernalia and had a history of felony convictions.
2. The Pitchess Motion
Before trial, appellant moved for discover of information in the personnel and administrative files of five officers pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and Pitchess. During the hearing on the motion, appellant agreed to limit her request to Officers Collins and Vergara. In support of the motion, appellant asserted that the officers alleged false statements, observations and conduct by appellant in the arrest report concerning the three cars appellant supposedly contacted. Appellant insisted these vehicles were never in the area when she was arrested. The juvenile court granted the motion as to Officers Collins and Vergara to the extent it sought any citizen complaint relating to falsifying or fabricating of reports or evidence. After subsequently conducting an in camera review of potentially responsive documents, the court ordered disclosure to the defense of one item.
DISCUSSION
Appellant requests that we review the in camera proceedings of her Pitchess motion to determine whether the juvenile court properly ruled on the discoverability of information contained in personnel and administrative files of Officers Collins and Vergara. "For approximately a quarter-century our trial courts have entertained what have become known as Pitchess motions, screening law enforcement personnel files in camera for evidence that may be relevant to a criminal defendants defense." (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1225 (Mooc).) In order to balance the defendants right to discovery of records pertinent to his defense with the peace officers reasonable expectation that his personnel records will remain confidential, the Legislature has adopted a statutory scheme requiring a defendant to meet certain prerequisites before his request may be considered. (See Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1047 [statutory scheme governing Pitchess motions].) Specifically, a defendant seeking discovery of a peace officers confidential personnel record must file a written motion describing the type of records or information sought (Evid. Code, § 1043) and include with the motion an affidavit demonstrating "good cause" for the discovery and the materiality of such evidence relative to the defense. (Mooc, at p. 1226.) The information must be requested with "sufficient specificity to preclude the possibility of a defendants simply casting about for any helpful information." (Ibid.)
Once the trial court concludes the defendant has satisfied these prerequisites and made a showing of good cause, the custodian of records is obligated to bring to court all documents "potentially relevant" to the defendants motion. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) The trial court must then examine the information in chambers, outside the presence of any person except the proper custodian "`and such other persons [the custodian of records] is willing to have present." (Evid. Code, §§ 915, subd. (b), 1045, subd. (b).) Subject to certain statutory exceptions and limitations the trial court must then disclose to the defendant "`such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. [Citation.]" (Mooc, at p. 1226.)
Here, upon finding appellant had demonstrated good cause to discover information in the officers personnel and administrative records pertaining "to falsifying or fabricating of report[s] or evidence," the juvenile court granted appellants motion and reviewed the potentially responsive documents in an in camera proceeding outside the presence of all persons except the custodian and his counsel. The juvenile court made the appropriate inquiries concerning whether the custodian had produced all potentially responsive documents and described thoroughly in the sealed transcript of the hearing the documents produced. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) We have reviewed the sealed record of the in camera proceeding and conclude the juvenile court appropriately exercised its discretion in ruling on the material to be disclosed. (See ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order under review is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J. and MUÑOZ (AURELIO), J. --------------- Notes: Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.